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ABSTRACT  
This thesis advances an interpretivist perspective on the theory of tacit knowing and its 
role in organizational routines. Rather than merely acknowledging that tacit knowledge 
plays an important role in the context of capabilities and organizational routines, it is 
argued how it can be understood as emerging from human agency within the context of 
its use. Revisiting Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowing, a theorization of this context is 
proposed in which the silent integrations of subsidiary particulars give shape and meaning 
to focal targets in the process of knowing in practice. These integrations remain tacit for 
the most part of human engagement in organizational routines. However, on occasions, 
they breakdown when routines do not produce the intended outcomes or when 
unanticipated events call for a change in the ways that actions are performed. It is in these 
moments that routine participants step back from their activities and reflect, discuss, and 
reassess their actions and thus may perform the same action in a different way or perform 
different actions. Therefore, any breakdown in the structure of tacit knowing, whether 
major or minor, will inevitably affect the routine actions that organizational participants 
engage in their daily activities. 
Following this theoretical exploration, a methodological approach is described for 
researching tacit knowing in the context of organizational routines. Building on the 
premises of ethnographic research and embracing the view that routines are practices 
enacted by multiple individuals and manifested in sayings and doings of routine 
participants, the approach adopted in this thesis utilizes formal (and informal) interviews 
based on the Critical Incident Technique and company documentation with participants 
in two large public-owned organizations based in the UAE. Drawing on a dialogical theory 
of knowledge creation it is found that due to breakdowns routine participants fail to 
integrate their actions and understandings in three areas related to their (a) identities, 
roles, and responsibilities, (b) relations with other people, and (c) the use of artifacts 
(objects or tools). In attempting to restore sense of these failed integrations, routine 
participants provide evidence not only on how routines change (or not) but also on why 
they do. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH 
When I embarked on my studies in the UK, I came across many different modules, topics, 
and themes some of which I liked more than others. It was in my final Under-Graduate 
year that a lecture in the module of ‘Corporate and Global Strategy’ on Knowledge and 
the Knowledge-based View of the Firm would, eventually, change the course of my 
studies. In that particular lecture, the lecturer pointed out that in order understand why 
some firms outperform competitors in their respective industries, understanding 
resources and capabilities may not be sufficient as in both of these perspectives a key 
‘resource’ for the firm is its ability or capability ‘to know’. It was suggested then that it is 
not so much what companies know, but, more importantly, how they know what they know 
that distinguishes a good company to an excellent one. But perhaps more importantly, in 
that lecture, and later in the seminar that followed on from the lecture, there were some 
references to the continental philosopher Michael Polanyi and his apparent distinction 
between two forms of knowledge: explicit and tacit.  
Explicit knowledge, was argued, is a form of codified, visible and articulated mode of 
understanding which is manifest in graphs, charts, notes, words, letters, Information 
Systems, discussion forums, and so on. It is the form of knowledge which demonstrates 
what the organization knows as it appears in front of us in an explicit manner. Tacit 
knowledge, on the other hand, is a more ‘mystical’ form of understanding; one that cannot 
be codified, remains hidden and inaccessible to others and is responsible, by and large, 
for how we know or, indeed, how organizations come to know. Such an insight had a 
profound impact on my understanding of why some organizations are particularly better 
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than others in gaining and sustaining competitive advantage in any given market. Such 
an insight, also, had a profound impact on my general understanding of knowledge and 
made me wonder – many times since then – how do I (whether I see myself as a 
researcher, colleague, professional, or human being) know what I know and how this 
process shapes the way I conduct myself in my everyday dealing with the world. 
This critical experience, thus, was a turning point in my studies as I became increasingly 
interested in wanting to gain a deeper understanding about knowledge and particularly 
its tacit dimension. After successfully completing my MBA I wanted to pursue further my 
exploration into tacit knowledge in organizations and registered for a Ph.D. My supervisor 
was/is that lecturer who made me think more deeply about knowledge and its tacit 
dimension and, hence, slowly but steadily, begun to delve into the concept. I now have 
come to understand that many scholars and practitioners have paid considerable 
attention to the concept of knowledge and its possible distinctions between its so-called 
different types. Important writers in the area of knowledge such as Gilbert Ryle (1949) 
and Michael Polanyi (1962; 1966) have made the aforementioned crucial distinctions 
between knowledge that can be effectively represented using symbolic forms of 
representation, usually referring to such knowledge as explicit or codified and, other, more 
‘mystical’ forms that defy such representation, verbalization or capture, namely, tacit 
aspects of knowledge. In organization and management studies field in particular, these 
distinctions have been manifested more famously in one study, that of Nonaka and 
Takeuchi’s (1995) book The Knowledge-Creating Company. Also, in the area of 
Evolutionary Economics, the classic work of Nelson and Winter (1982), An Evolutionary 
Theory of Economic Change, has made extensive use of the concept of tacit knowledge 
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and its relation to organizational routines. These authors were responsible for reviving the 
interest in the earlier works (particularly) of Michael Polanyi to the point that tacit 
knowledge has come to be recognized as a central component of the learning 
organization (Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2003; Senge, 1990) and value creation (Felin 
and Hesterly, 2007; Kogut and Zander 1992). 
From reading these publications and with the direction and guidance of the supervisory 
team, I was gradually led to inquire too into the connection between tacit knowledge and 
organizational routines. While the literature on organizational routines acknowledges that 
tacit knowing constitutes its foundational premise (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 
2011; Pentland, et al 2012), there has been limited research on the actual role of tacit 
knowing and its impact on organizational routines. The work of Nelson and Winter (1982) 
has been instrumental in making an explicit connection between routines and the tacit. 
For them, routines are repositories of tacit knowledge which is preserved within the firm 
by the everyday practicing of these routines. Early literature viewed routines as stable 
entities that are stored in an organization’s repertoire as ‘black boxes’ with change being 
a matter of recombining and selecting them (Nelson and Winter 1982). However, more 
recent work took account of the concrete actions as a central component of routines and 
attempted to explain how routines are responsible for both stability and change in 
organizational settings (Feldman and Pentland 2003; Howard-Grenville 2005). This 
recent take on routines emphasizes a recursive pattern between what routine participants 
actually do when enacting routines (performative aspect) and the rules, concepts, and 
principles that guide them in doing so (ostensive aspect). These accounts provide us with 
a rich view of how routines evolve continuously as organizational participants adapt and 
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adjust their performances to ongoing circumstances while maintaining selected 
adaptations within the overall structure/concept of the routine (i.e. its ostensive aspect). 
What they do not provide us with, however, is an explanation of the actual role of tacit 
knowing in the process of changing or adapting routines to ongoing circumstances. 
The concept of ‘tacit knowledge’ has played a particularly significant role in many areas 
of academic inquiry. Since Michael Polanyi published his two influential books,  Personal 
Knowledge (1962) and The Tacit Dimension (1966), academic inquiry considered the 
concept in many different areas that include music creativity (Bowman, 1982), academic 
writing (Boice 1995, Gerholm, 1990), professional education (Eraut, 2000; Stenberg and 
Horvath, 1999), accounting (Tan and Libby, 1997), nursing (Meerabeau, 2006), and 
economic geography (Amin, 1998; Gertler, 2003). The concept of tacit knowledge has 
also witnessed a substantial upsurge in organization and management studies literatures, 
particularly in the mid-1990’s, with academic inquiry investigating its links with 
organizational performance (Harlow, 2008; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Pathirage et al, 
2007), competitive advantage (Berman et al, 2002; Boisot, 1998; Spender, 1996b), 
innovation (Leonard and Sensiper, 1998; Von Krogh et al, 2000), decision making 
(Brochmann and Anthony, 2002; Forbes and Milliken, 1999) and learning in organizations 
(Argyris and Schon, 1978; Lam, 2000; Nicolini et al, 2003). 
However, a number of authors [e.g. Gourlay (2006a; b), Tsoukas (2003; 2011), Oguz and 
Sengun (2011)] have suggested that the concept of tacit knowledge is largely under-
specified and carries a myriad of meanings. It has been pointed out that we still do not 
understand tacit knowledge adequately, that it resists operationalization, and that much 
of the discussion around it leads towards mystification (Spender, 1996a; Leonard and 
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Sensiper, 1998; Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001; Oguz and Sengun, 2011). These 
problems reveal several antinomies in relation to the concept. First, a number of authors 
regard tacit knowledge as personal or private endeavor which should be treated only at 
an individual level (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001; Boiral, 2002). Other authors treat it at 
a collective or organizational level by linking it to resources and capabilities (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Spender, 1996a; Leonard and Sensiper, 1998). Others yet, claim that tacit 
knowledge is manifested in the forms of life of a group, at a collective level (Collins 2001a, 
b; 2010; Ribeiro and Collins, 2007, Hecker, 2012). Nevertheless, there is an agreement 
that tacit knowledge is acquired through an individual’s direct experience and 
engagement in everyday activities and tasks (see for instance Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka 
and Takeuchi, 1995, amongst others). 
Since the work of Nelson and Winter (1982), a number of authors have argued that 
socially complex tacit knowledge that is diffused in organizational settings can constitute 
a valuable intangible resource which, if it is appropriately managed, can be a source of 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Kogut and Zander 1992; Teece et al 1997). The 
concept of routines – and its core aspect, tacit knowledge – have given credence to 
theories of capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Helfat et al 2007) and the distinction 
made between operational and dynamic capabilities (Helfat et al 2007). The former is 
characterized by processes in steady state whereas the latter is found in processes which 
can contribute to change in organizational settings. More recently, nevertheless, authors 
have started engaging more closely with the concept of organizational routines which is 
viewed as comprising of patterns of interdependent activities performed by multiple actors 
by building on their tacit knowing (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville 2011). 
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Routines have been equated to habits and habits, by definition, connote stability and 
automatic action (Turner and Cacciatori, 2016). Building on this conception, early 
scholarship viewed routines as thing-like, self-contained, and stable entities that are 
responsible for stability in organizational contexts. More recently, however, routines are 
seen as dynamic processes (Feldman, et al 2016) or practices (Feldman and Orlikowski, 
2011) which necessarily embody action in an attempt to accomplish particular tasks, thus 
providing the foundation for change to take place. This paradox between stability and 
change in organizational routines is what Cohen (2007: 781) referred to as the ‘paradox 
of the (n)ever changing word’: although each routine performance is different, by virtue of 
being a routine, it is, at the same time, the ‘same’.  This has led many scholars (Dittrich, 
et al 2016; Feldman, 2000; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Feldman, et al 2016) to ask a 
simple question: How do routines change (or fail to do so) in organizational contexts? 
The answer to this question may lie in the way that tacit knowing is theorized and 
researched in organizational contexts. How an individual knows and how this knowledge 
is exhibited in the actions the individual engages in organizations is the key process of 
learning. A common theme in the literature on tacit knowledge in organizations is the 
contribution of people (staff) in the creation, development and potential transfer of such 
knowledge. Venkitachalam and Busch (2012), for example, argue that the connectivity of 
organizational members to other staff constitute a considerable component of 
organizational know-how as individuals should not be seen as silos of knowledge. Each 
individual in an organization is connected to other individuals and together they perform 
a number of routines which keep the organization going. However, routine action in 
organizations is not always possible. There are moments that routines breakdown 
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because existing routines do not produce the intended outcomes or, as a result of existing 
routines, new problems occur that need to be solved in order for activity to move forward.  
Moreover, routine outcomes can produce new organizational resources that offer new 
opportunities for the performing actors (Feldman 2000, 2003). 
Therefore, in this thesis I want to explore more closely the role of tacit knowing in the 
context of organizational routines. If tacit knowing is at the heart of routine action, and if 
routines are characterized by both stability and change, how and why routines change? 
What is the process (or mechanism) that enables routines to change and, at the same 
time, maintain their stability? 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 WHY STUDYING TACIT KNOWLEDGE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINES?  
In this thesis I want to explore more deeply the connection between tacit knowing and 
organizational routines and the impact the former has on the latter (or vice versa). In this 
section, therefore, I sketch out in more detail why studying and understanding tacit 
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knowing is of particular significance if we are to get closer in understanding the oscillation 
between stability and change in organizational routines. 
As the concept of tacit knowing was introduced in Polanyi’s (1962; 1966) seminal 
publications, it is important to briefly describe what constitutes ‘tacit’ in his writings. 
Polanyi’s ‘knowing’ (rather than knowledge) consists of three complementary but mutually 
exclusive forms of comprehension: subsidiary particulars, a focal target, and a person (a 
subject) who links the two together. For Polanyi, our personal knowledge depends on the 
skill of integrating subsidiary particulars into a ‘whole’ to crate meaning. Knowledge is a 
personal endeavor; a continuous process of integrating subsidiary particulars into a 
whole. This ‘whole’ is what Polanyi refers to as ‘meaning’. In other words, to make sense 
of our experiences we necessarily rely on some parts of it subsidiarily in order to attend 
to our main objective focally. We comprehend something as a ‘whole’ (focally) by tacitly 
integrating certain particulars, which are known to the individual in a subsidiary sense. 
Polanyi used several examples (reading a map, riding a bicycle, doing scientific work) to 
underline the personal character of all knowledge. He insisted that the act of knowing 
depends, fundamentally, on personal participation (action) in its generation: the individual 
acts to integrate the subsidiary particulars so to know something focally. 
In organization and management studies literature, the concept of knowledge was more 
systematically addressed in a special issue of the Strategic Management Journal – the 
first of its kind – on knowledge. Spender and Grant (1996) suggested in that issue that 
interest in knowledge stems from the important works in the field by Penrose (1959), 
Heyek (1946), Nelson and Winter (1982) and Polanyi (1962; 1966). Theory of knowledge 
in organizations has given rise, as Chiva and Alegre (2005) suggest, to a number of 
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conceptual frameworks/models including, inter alia, the knowledge-based view of the firm,  
organizational knowledge, knowledge management, and knowledge creation, mainly due 
to the contradictory and often confusing typologies used to understand the concept 
(Brown and Duguid, 2001). Easterby-Smith and Lyles (2003) argued that it was the major, 
foundational work of Nelson and Winter (1982) which brought forward tacit knowing as 
the basis for individual and organizational competence. Other important works emerged 
in the early 1990s with the two Special Issues of the Journal of Management Studies on 
‘knowledge work’ (Alvesson, 1993; Starbuck, 1992, 1993), and Blackler’s (1995) 
elaboration of the six different forms of organizational knowing (Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 
2003:11). 
Despite the apparent importance of the concept of knowledge and, in particular, its tacit 
dimension in many diverse areas of academic inquiry, there still remain various gaps that 
the literature on tacit knowledge has yet to fill. For example, Oguz and Sengun (2011: 
445) have suggested that the tacit dimension of knowledge is so ‘mystical’ that has 
become a ‘buzzword’ and a ‘slippery’ notion. This is a reason why a number of authors 
have attempted to re-conceptualize tacit knowledge in order to achieve better clarity 
(Tsoukas, 2003, 2011; Gourlay, 2006a, b; Gueltenberg and Helting, 2007; Ribeiro and 
Collins, 2007). A central premise of these studies is that tacit knowledge, as it is currently 
used in organization and management studies, offers a limited understanding of the 
process of knowing that Michael Polanyi had in mind. The continuous upsurge in writings 
and publications on the topic demonstrate that there still remains some ground to be 
covered in achieving conceptual clarity as deeply-couched problems still persist. These 
include the problematic division between tacit and explicit knowledge, the problem of 
10 
 
articulating tacit into explicit knowledge, and the problem of operationalizing the tacit to 
make it available for research and analysis. 
Despite the apparent importance of tacit knowledge in organization and management 
studies, a search in the literature reveals only a limited number of empirical studies 
dealing directly with the concept. Instead, there is a plethora of studies that deal with 
knowledge transfer [in many different areas (see, for example, Cavusgil et al 2003; 
Giannakis 2008; Joia and Lemos 2010; Mowery et al 1996; Panahi et al 2013; Ryan and 
O’Connor 2013)], the interplay between tacit and explicit knowledge (Bhardwaj and Monin 
2006; Kothari et al 2012),  and the role of tacit (and explicit) knowledge in different 
research areas including HRM, Marketing, Leadership, Knowledge Management, Project 
Management, and so on (Boiral 2002; du Plessis 2007; Fong 2003; Hislop 2003). 
Arguably, however, the most frequently-cited and impactful work in the field of 
organizational knowledge (especially related to the tacit dimension) have been the 
publications by Nonaka (1991) and more so, Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) highly 
respected book, The Knowledge Creating Company. Nonaka’s work has made a 
significant contribution to the field of organizational knowledge, learning, and innovation 
by focusing on how firms gain competitive advantage in the market place through the 
timely application of explicit (or codified) knowledge and tacit (or personal) knowledge. 
The foundation of that work centers on the distinction between tacit and explicit 
knowledge and the process of knowledge conversion, that is, how knowledge in 
organizations is ‘captured’ and ‘converted’ or ‘articulated’ from tacit into explicit and again 
into tacit. 
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However, although the model of knowledge creation has been particularly influential in 
the field of organization studies, a number of researchers have started to critically engage 
with it and problematize almost every level of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) arguments, 
including its theoretical foundations (and Nonaka and Takeuchi’s reading of Polanyi), its 
methodological rigor, and the implications or applications of their model in the wider 
context of organization and management studies and real-life organizational settings. 
One of the major critiques of Nonaka’s work has been Professor Haridimos Tsoukas (and 
colleagues) who has provided extensive arguments that elaborate an understanding of 
tacit knowledge more closely to what Polanyi meant to project. Tsoukas’ earlier works, 
for example, suggest that although a number of studies have agreed that knowledge is 
important in organizations (whether it is viewed as a resource or a capability), we need to 
shift our attention towards how knowledge is actually created in organizational settings 
(Tsoukas, 1996; 2003; Tsoukas and Mylonopoulos, 2004). In so doing, a more robust 
knowledge-based perspective can emerge that could provide more convincing answers 
in relation to how competitive advantage can be achieved and maintained over time. 
Tsoukas’ later works (Tsoukas, 2005; 2011; Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001) have 
concentrated more solely on knowledge creation in organizations with emphasis placed 
on clarifying Polanyi’s (1962; 1966) tacit dimension of knowledge which, according to 
Tsoukas, have been greatly misunderstood.  More recent  works by Tsoukas and 
colleagues are geared towards offering ways to researching such knowledge in 
organizations by paying more attention to breakdowns, accidents and dialogue that are 
seen as the foundations for understanding the concept more fully (Baralou and Tsoukas, 
2015; Tsoukas, 2011; Shotter and Tsoukas, 2014). 
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A common theme in the literature on tacit knowing is the acknowledgement that 
researching such knowledge in organizations has not been advancing as much as it could 
have been. This is mainly because the major problem of studies that have attempted to 
operationalize the concept rely on inappropriate methodological premises (Tsoukas 
2011). Tacit knowledge, by definition, is hidden and inaccessible to others. The word 
‘tacit’ comes from the Latin word ‘tacitum’ which means the ‘unvoiced, silent, or wordless’ 
(Oxford English Dictionary). It is for this reason that a number of researchers 
acknowledged that tacit knowledge has an ineffable quality (Tsoukas, 2003; Tsoukas and 
Vladimirou, 2001) that is hard to formalize or communicate with any precision (Nonaka, 
1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, Spender, 1996). Researchers of tacit knowledge in 
organizations may find it difficult to inquire into something which by definition is hidden.  
Tsoukas (2003; 2011), however, has insisted that the hidden quality of tacit knowledge 
does not imply that we should stop researching it. Rather, we should start discussing 
individual skilled performances in which we are involved as, in so doing we can draw 
attention to how we draw each other’s attention to things. This means that we need to 
engage in conversations and discussions with organizational actors with a view to 
identifying how their skilled performance is manifested in organizational practices. 
The study of tacit knowledge has given credence to a number of influential theories and 
frameworks in organization and management studies. The Resource-based View of the 
firm (Barney, 1992; Barney et al 2001; 2011), for example, argues that firms possessing 
intangible resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substituted can gain and 
sustain competitive advantage in the marketplace. In this view, tacit knowledge 
represents the most strategically significant resource possessed by a firm and the ways 
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that managers (or firms) arrange and re-arrange these resources in order to create 
advantage and increase value, underpin the capability of the manager to make strategic 
decisions (Teece, et al 1997; Tsoukas and Mylonopoulos, 2004). 
A related field of research that has tacit knowledge in its core assumptions is the area of 
organizational routines.   Defined as repetitive, recognizable patterns of interdependent 
actions that involve multiple actors (Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 2013: 181; Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003: 96; Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011: 417), organizational routines 
have long been regarded as the primary means through which organizations accomplish 
much of what they do (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958; Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). 
Early work on routines goes as far back as March and Simon’s (1958) notion of 
‘performance programs’, Cyert and March’s (1963) ‘standard operating procedures’, and 
Nelson and Winter’s (1982) metaphor of routines as ‘genes’ or an organization’s DNA. 
This early work approached routines as “collective, recurrent entities or ‘black boxes’” 
(Salvato and Rerup, 2010: 2) and, to a certain extent, accounted for stability in 
organizations (Pentland and Feldman, 2005) and a focus on the effects of routines on 
higher-level phenomena that include organizational performance, learning, and 
capabilities (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011; Salvato and Rerup, 2010). 
However, this early work on routines has been criticized for ignoring the internal structure 
and dynamics of routines (Feldman, 2016; Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011; 
Salvato and Rerup, 2010). Scholars have, therefore, turned their attention to a more 
performative view of routines (Feldman, 2000; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Parmigiani 
and Howard-Grenville, 2011) with the goal of overcoming the difficulties and ambiguities 
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of the ‘black box’ view by paying increased attention to the processes that take place 
inside the routines themselves. Challenging the traditional view of routines, scholars have 
shown that routines are ‘effortful accomplishments’ (Pentland and Rueter, 1994: 488), 
that is, every performance of a routine requires effort as actors choose their actions in 
light of the specific situation and their experience of earlier iterations of the routine 
(Feldman, 2000; Howard-Grenville, 2005). By focusing more explicitly on human action 
(agency), this recent perspective has paved the way for a more micro-oriented account 
of routines aiming to capture their generative nature, namely, the potential variability 
manifested when routines are enacted in particular contexts over time (Dionysiou and 
Tsoukas, 2013). 
The recent work on routines conceptualizes them as the interplay between a performative 
aspect, that is, the specific actions through which the routine is performed, and an 
ostensive aspect, namely, the abstract, generalized pattern that actors distinguish across 
performances (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011). 
These two aspects of routines, the performative and the ostensive, represent the two 
sides of what Cohen (2007: 781) referred to as “the paradox of the (n)ever changing 
world”: while the concrete actions differ in every re-enactment of the routine, the actors 
may still see a ‘pattern-in-variety’ (Cohen, 2007: 782) and therefore perceive these 
actions as part of the same routine.  
The distinction between ostensive and performative aspects of routines has been 
instrumental in allowing researchers to discern two types of routine change (Howard-
Grenville, 2005): the first is related to flexible adaptation of individual performances, that 
is, the change in temporary deviations from the abstract, general pattern. The second 
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type is related to changes in the pattern across several performances. These two types 
of change can be understood as an evolutionary process of variation and selective 
retention (Feldman and Pentland, 2003), which implies that adaptations in the 
performative aspect of routines constitute variations that are selectively retained in the 
ostensive (the abstract and generalized) aspect which is modified as a result. 
While these recent insights on organizational routines have been immensely useful in 
correcting the previous ‘black-box’ approach, our understanding of routines still remains 
slow (Cohen, 2007: 774; Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 2013: 182; Pentland and Feldman, 
2005: 794). This may be due to the rather limited attention to the concept of tacit knowing, 
and its role in stabilization and/or change of routines in organizational contexts. Since 
tacit knowing is the act of integrating subsidiary particulars and focal targets by a person 
engaging in everyday (organizational) activities, an understanding of this process may 
pave the way towards strengthening our view on how individual participants interrelate 
their individual actions to form “repetitive, recognized patterns of action” (Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003: 103).  Furthermore, to the extent that routines mainly change due to 
adaptations of individual performances enacting routines, the process by which this is 
done has not been explored. Put simply, the questions of “what is the role of tacit knowing 
in the context or organizational routines?” and “what is the process (or mechanism) that 
enables routines to change and, at the same time, maintain their stability?” deserve more 
attention. 
In the next section I sketch out the thesis aims and the contributions that are expected to 
be achieved. 
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1.3 RESEARCH AIMS AND EXPECTED CONTRIBUTIONS 
My purpose in this thesis is to extend the performative view of routines by exploring the 
process of tacit knowing in underpinning routine stability and change as a collective 
phenomenon. Drawing more closely on the work of Polanyi (1962; 1966) on tacit knowing 
and Tsoukas (and colleagues) work on how such knowing may be researched in 
organizational contexts (Baralou and Tsoukas, 2015; Tsoukas, 2011; Shotter and 
Tsoukas, 2014), the concept of ‘breakdowns’ is introduced to explain that changes in the 
structure of tacit knowing (the integration of subsidiary particulars and focal targets) are 
largely responsible for adapting or, more fundamentally, changing organizational 
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routines. Responding to recent calls to shift the attention on ethnographic methods for 
studying routines (Feldman 2016), the thesis advances a practice-oriented perspective 
(Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011) that focuses on the routines and actions that constitute 
them (D’Adderio, 2014; Turner and Rindova, 2012; Howard-Grenville, 2005) by building 
on dialogical interactions (Tsoukas, 2009) of participants engaging in skilful action.  
Consistent with recent work in the field of organizational routines (Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 
2013; Dittrich et al, 2016; Salvato and Vassolo, 2018), emphasis is placed on the 
‘reflective talk’ of participants engaging in organizational routines and their reflections on 
how and why routines have changed. Drawing on an ethnographic study of two public 
organizations located in the UAE, it will be shown that when tacit knowing is disrupted 
due to a breakdown (major or minor) (Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011) in the performance 
of the routine, participants’ experiences become an issue of and for reflection and 
attention as their experience of performing a routine action is disturbed (in a major or less 
major way).  
Such a disruption of routine action is important because breakdowns in the context of 
performing a routine can be viewed as the triggering mechanism for routine action to be 
adapted or changed. In this way, the ‘lived experiences’ of those who work in 
organizational settings and the researcher who investigates these conditions can 
generate discussions and conversations that take place not only during the performance 
but also retrospectively, i.e. after the performance has transpired. This is particularly 
important as organizational participants can discuss their engagement in organizational 
routines by reflecting on how and why they have acted in the way they have in particular 
circumstances. It is only when participants step back from the actions and engage in 
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dialogical interactions with other participants engaging in the same routine that talking 
about the routine may provide avenues for noticing “certain important features which had 
hitherto escaped our attention and can now be seen in a new context” (Tsoukas, 2011: 
472). Consequently, participants engaging in routines are able to relate to their 
circumstances in novel ways and, therefore, ‘see’ new ways of performing and moving a 
task forward. 
Therefore, the questions I want to address in this thesis are: 
(a) What is tacit knowing and why is it important in organizational settings? 
(b) What is the role of tacit knowing in the context of organizational routines? 
(c) How can tacit knowing be empirically investigated in the context of organizational 
routines? 
(d) How and why tacit knowing affects stability and change in organizational routines? 
(e) Why such a research is important in organizational settings based in the UAE? 
The expected contributions of this thesis are envisaged to be related to three areas of 
inquiry, namely, theoretical, methodological and practical: 
 In terms of theoretical contributions, the thesis would advance a more robust 
connection between two seemingly separated literatures: tacit knowing and 
organizational routines. In terms of tacit knowing, the thesis examines more closely 
the concept and its structure as it has been exemplified in the works of Polanyi 
(1962; 1966) and Tsoukas (and colleagues) (Tsoukas, 2003; 2005; 2011; Tsoukas 
and Vladimirou, 2011) by placing emphasis on the skilful integrations of subsidiary 
particulars and focal targets by a person who links the two together when carrying 
out any task. These integrations, however, are not always successful and thus 
19 
 
breakdowns occur that potentially and actually disrupt the flow of skilful actions. In 
these moments, the person becomes reflective of the action and may alter the 
action itself in order to carry on the performance forward. Such an understanding 
has implications on how routines are carried out in organizational contexts as the 
foundational question of any theory of organizational routines is to explain how 
routines change (Dittrich et al, 2016; Feldman, et al 2016; Pentland, et al 2012) or 
fail to do so over time. The thesis, moreover, goes one step further: since action is 
at the centre of tacit knowing and routines comprise of interdependent patterns of 
actors performances (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011), it follows that any 
breakdown in the structure of the former will inevitably affect the outcome of the 
latter. Thus, the thesis sheds light on the question of why routines change (Dittrich, 
et al 2016: 17; Howard-Grenville, 2005) by placing emphasis on the role of 
breakdowns as the triggering mechanism that enables (or not) routines to be 
adapted and/or changed.  
 In terms of methodological contributions, the thesis advances an approach to 
researching, identifying, and analyzing tacit knowing in the context of 
organizational routines by taking on the suggestions in the literature for more 
ethnographic approaches (Baralou and Tsoukas, 2015; Cunliffe, 2011; Feldman, 
2016; Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013) to the study of knowledge and routines. In so 
doing, emphasis is placed on breakdowns and dialogue  as these are seen as 
foundational aspects for understanding and researching the tacit, which by 
definition is hidden and inaccessible to observation alone (Baralou and Tsoukas, 
2015; Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011; Shotter and Tsoukas, 2014). In line with 
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recent developments in the field of organizational routines the thesis advances a 
‘practice-oriented’ perspective which embraces the view of ‘routines-as-practices’ 
(Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011: 1245; Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011; 
Zbaracki and Bergen, 2010) that are enacted by individuals in socially organized 
contexts and are manifested in ‘sayings’ and ‘doings’ of routine participants. Taking 
such a perspective seriously means that observing what actors do when 
performing routines (the ‘doings’ of participants) is only one aspect and should go 
hand-in-hand with participants’ reflective accounts (the ‘sayings’) of why things 
have been done in one way rather than another. Therefore, the novelty of the 
contribution of this thesis is the focus on breakdowns in participants’ experiences 
– as these are perceived by them – rather than the routines themselves. Utilizing 
such an inductive methodology with a focus on narratives and unstructured 
interviews based on critical incidents (i.e. salient moments in a participants 
organizational experience as these are perceived by the participants themselves) 
has the potential to surface participants’ tacit understandings and thus make them 
available for research and analysis in the context of routines.  
 In terms of practical contributions, the thesis provides an account of the reasons 
as to why and how routines change and how managers should understand such 
change in their respective organizations. Focusing on breakdowns as an integral 
and necessary part of organizational activity, management in organizations should 
embrace such moments rather than seeing them as challenges that need to be 
dealt with.  Moments of breakdown are the norm in organizational activity, not the 
exception and therefore managerial attention should put more firmly on 
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encouraging  productive dialogue among organizational participants with a view to 
facilitate (and, perhaps, stimulate) reflective and creative individuals that could 
mindfully envision new ways of acting and doing things (Salvato and Vassolo, 
2018).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE AND CONTENT 
In order to articulate the arguments and explore the research questions in detail, the 
thesis is presented in seven Chapters. This Chapter (Chapter One) lays out the basic 
premise and rationale behind this study and outlines the approach and content of the 
thesis with its main research questions, aims, and expected contributions.  
Chapter Two provides an overview of the literature on knowledge and its tacit component 
in particular within organization and management studies literature. Despite the 
substantial number of studies associated with the concept of tacit knowing, the literature 
identifies convergent themes as well as important antinomies. The exemplary study of 
Nonaka and his colleagues on tacit knowledge although remains one of the most 
significant in the field, it has also added ambiguity that subsequent studies have not, to a 
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large extend, been able to address. Particularly in the field of capabilities and routines, 
the concept of tacit knowledge plays a central role in that if properly managed it can lead 
to competitive advantage and superior performance. However, how and why exactly this 
is done still remains underexplored. It is argued in that Chapter that we need to better 
understand the tacit if we are to come closer in answering these significant questions that 
can illuminate both theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of tacit 
knowing. 
For this reason, Chapter Thee delves deeper into the concept of tacit knowing in an 
attempt to clarify and clear up conceptual ambiguities found in relation to the tacit. 
Following from suggestions expressed in Tsoukas’ work, Michael Polanyi’s work is 
revisited in an attempt to understand more fully how tacit knowing is conceptualized and 
understood. Polanyi argues that all knowing consists of the integrations of subsidiary and 
tacitly held particulars into a focal and articulate whole. Crucially for Polanyi, these 
integrations are silent or ineffable to a person who is attempting to accomplish a task but, 
the outcomes they contribute to, are not. Most of the time we are absorbed in the actions 
we perform and thus subsidiary awareness is hidden in the background of inarticulate 
experiences. However, when we are faced with a challenging or difficult situation that 
disturbs our tacit expectations, our subsidiary awareness becomes the focal point of 
attention, deliberation, and reflection. Thus, new knowledge comes about when our 
previously held tacit understandings (our subsidiary particulars) are re-punctuated 
(articulated) through disruptions, accidents and surprises. 
These insights are significant for our understanding of tacit knowing and its important role 
in organizational routines as they too comprise of a similar structure to that of tacit 
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knowing: the ostensive aspect (the abstract, generalized idea of what the routine should 
entail) and the performative aspect (the concrete actions that give shape to the routine 
itself). Any breakdown of the tacit can potentially disrupt (to a more or less major way) the 
performance of a routine and hence provide the space for reflection and review of 
alternative ways to move the performance forward. It is argued in the Chapter that this 
takes place through dialogical exchanges and discussions among routine participants 
thus enabling novel features to be uncovered that can contribute to changing 
organizational routines. 
Chapter Four discusses the methodological approach and research design that the thesis 
has adopted. The Chapter aims at understanding how can tacit knowing be empirically 
investigated in the context of organizational routines. Building on the novel understanding 
of the tacit and its role in routines and following recent research approaches in the field 
of organization and management studies, it is argued that the researcher should pay 
attention not only to the actions of routine participants but also to the ways they discuss 
routine performances and understandings in organizational settings. To achieve this, the 
Chapter describes and explains a methodological approach that is based on subjectivist 
ontology, interpretivist epistemology, and methodology that is ethnographic, inductive, 
and dialogic in nature and methods of inquiry that include loosely structured interviews 
(based on the Critical Incident Technique) and company documentation to elicit the 
processes by which routine participants act and understand such acting in organizational 
contexts. Data has been collected from two public-owned companies based in UAE and 
the Chapter offers justifications and explanations related to the overall methodology, 
choice of methods, and data analysis. 
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Chapter Five presents a detailed description of the analysis of data and the major findings. 
The aim of this Chapter is to understand how breakdowns in practical engagement of 
participants in their daily routines altered their understanding of the practices involved in 
enacting these routines. The analysis centers on four routines, i.e. Hiring and Promotions, 
Rebranding, HR System Implementation, and Customer Services that participants 
engaged in and discussed during the interviews. The findings indicate that the breakdown 
of a particular routine is connected to three areas that potentially reveal how changes in 
the structure of tacit knowing impact routines. This happens when participants fail to 
integrate their actions in the following areas: (a) identities, roles and responsibilities; (b) 
the use of tools, objects or other artefacts; and (c) relationships with other participants. 
Chapter Six provides a thorough discussion of the thesis findings. It is discussed that 
breakdowns play a crucial and often catalytic role in changing routines as they bring 
forward a disturbance in the ways that organizational participants integrate and re-
integrate their subsidiary particulars in order to attend to focal targets. Failure of these 
integrations deriving from a breakdown in practical engagement of participants in 
organizational contexts affect the ways that routines are enacted in a more or less 
significant way. Depending on the extent and severity of the breakdown, participants are 
forced to critically reflect on these novel experiences before they are able to re-align their 
tacit understandings in order to perform the routine effectively. 
Finally, Chapter Seven provides a set of conclusions and a summary of the main 
theoretical, methodological, empirical, and practical contributions achieved in the thesis. 
It also sketches out the limitations of the current study along with an outline of some 
possible directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first Chapter (Chapter One) provided an overview of the context, arguments, 
theoretical and methodological approaches that would be guiding this thesis. This 
Chapter (Chapter Two) provides an overview of the literature on knowledge in general 
and tacit knowledge in particular, in organization and management studies. Despite the 
exponential increase in the number of studies associated with tacit knowledge across a 
very broad spectrum of academic inquiry, the literature identifies common themes as well 
as important antinomies. It is widely accepted in the literature that tacit knowing (and its 
associated synonyms, e.g. know-how, implicit knowledge, abilities, skills, etc.) is 
important in organizations. However, there are still ambiguities around whether such 
knowledge is acquired through direct experience; whether such acquisition is a socially 
complex process; whether it contributes to competitive advantage; whether it is the source 
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of all knowing and the contributor of creativity and innovation; whether it can be converted 
into explicit; and, whether it is an individual or both an individual and collective 
phenomenon. 
To ensure that these ambiguities are minimized, this Chapter reviews two main areas of 
inquiry in which tacit knowledge (or knowing) is identified in the literature as being 
particularly important, namely, tacit knowledge and its relation to knowledge management 
and its relation to organizational routines. In reviewing the literature on knowledge 
management, one has to appreciate the role of the works of Nonaka (and his colleagues) 
whose creation and development of the SECI model of knowledge conversion has 
attempted to explain how the recursive conversion of tacit into explicit knowledge can 
lead firms to competitive advantages. Although Nonaka’s theory has been particularly 
influential in the area of knowledge management and innovation, a number of critiques 
(e.g. Gueldenberg and Helting 2007; Gourlay 2006a, b; Ribeiro and Collins 2007; 
Tsoukas 2003, 2011; Tsoukas and Vladimirou 2001) have asserted that it should be 
treated with caution because of its treatment of articulation and conversion of tacit into 
explicit knowledge and Nonaka’s reading and understanding of Polanyi’s original work on 
the tacit. Despite these criticisms, the insights provided by Nonaka’s work have influenced 
the ways in which scholars understand and theorize knowledge and learning in 
organizational settings and paved the way for subsequent work in the field. 
The concept of tacit knowledge has also been at the center of one of the most influential 
theories in organization and management studies, namely, the Resource-based Theory 
of the firm (Barney 1991; Barney et al 2001, 2011) and has provided the basis on which 
the concept of ‘dynamic capabilities’ (Teece, 2010; Teece et al, 1997; Zollo and Winter, 
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2002) has been built upon. The main premise on which the capabilities approach departs 
from that of the Resource-based Theory is that a firm’s competitive advantage is 
dependent upon its ability to create and renew its knowledge base by altering or re-
configuring internal and external competencies in rapidly changing environments. On the 
one hand, from a more macro/organizational level, capabilities are conceptualized as 
‘higher-level routines’ (Zollo and Winter, 2002) or ‘decision-making rules’ (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000) and this makes it difficult to identify what makes them ‘dynamic’, i.e. 
contribute to innovative change. On the other hand, from a more micro/individual level, 
capabilities are conceptualized as ‘decision-making activities’ based on the skills of one 
or a few top managers (Helfat and Peteraf, 2015) and this makes it difficult to understand 
how firms create systematic and reliable processes of resource configuration (Salvato 
and Vassolo, 2018).  
Thus, current interpretations of ‘dynamic capabilities’ make them paradoxical entities 
(Peteraf et al 2013) that involve, simultaneously, stability and change (Feldman and 
Peteraf 2003). This paradox has implications in practice because organizations need both 
the reliability of routines and the creativity of individuals to systematically reconfigure 
resources to adapt to change (Helfat, et al 2007). To account for this paradox, researchers 
have attempted to concentrate on routines and view them more closely by focusing on 
their ‘dynamics’. At the core of this research approach lays the concept of tacit knowing 
since routines comprise of patterns of interdependent activities performed by multiple 
actors (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011) and action is at the center of 
organizational knowledge and learning. In addition, routines are ‘dynamic’ because the 
action patterns observed in their performance are temporal and can change from one 
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performance to the next. The two levels (or aspects) of routines, namely, the ostensive 
(what the routine should be) and the performative (how the routine is actually performed) 
have been analogous with the difference between outcomes and processes. When 
people perform certain actions in routines they become reflective of the outcomes they 
produce and thus performing the same routine in the future may not be exactly the same. 
Thus, reflection and mindful action take center stage in routine performance. 
This Chapter unfolds as follows: In the next section (Section 2.2.) an overview of the 
literature on tacit knowledge is presented. Following discussion of this, Section 2.3. 
provides a discussion of the relevance of tacit knowledge in organization and 
management studies by concentrating on two areas: knowledge management and 
organizational routines.  The Chapter concludes by offering a summary of the main points 
(Section 2.4).  
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2.2 A SEARCH ON TACIT KNOWLEDGE  
Research on tacit knowledge in organization and management studies literature has been 
significantly increased after 1995. I have conducted two literature searches, the first in 
2013 and the second in 2016. The reason for this was to identify the number of studies 
dealing with the concept of tacit knowledge, not only in organization and management 
studies, but at a broader spectrum of academic inquiry. It is true that tacit knowledge 
appears across many different areas of academic and professional inquiry that range from 
sports, film production, and engineering, to medicine, education, and psychotherapy. 
Table 2.1.provides an overview of the differences in my two different chronological 
searches in terms of the number of studies found related to tacit knowledge. 
TABLE 2.1 STUDIES ON TACIT KNOWLEDGE IN 2013 AND 2016 
Year Business 
Source 
Premier 
(on title) 
Business 
Source Premier  
(subject terms) 
Business 
Source Premier 
(in abstract) 
Google Scholar 
2016 864 1,459 4,796 361,000 
2013 188 515 1,111 228,000 
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This substantial increase in studies on tacit knowledge within the last three years 
demonstrates the increasing interest that academics and practitioners place on the 
concept. This increase also signifies that despite unresolved areas on the tacit dimension 
of knowledge that include both its clarity and the difficulties associated with researching 
such knowledge in organizations, most studies appear to take for granted the distinction 
between tacit and explicit knowledge (where the former is defined as ‘hard to codify’ and 
the later as ‘codified’ knowledge). Another implication that this apparent increase in 
studies poses is that it becomes harder for a researcher on tacit knowledge to review all 
the studies associated with the concept.  
However, in this review I concentrate on the literature on organization and management 
studies (broadly defined) in an attempt to identify the key studies, authors, and areas of 
interest that have a bearing on our understanding of the concept to date. Besides reading 
the key texts (e.g. Polanyi, Nonaka, Spender, Tsoukas, amongst others), in this review I 
have identified academic papers as potentially relevant from information in the title and 
the abstract. The studies and areas of inquiry that are presented below are not meant to 
be exhaustive in terms of coverage of the field. An early attempt to synthesize these 
different publications in the area of knowledge and learning, for example, is the study 
conducted by Easterby-Smith and Lyles (2003) who developed a typology in mapping the 
key topics in the area. These include organizational learning, the learning organization, 
organizational knowledge, and knowledge management. The authors argue that the field 
has developed very rapidly (especially after 1995) mainly due to the diversity and 
specialization of the studies dealing broadly with the concept of knowledge. For the 
purposes of this study, I have read and reviewed most of the papers cited by Easterby-
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Smith and Lyles (2003) to ensure that this current search goes as far back in time as it is 
possible. As it would become clear, some of the studies have had a more impactful 
contribution in the field and are cited repeatedly in scholars’ attempts to make sense of 
the concept of tacit knowledge. 
Gourlay (2006a: 1426) provides a useful starting point in the investigation of tacit 
knowledge in organization and management studies. He distinguishes among different 
fields of inquiry in social sciences to demonstrate the different understandings provided 
by authors in their attempts to conceptually capture tacit knowledge. It is evident that tacit 
knowledge is juxtaposed with explicit knowledge (according to Polanyi’s famous division) 
or Ryle’s (1949) distinction between know-how (tacit knowledge) and know-that (explicit 
knowledge). Gourlay (2006a) suggests that the idea that there are broadly speaking two 
different types of knowledge is widely accepted amongst academics. Table 2.2. offers an 
overview of the typology and use of the concept in different disciplines.  
TABLE 2.2 NAMES AND TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE IN DIFFERENT DISCIPLINES OF 
ACADEMIC INQUIRY  
Discipline Tacit Knowledge Explicit Knowledge 
Philosophy Knowledge-how; procedural 
knowledge; abilities 
Knowledge-that; propositional 
knowledge 
Philosophy (Polanyi) Tacit knowing Explicit knowledge 
Psychology Implicit Knowledge; tacit 
abilities; skills 
Explicit Knowledge; declarative 
knowledge 
Artificial Intelligence Procedural Knowledge  Declarative Knowledge 
Neuroscience Covert Knowledge Overt Knowledge 
Organization and 
Management Studies; 
Education 
Tacit Knowledge Explicit Knowledge 
Knowledge Management Know-how Know-what 
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Sociology of Science Tacit / Encultured (forms of life) Explicit / Symbolic 
Source: Adapted from Gourlay (2006a: 1426) 
What is also particularly important to note is that within organization and management 
studies literature there are many different synonyms for the term ‘tacit’ (Ambrosini and 
Bowman, 2001). For example, Nelson and Winter (1982) equate tacit knowledge to ‘skills’ 
whereas Kogut and Zander (1992) believe that a ‘recipe’ is comparable to know-how and 
thus to tacit knowledge. Spender (1994) referred to such knowledge as ‘implicit’ or 
‘unarticulated’ and Hu (1995) referred to it as ‘uncodifiable’ or ‘procedural’.  
Despite these differences in terminology, however, the use of the concept is quite 
common to all fields but there appear to be a number of ambiguities.  Gourlay (2006b: 
61-62) offers six of these ambiguities found in the literature and relate to whether: (a) 
knowledge is acquired through direct experience or whether we are biologically 
predisposed towards certain kinds of tacit knowledge; (b) the acquisition of tacit 
knowledge is a complex social process or whether it is acquired with little or no help from 
others; (c) tacit knowledge is essential for competent performance in concrete situations 
or whether it is also responsible for defensive routines; (d) tacit knowledge is the source 
of all knowledge with particular emphasis on innovative ideas and the source of 
sustainable competitive advantage or whether it can prove to be a conservative rather 
than innovative force – if we view such knowledge residing in traditions and cultures; (e) 
tacit knowledge can be converted into explicit knowledge or whether it is non-verbal, 
inarticulate, unconscious, and ineffable; (f) knowledge is ultimately an individual 
possession or whether it is both individual and collective (e.g. organizational). 
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As the thesis unfolds, I will attempt to clear up some of these apparent ambiguities. It will 
be argued that tacit knowing (rather than ‘knowledge’) is a complex social process (point 
b) and it is acquired through direct experience within social practices and organizational 
routines (point  a). As the process of knowing is demonstrated in people’s action, it is also 
context-specific and in organizational settings it is manifested in routines and practices. 
However, routines may remain unchanged for long periods of time and in that case tacit 
knowing become stubborn and difficult to change (point c). Changes in the structure of 
knowing due to a disturbance or breakdown in people’s practical engagement may be a 
source of creativity and innovation which can contribute to competitive advantage (point 
d). Even though tacit knowing contains ineffability and it is, by definition, non-verbal, it 
does not mean that it cannot be reflected upon and contribute to a novel experience and 
action (point e). Ultimately, tacit knowing is an individual endeavor but requires a social 
(organizational) context to provide the framework in which it can be developed and 
understood (point f).  
In the next section I begin the exploration of the concept of tacit knowing in organization 
and management studies literature and assess its relevance in the field. 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 THE RELEVANCE OF TACIT KNOWLEDGE IN ORGANIZATION AND 
MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
Ever since Polanyi (1962; 1966) published his influential works on tacit knowledge, 
organization and management studies scholars embarked on a pursuit to relate and apply 
his concept for research in organizational settings. One of the earliest contributors to the 
area has been the work of Nelson and Winter (1982) who attempted to bring together and 
marry the concept of tacit knowledge and that of organizational routines in their distinction 
between lower-level (organizational skills) and higher-level (decision procedures) 
routines. Routines, for Nelson and Winter (1982), are repositories of tacit knowledge 
where knowledge is preserved within the firm by everyday practice of these routines. As 
they (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 73) have put it, “the performer is not fully aware of the 
details of the performance and finds it difficult or impossible to articulate a full account of 
those details”. Nelson and Winter further assert that the reason for tacit knowledge 
remaining tacit may be due to cost because “whether a particular bit of knowledge is in 
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principle articulable or necessarily tacit is not the relevant question in most behavioral 
situations. Rather, the question is whether the costs associated with the obstacles to 
articulation are sufficiently high so that the knowledge in fact remains tacit” (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982: 82). 
Nelson and Winter’s extensive discussions on skills and routines (Chapters 3 to 5 in their 
book) in organizational settings made tacit knowledge operational for organizational 
behavior research (Oguz and Sengun, 2011). A novel body of researchers emerged in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s that attempted to codify tacit knowledge based on the 
assumption that the process of knowing that Polanyi had in mind (tacit knowing rather 
than knowledge) and the outcome of knowledge (know-how) had no difference. Thus, 
although Nelson and Winter’s discussion on skills and routines allowed for the 
operationalization of tacit knowledge, it also legitimized a misinterpretation of tacit 
knowing (Oguz and Sengun, 2011: 446). An immediate consequence to this 
misinterpretation was whether tacit knowledge can be managed or not since it can be 
viewed as emerging spontaneously in organizations and thus its management becomes 
harder. On the other hand, tacit knowledge was seen as one end of the knowledge 
spectrum (the other one being its explicit counterpart) and that meant that, in theory, it 
may be managed and controlled.  
Nevertheless, many authors have drawn on the work of Nelson and Winter (1982) to 
argue that socially complex tacit knowledge that is diffused through a firm can constitute 
a valuable intangible resource (Barney, 1991) and can be seen as a source of competitive 
advantage (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Teece, et al., 1997). These authors have theorized 
that tacit knowledge is difficult to imitate and all but impossible to codify. Because it cannot 
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be codified, tacit knowledge cannot be separated out for sale through the medium of the 
market mechanism. This means that when tacit knowledge leads to high organizational 
performance, this performance can be sustained for some time.  
These assumptions have influenced the work of Kogut and Zander (1992) who developed 
a theory of the firm that has in its core effective knowledge creation and transfer as the 
major advantage of firms in different markets. According to the theory, firms exist as social 
vehicles of certain voluntary activities as these activities are structured through 
organizational resources that do not exist at an individual level. This means that 
knowledge, although it is in the hands of individuals, is also expressed via certain routines 
through which people cooperate in organizations. Changes in those routines are what 
make organizations capable of renewal. Kogut and Zander also argue that activities which 
are designed to bring about a firm’s growth through replication of its technologies increase 
the potential for imitation. This potential can only be tackled through innovation. Kogut 
and Zander introduce the notion of ‘combinative capabilities’ denoting the ability of the 
firm to recombine and use their current and future knowledge in their attempt to maintain 
their competitive position. 
But perhaps the most influential figure in the area of knowledge and in particular its tacit 
dimension is the Japanese writer Ikujiro Nonaka and his colleagues (Nonaka, 1991; 1994; 
Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Nonaka and Toyama, 2003; Nonaka et al, 2006; Nonaka 
and Von Krogh 2009) whose research has influenced significantly our understanding of 
the concept in organization and management studies. The next section explores his work 
and others in organization and management studies. 
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2.3.1. Tacit Knowledge and its Relation to Knowledge Management  
One of the most significant figures in this area of tacit knowledge and knowledge creation 
has been the Japanese management writer Ikujiro Nonaka (and his colleagues). Nonaka 
has published a number of influential papers in the area (Nonaka, 1991; 1994; Nonaka 
and Toyama, 2003; Nonaka et al, 2006; Nonaka and Von Krogh 2009) and a highly 
respected book (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) that set the scene for subsequent works in 
the area of tacit knowledge in organizational settings. Nonaka’s (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka 
and Takeuchi, 1995) perspective focuses on gaining competitive advantage in the market 
place through the timely application of explicit (or codified) knowledge and tacit (or 
personal) knowledge. The foundation of this type of research centers on the distinction 
between tacit and explicit knowledge and the process of knowledge conversion, that is, 
how knowledge is converted from tacit into explicit and again into tacit. Nonaka (1994) 
and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) have created the SECI model of knowledge conversion 
which is composed of Socialization (the conversion of tacit into tacit knowledge), 
Externalization (the conversion of tacit into explicit knowledge), Combination (the 
conversion of explicit into explicit knowledge) and Internalization (the conversion of 
explicit into tacit knowledge).According to the authors, knowledge conversion starts from 
the individual level, moving upwards to the group level, which eventually reaches the 
organizational level through a bottom-up spiraling process. Knowledge creation, Nonaka 
and his colleagues argue, always takes this form in organizational settings. At the heart 
of their conceptualization of knowledge lays the concept of tacit knowledge that was first 
introduced by Michael Polanyi (1958; 1966).  
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While some authors have been sympathetic to Nonaka’s work (e.g. Dyck et al, 2005), a 
number of critiques have been developed. These criticisms center around Nonaka’s 
treatment of tacit knowledge, his reading and understanding of Polanyi’s original work, 
and the problem of articulating or converting tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge 
(Gueldenberg and Helting, 2007; Gourlay, 2006a,b; Hong, 2012; Peters, et al 2011; 
Ribeiro and Collins, 2007; Tsoukas, 2003; Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001; Zhu, 2006). 
Gueldenberg and Helting (2007) and Hong (2012), for instance, argue that Nonaka’s 
theory of knowledge conversion should be approached with caution in the West as the 
conceptual understanding residing in the model may only be applicable in the East (e.g. 
Japanese companies) rather than generalizing across the globe. This is because, 
according to Hong (2012: 203), the SECI model is built implicitly on traditional Japanese 
philosophies and cultural assumptions deriving from the concept of ba which places 
emphasis on shared mental, social, and physical space for engaging in knowledge 
creation and interaction. This reflects a particular trait of Japanese culture, namely their 
strong commitment for building and engaging in close interpersonal relationships with 
those whom they share a common fate or identity, and their cognitive style of preferring 
tacit over explicit knowledge. 
Also, on the point of converting tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge, Gourlay (2006a) 
argues that Nonaka’s proposition is flawed. Building on the work of the sociologist Harry 
Collins (2001a, b; 1993), Gourlay suggests that Nonaka’s Combination and 
Externalization in the matrix appear to be problematic and ambiguous because they 
conflate knowledge conversion to knowledge transfer. He also, and perhaps more 
importantly, suggests that the perspective put forward by Nonaka (and his colleagues) 
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ignores the view that tacit knowledge may be partially or wholly inherently tacit. Similarly, 
Ribeiro and Collins (2007) point out how the so-called explicit forms of knowledge (e.g. 
instructions, manuals, templates) are devoid of any meaning without their being used 
skilfully by humans as part of their social, cultural, and material contexts in which they are 
embedded. The point of articulation and conversion of tacit into explicit knowledge is also 
discussed earlier by Tsoukas (2003) and Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001). In other words, 
these authors argue that what is known cannot be separated from the particular 
experiences from which it emerges; it has no separate existence as any attempt to 
articulate it can result in a loss of its meaning. 
The insights provided by Nonaka’s (and colleagues) work gave rise to the development 
of ideas concerned with the fundamental role of organizational learning mechanisms and 
how they relate to effective business strategies. A number of scholars understand 
organizational learning as adaptive change process which is influenced by organizational 
memory and accumulated experience in development and modification of organizational 
routines. The subsequent work on knowledge termed as ‘knowledge-based view’ of the 
firm (see, for example, Eisenhardt and Santos, 2001; Foss and Foss, 2000; Grant, 1996; 
Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Nonaka, 1994; Spender, 1996a) places emphasis on the 
inherent creative human action in open-ended contexts (Spender, 1996; Tsoukas, 1996; 
Tsoukas, 2002). As Tsoukas (2003) and Tsoukas and Mylonopoulos (2004) suggest, the 
knowledge-based view of the firm shifts the attention from assuming that knowledge is 
important in organizations to actually understand the ways in which knowledge is created 
in organizational settings. 
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The ideas expressed in Nonaka’s work paved also the way for the concept of ‘dynamic 
capabilities’ (Eisenhardt and Santos, 2001: 139) which offered two basic arguments: First, 
a firm’s competitive advantages are not so much linked to their overall knowledge pool 
but are derived from their ability to create and renew it; and, second, dynamic capabilities 
are the central part of the mechanism that allows firms to obtain economic returns from 
their ownership of knowledge assets (Teece, 2008: 1508). Overall, dynamic capabilities 
of firms involve the identification and absorption of new opportunities, reconfiguring of 
knowledge assets, competences and complementary assets, selection of appropriate 
forms of organization, proper allocation of resources, and establishment of appropriate 
pricing strategies.  
The Dynamic Capabilities literature (Teece, 2010; Teece et al, 1997; Zollo and Winter, 
2002) suggests that resources themselves are not necessarily sufficient for competitive 
advantage without the discretion of managers to make choices as to how they should be 
arranged and re-arranged in organizations so as to increase value and create advantage 
(Tsoukas and Mylonopoulos, 2004).Thus, the capability of the manager to make strategic 
decisions in terms of appropriate resource allocation is informed by (tacit) knowledge 
(Teece et al. 1997).  
Teece and Pisano (1994: 537) described capabilities as “the firm’s ability to integrate, 
build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments”. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1105) view capabilities as the firm’s internal 
processes which “integrate, reconfigure, gain or release resources to match and even 
create market change”. The literature has tended to agree to the central role of dynamic 
capabilities in relation to change but the source of change has varied across elements 
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such as resources and capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Helfat et al, 2007; 
Teece et al 1997; Winter, 2003), operating routines (Zollo and Winter, 2002) and 
resources and routines (Zahra, et al. 2006). Thus, some studies refer to dynamic 
capabilities as ‘capacities’ (Helfat, et al. 2007) or as ‘routines’ (Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000) by which an organization alters its resource base. Other researchers yet view 
capabilities as operating in two levels distinguishing between ‘zero-level’ (i.e. ‘ordinary’ 
capabilities that allow the firm to ‘make a living’ in the short run) and ‘higher-level’ 
capabilities (i.e. ‘substantive capabilities’ that are used to solve a problem) (Winter, 2003; 
Zahra, et al. 2006). Dynamic capabilities, in contrast, are ‘higher-level’ capabilities that 
operate to change ordinary or substantive capabilities.  
An example of a dynamic capability is a firm’s ability to learn new practices and routines 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Pablo et al 2007). Learning represents a dynamic process 
by which resources can be integrated and re-configured. Learning combines experiential 
learning and repetition in a non-linear fashion with the purpose of improving a firm’s 
performance (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Zollo and Winter (2000) contend, however, 
that learning is not a dynamic capability per se but the necessary condition for dynamic 
capabilities to emerge. As they (Zollo and Winter 2002: 340) have argued, “dynamic 
capabilities arise from learning: they constitute the firm’s systematic methods for 
modifying operating routines” (emphasis added). 
Zollo and Winter (2002) distinguished between two types of routines: those employed in 
the operational activity of the firm (‘operating routines’) and those dedicated to the 
modification of operating routines (‘dynamic capabilities’). According to Zollo and Winter 
(2002), creating and preserving dynamic capabilities requires special learning 
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mechanisms in organizations. The authors argue that dynamic capabilities result from 
organizational learning and stable patterns of collective activity through which the 
organization systematically generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit of 
improved effectiveness. Zollo and Winter argue that such mechanisms involve 
accumulation of experience, knowledge articulation (e.g. the process through which 
implicit (tacit) knowledge is articulated through collective discussions or performance 
evaluation processes) and knowledge codification (e.g. the process of codifying the use 
of manuals or tools).  
At the core of these conceptualizations lays the idea that a dynamic capability is the ability 
of the firm to reflectively engage with the accumulation, use, and development of assets 
so that a continued congruence is secured between capabilities. As they are 
conceptualized, people become aware of capabilities by deliberating and analyzing firm 
performance. A change in the market conditions, or technology, or personnel, might bring 
about a need to do things differently, and if this change is thought about, people may 
come to realize what it is that they are capable of. At its most basic this requires reflection 
on what constitutes an adequate level of performance and how this might be measured. 
But knowledge may take place without such a reflection; people cope with changes, they 
adjust and even learn new skills, but it appears that it is only when experiences are made 
apparent through articulation and codification that we can talk about dynamic capabilities 
rather than just an evolution of experience (Winter 2000; Zollo and Winter 2003). In other 
words, it is only through ‘deliberate cognitive processes’ (Zollo and Winter 2002: 340) of 
learning that dynamic capabilities are realized. 
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In summary, the work of Nonaka (and colleagues), despite some important criticisms, 
have paved the way for subsequent work in the field of organization and management 
studies and provided the foundations for resources and capabilities literatures to emerge 
and proliferate. As the resource-based theory of the firm was enhanced by capabilities 
research, it becomes apparent that despite some important ambiguities, there is a 
consensus on certain areas. According to Easterby-Smith and Prieto (2008), tacit 
knowledge plays a significant role in both areas of research: resources and capabilities. 
Capabilities of a firm reside in their routines (especially ‘high-level’ routines) rather than 
their resources. Learning is the core mechanism by which firms create and renew their 
capabilities and thus, an understanding of the mechanisms of learning is critical to our 
understanding of firms’ capabilities. How change is achieved, however, is still under-
explored in the literature of capabilities. For this reason, researchers have begun to pay 
more attention to the area of organizational routines which I turn to below. 
2.3.2 Tacit Knowledge and its Relation to (Organizational) Routines  
A related and relevant field of research that has the tacit aspect of knowledge in its core 
assumptions is the area of (organizational) routines. Routines have been seen for a 
number of years as the foundation of organizational capabilities, particularly due to the 
work of Nelson and Winter (1982) in evolutionary economics. Current theories of dynamic 
capabilities are based on the concept of ‘capabilities as routines’ (Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000; Helfat et al 2007; Teece et al, 1997). As we have seen in the previous section 
(2.3.1), dynamic capabilities are learned and stable patterns of collective activities that 
modify a firm’s operating routines (Zollo and Winter, 2002). The distinction between 
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processes in steady state and processes contributing to change is similar to the distinction 
between operational and dynamic capabilities (Helfat et al, 2007).  
Thus, according to Pentland et al (2012: 1488), any foundational theory of organizational 
routines should explain how routines change (or fail to change) over time. Pentalnd et al 
(2012) identified four aspects of routines that are of importance when researching and 
theorizing about the concept: (a) Formation of routines is typically taking place through 
repetition and they can form very quickly; (b) inertia or stability in the patterns of action of 
a routine even though external conditions maybe changeable; (c) endogenous change of 
routines even though external conditions remain relatively stable; and (c) routines as a 
primary vehicle of organizational learning. 
Routines are also linked to the concept of ‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Zahra and George, 2002) which according to Zahra and George (2002: 190) is 
defined as “a set of organizational routines and processes by which firms acquire, 
assimilate, transform and exploit knowledge to produce a dynamic organizational 
capability”. From this definition, we can infer that organizational learning is based on 
routines and the creation of dynamic capabilities depends on the underlying routines 
actually changing (Winter, 2003). It follows then, that if routines exhibit inertia, learning 
will be slow and organizational capabilities may not be particularly dynamic (Pentland et 
al 2012). 
In a recent special issue of Organization Science on ‘routine dynamics’, Feldman et al 
(2016) conceptualize routines as “recognizable, repetitive patterns of independent action 
carried out by multiple actors” (Feldman et al 2016: 505). These authors view routines as 
‘dynamic’ for two reasons: (a) the action patterns observed in routines are temporal, that 
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is, the performance of a routine cannot persist indefinitely as it exists as a trace through 
time and space; (b) any action pattern that is repeated can potentially change from one 
performance to the next. Routines are not, therefore, static things but dynamic and ever 
changing processes through the ongoing effort of those who perform them. Research on 
routine dynamics is oriented to the internal dynamics of routines and takes as focal point 
of attention and analysis the actions of human (and non-human) agents along with the 
patterns created through these actions (Feldman 2016). Routine dynamics represent one 
branch of research on routines that is based on the idea that “routines are practices with 
internal dynamics that contribute to both stability and change in organizations” (Feldman 
et al: 2016: 505; Feldman and Pentland 2003). Observations of stability and change in 
routines that could not be explained by exogenous forces (e.g. management demand, 
technological changes, environmental shifts, etc.) can be explained by research on 
routine dynamics. For example, Feldman (2000) and Pentland et al (2011) noted that as 
people enact routines they generate new patterns of action even when there was no 
evidenced exogenous force that caused these changes. Also, it has been observed that 
when significant exogenous forces were impacting on organizations, people enacting 
routines often manifested considerable flexibility in the actions they took to maintain 
patterns of action (Feldman 2000; Howard-Grenville 2005; Pentland and Feldman 2008). 
As Feldman (2016: 27) asserts, the focus on the process of routine dynamics allow us to 
address these issues by “focusing on enactment rather than representation, on process 
and potentiality rather than likelihood, and on relationality rather than correlation”.  
Routines are conceptualized as comprising of two levels (or parts) (Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003; Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011; Pentland et al, 2012): First is 
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the concrete level, the core of routines that consists of the specific performances of the 
routine which may exhibit some variations. Feldman and Pentland (2003) refer to this 
level as the ‘performative’ aspect of routines and define it as the specific actions that take 
place at specific times and places. Second is the more abstract level of routines that 
shapes and is shaped by the first, that is, the performative. Feldman and Pentland (2003) 
refer to this part as the ‘ostensive’ aspect, a more abstract level that what it contains is 
more debatable. The ostensive and the performative aspects of routines have initially 
been distinguished by Feldman (2000: 622) drawing on earlier work of Latour (1986) who 
used the same terminology in his description of power. Ostensive routines may be devoid 
of active thinking, argues Feldman (2000), but routines enacted by people (performative) 
in organizations involve a range of actions, behaviors, thinking and feelings. Ongoing 
performances, however, are not solely determined by ostensive aspects. Variations in the 
enactment of routines occur on a daily basis without necessarily altering the ostensive 
aspect of a routine. Performances can lead to change of the ostensive aspect when 
participants repeat the same variations, reflect on them, and reorient understandings of 
the routine for future performances (Feldman and Pentland 2003). 
The performative aspect of routines has also been referred to as ‘skills’ (Nelson and 
Winter, 2003) or ‘dispositions’ (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010), or ‘practices’ (Orlikowski, 
2002), or even ‘collective mind’ (Wick and Roberts, 1993). In the literature on 
organizational routines, the core level, i.e. the performative aspect of routines, has been 
generally agreed upon in its theoretical foundations (Pentland et al, 2012). However, the 
more abstract level, i.e. the ostensive aspects of routines, have been more difficult to 
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define and agree a consensus as to what it contains. This is because of two important 
reasons:  
(a) Routines are almost never carried out by humans alone; instead, they are carried 
out by sociomaterial ensembles of actants that include artifacts such as tools, 
templates, written procedures, information and communication technologies, and 
so on. Orlikowski (2007: 1436) for example argues that “every organizational 
practice is always bound with materiality. Materiality is not an incidental or 
intermittent aspect of organizational life; it is integral to it” (original emphasis). 
(b) The ability to observe the ostensive level is difficult as dispositions or skills operate 
at a background as an unseen force and the ostensive patterns of actions vary 
from one routine to the next or from one perspective to another. Pentland et al 
(2011) refer to the ‘ostensive’ part of the routines simply as ‘history’. If this 
conceptualization is accepted, it implies that ostensive routines are path-
dependent, i.e. each action performed in routines is dependent on prior actions 
and future actions depend on current ones. 
Moreover, a paradox arises in that even though the ostensive part of the routine remains 
stable, the performative aspect can be highly diverse. This results in an apparent 
oscillation between stability and change in organizational routines. Farjoun (2010) 
suggested that this stability and change in routines can be better thought of as a 
decoupling of outcomes (ostensive) from processes (performative). Pentland et al (2011: 
1380) used the example of invoice processing in four different organizations which 
although appeared to be an unproblematic, structured, repetitive and institutionalized 
routine, it was characterized by large variations in the performance. 
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It appears then that no two routines are the same. It is apparent that the decoupling of 
ostensive from performative routines, i.e. outcomes from processes, sheds light on the 
paradoxical nature of stability and change on organizational settings. We can further 
elaborate on this paradox by thinking of mundane routines that we may participate in our 
everyday lives – an example I will concentrate further in the next chapter. Think for 
example of riding a bicycle to go to work on a daily basis. This action can be differentiated 
if we think that the ostensive part of the routine (or, the outcome) is to arrive at work safely 
and on time. The performative part (or process) of the routine, on the other hand, is the 
performance execution itself, that is, riding through the busy roads, negotiating through 
traffic, paying attention to other cyclists or vehicles on the road including pedestrians, and 
so on. Therefore, the ostensive aspect remains largely unchanged (i.e. arriving at work 
safely and on time) whereas the performative aspect can be adjusted depending on the 
road conditions, traffic, accidents, even our own feelings, moods and body capabilities. It 
is easy to compare our execution of the routine to that of our colleagues, for example, 
only to identify that the ostensive part remains largely unchanged whereas the 
performative might vary significantly from person to person.  
Even executing the same routine over and over again would only affect the performative 
aspects, not the ostensive. As Cohen (2007: 782) suggests:  
“For an established routine, the natural fluctuation of its surrounding environment guarantees 
that each performance is different, and yet, being a routine, it is ‘the same’. Somehow there is 
pattern in the action, sufficient to allow us to say the pattern is recurring, even though there is 
substantial variety to the action, variety sufficient to allow us to rule out any two occasions being 
exactly alike”.  
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From a more phenomenological (or interpretivist) perspective, routines are 
conceptualized as practices in which patterns of action are an essential part of routines 
(Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011; Parmigiani and Howard-
Grenville, 2011, Rerup and Feldman 2011). From a practice perspective, patterns are 
enacted through actions taken by people (or machines) and are reflective of the actions 
that constitute them (Pentland et al 2012: 1489). Feldman (2000: 613) argued that “ideas 
produce actions, actions produce outcomes, and outcomes produce ideas. It is the 
relationship between these elements that generates change”. This reflective response to 
previous outcomes signifies the central role of reflection in routine changing. 
The concept of reflection is then particularly useful when viewing routines as practices. In 
a broad sense, reflection means engaging in comparison, considering alternatives, seeing 
things from different perspectives, and drawing inferences (Jordan et al 2009). As such, 
reflection is a major element of learning from experience especially when it comes to 
critical or transformative types of learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978) that challenge 
previous ways of thinking and acting instead of just adapting them slightly. In parallel to 
organizational reflection is the concept of mindfulness which can be defined as an 
individual learning process characterized by a heightened awareness of the specific 
circumstances in a given situation (Langer, 1989; 1997). 
The concept of mindfulness has its origins in psychology and entered the organization 
studies vocabulary through the work of Karl Weick and his colleagues (Weick and Sutcliffe 
2006; Weick et al 1999). Jordan et al (2009: 468) define mindfulness as “a state of mind 
or mode of practice that permits the questioning of expectations, knowledge and the 
adequacy of routines in complex and not fully predictable social, technological, and 
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physical settings”. Importantly, this definition implies that mindfulness does not exclude 
or oppose the idea of routines, but may instead build upon routinized action (Levinthal 
and Rerup, 2006). Therefore, mindfulness can be regarded as an organizational 
phenomenon which even though it may be grounded in individual mindful behaviors, it 
also builds on organizational mechanisms. This collective mindfulness can be realized in 
two different levels (Jordan, et al 2009):  
(a) The level of direct interaction in dyads or small groups: Collective mindfulness 
depends on communication where through conversation, organizational actors 
collectively tell each other about – or make sense of – an unusual experience. 
This ‘heedful interrelation’ (Weick and Roberts 1993) may take place in reaction 
to an unexpected event. Frequently, however, this interrelation is supported by 
interactive routines, that is, routines that evoke awareness of context in 
interaction, which are carried out by organizational actors quite habitually. In 
mindful organizations, as Weick et al (1999: 87) has suggested, “there is 
variation in activity, but there is stability in the [cognitive] processes that make 
sense of this activity”. Importantly, these cognitive routines of evaluation are 
used to detect and/or cope with unexpected events or moments of crisis. 
Dyadic or small group interactions are important because they direct attention 
to things that may have been unnoticed or unexpected and therefore help 
organizational actors to become more reflective of the action they participate in 
(reflection-in-action). 
(b) At a more general level routines help organizing mindfulness: mindfulness can 
also be conceptualized with reference to organization-wide rules and routines 
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that regulate interactive routines and individual mindfulness. Louis and Sutton 
(1991), for example, suggested that mindfulness is triggered by some element 
of surprise, and as such, it could be argued that surprises and instability rather 
than stable structures take prominence. Although routines (and rules) build on 
necessary resources for mindful action, these routines need to be 
complemented by other routines that are directed towards the organization of 
instability, making organizational members aware of diverse action ensembles 
and including mindful application of routines (Jordan, et al 2009). 
Rerup (2005: 452) defines mindfulness as the quality of attention enabling entrepreneurs 
and organizational actors to minimize errors, remain vigilant, and respond effectively to 
unexpected events. He argued that mindfulness makes actors aware of what they do and 
what they tacitly know as well as how distinct practices have positive and negative 
consequences when they are extrapolated from one task to the next or one venture to 
another. These ‘intelligent failures’ (Ucbasaran, et al 2013: 196) which can be defined as 
failures for which expectations are not met, may be increased by mindfulness and can be 
proved useful for future learning. Thus, mindfulness may be a way of maximizing the 
learning benefits of failure experience. Such attentional engagement involves mindful 
information processing as defined by Levinthal and Rerup (2006) who distinguished 
between mindful (or controlled) information processing from less mindful (or automatic) 
information processing and argued that the latter involved routinized behavior and 
reinforcement learning. They defined mindfulness as attentiveness to context and the 
capacity to respond to unanticipated cues or signals (Levinthal and Rerup 2006: 506). 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2006) stressed the importance of ‘quality’ of organizational attention 
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that is no so much concerned with encoding and conceptual thinking, but concentration 
and stability of attention. Attentional mindfulness is a particular variant of attentional 
engagement. 
Although some authors differentiate between mindfulness and reflection (Weick and 
Sutcliffe 2006), with mindfulness being characterized as heightened, ‘pre-reflexive’ 
awareness to the situation at hand and reflection being characterized by engaging in 
comparison and review of the situation at hand, a number of similarities have also been 
highlighted.  Both reflection and mindfulness are described as being triggered by 
surprises and discontinuous events and result in questioning of existing ways of doing 
things thus enhancing developments of new actions and practices. Moreover, both 
reflection and mindfulness are deemed appropriate in the face of complex environments 
and problems that call for improvisations and problem setting rather than mere problem 
solving (Levinthal and Rerup, 2006; Jordan, et al 2009). 
Nevertheless, many events in an organization’s life (e.g. substitute equipment, adjust to 
seasonal demand, etc.) can be anticipated with the use of an organizational routine or a 
standard operating procedure. These predictable routines, however, may take 
unpredictable paths and what was once easily fixed or tackled it could become unstable 
and unpredictable. This brings forward a fundamental question in routines research: How 
do routines change? Feldman and Pentland (2003) identified two reasons that shed light 
to this question: First, participants engaging in routines might not perform the same 
routines in exactly the same way every time; and, second, as routines are enacted by 
multiple participants, it is possible that disagreements occur on how to perform a routine 
that are based in differences in orientations, positions, and power in organizations. In 
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addition, Kaplan and Orlikowski (2013) suggested that managers face uncertainties in 
relation to the business, the market, and the environment in which a firm operates and 
therefore these uncertainties lead to breakdowns in understandings on how to move 
organizational tasks forward. Therefore, these authors and others (Farjoun et al 2015; 
Feldman 2003; Feldman et al 2016; Pentland et al 2012) suggest that breakdowns, 
accidents, surprises, or crises in the enactment of routines can be responsible for their 
change.  
From the preceding discussion in this Chapter we can draw some useful conclusions that 
relate to the ways in which knowledge and routines are intertwined and implicate the 
remainder of this thesis. First, a firm’s advantage resides in its ability to create and renew 
(tacit) organizational knowledge. Second, creating and renewing organizational routines 
means to appreciate the role of learning and in particular its tacit component. Third, taking 
tacit knowing seriously implies that attention is placed on both stability and change in 
organizational routines. Fourth, understanding changing routines involves an 
appreciation of breakdowns, accidents, disturbances, and discontinuities in 
organizational life. The following table (Table 2.3.) summarizes the main assumptions 
found in routines perspective. 
TABLE 2.3 A SUMMARY OF KEY ASSUMPTIONS OF ROUTINES PERSPECTIVE  
 Routines Perspective 
Main interests How routines operate; internal dynamics 
Level of Analysis Routines themselves 
Unit of Analysis Routines as ‘parts’ (internal structure of routines, what is inside the 
‘black box’) 
Empirical Attention Actors’ influence on routine performance 
How routines change and remain stable over time and the role of 
agency and artifacts in this 
54 
 
How routines are created or change 
When and how routines break down 
Stability and Change Change and stability always possible 
Same mechanisms (agency, artifacts) underlie change or stability 
Source: Adapted from Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville (2011: 418) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This Chapter has provided an overview of the developments around the concept of 
knowledge within the field of organization and management studies. It has been argued 
that despite a general agreement that tacit knowledge is important in organizations, the 
proliferation of studies on the topic has contributed to more ambiguity than clarity. To 
tackle some of these ambiguities, the Chapter reviews two main areas in organization 
and management studies literature in which the concept of tacit knowledge appears to be 
particularly important. These are related to knowledge management and organizational 
routines. Since the work of Nonaka (and his colleagues) on knowledge creation, 
considerable attention has been placed on tacit knowing as a strategically significant 
resource of the firm that if managed appropriately, it can lead to competitive advantage. 
The resource-based theory of the firm views (tacit) knowledge as a fundamental part of a 
firm’s ability to gain and sustain advantages in the marketplace. The literature on 
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(dynamic) capabilities, too, places tacit knowledge at the core of the learning organization 
in its pursue to creating and renewing its resource base. However, what is the exact 
mechanism by which knowledge is generated and developed so as to contribute to 
changes in the resources still remains under-explored. To address these issues, the 
concept of ‘dynamic routines’ has emerged as a promising research area in which 
organizational routines are seen as practices with internal dynamics that contribute to 
both stability and change in organizations. This particular branch of research focuses the 
attention on the actions of human (and non-human) agents and the patterns created 
through these actions. 
Therefore, although the importance of tacit knowledge is acknowledged and appreciated 
in these prominent literatures, what is its exact role and how (and why) it contributes to 
both stability and change in organizational settings is still under-researched. This may be 
due to lack of a clear framework from which tacit knowing can be theorized and 
researched that can potentially clear the way for a more robust understanding of the 
contribution of tacit knowledge in changing routines. For this reason, the next Chapter 
(Chapter Three) embarks on an attempt to answer the questions of what is tacit 
knowledge, how can we – as researchers – understand it, and how can we 
reconceptualize it in the context of organizational routines. 
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CHAPTER THREE: WHAT IS TACIT KNOWLEDGE?  
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
In this Chapter (Chapter Three) I delve deeper into the concept of tacit knowledge in an 
attempt to critically examine its main contributors. The purpose of this critical examination 
is twofold: First, in spite of several authors’ attempts to re-conceptualizing the tacit, an 
appropriate framework through which tacit knowledge may be viewed still remains 
elusive. A novel framework is needed which may be more appropriate in eliminating a 
number of misunderstandings that have arisen and can be more productive in moving the 
concept forward. Second, building on this novel framework of the tacit, we can be in a 
better position to access and research tacit knowledge in organizational settings. This is 
of particular importance because as we have seen in the previous Chapter (Chapter Two), 
one of the main problems associated with the concept is the apparent difficulty associated 
with researching the tacit. 
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Tacit knowledge plays a significant role in organizational life. This is not surprising as the 
concept has been strongly linked to skilful action where organizational members know 
many things about what they do but when they are asked to describe and give an account 
of their action, they often find it hard to explain it in words because, it has been argued, 
effective performance depends on knowledge that cannot be explicitly formulated in full 
(Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 
2001). Building on this observation, several studies have sought to explore further the 
concept but critical misunderstandings still remain. The main one is that tacit knowledge 
is still understood as depicted in Nonaka’s work and the SECI model of knowledge 
conversion, that is, tacit knowledge that awaits its conversion into explicit. Tsoukas (2011) 
has argued that this prevalent conceptualization of tacit knowledge is built on the 
premises of a cognitivist epistemology in which tacit knowledge is thought to be a mental 
capacity awaiting its symbolic representation or conversion into explicit knowledge by 
merely retrieving it. In so far as tacit knowledge is a mental phenomenon, it should be 
accessible to consciousness. However, accessing tacit knowledge can be achieved 
through non-cognitivist ways but these have not been fully explored in the literature and, 
only recently, some authors have attempted to shed light on this alternative approach 
(Sandberg and Pinnington, 2009; Yanow and Tsoukas, 2009). 
Nonaka and his colleagues are perhaps the one who deserve the most credit in raising 
awareness of tacit knowledge in organization studies but are also the ones who are 
responsible for the subsequent misunderstandings of the concept. It could be argued that 
conceptualizing something as mystical or elusive as tacit knowledge is problematic but 
this is not necessarily the case. Such problems can – and have – indeed arisen because 
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many authors have started from the wrong premise which places tacit knowledge to the 
cognitive domain and, as such its access becomes a very difficult, if not impossible, task. 
Therefore, we may need to change our perspective from which the tacit can be viewed. 
A more interpretivist [or, what Tsoukas (2011) refers to as ‘phenomenological’] account 
of tacit knowledge is needed in which the concept accrues its special place as the 
necessary condition for explicit knowledge to exist. We can get access to tacit knowledge 
through action and in retrospect. Only if we, as organizational researchers, change our 
perspective of viewing the tacit, we can have a better understanding of the concept that 
will be no more mystical, elusive, and inaccessible. 
In this Chapter, therefore, I aim to understand how knowledge can be (re-) conceptualized 
in order to allow for it to be accessed, analyzed, researched and ultimately understood. 
By clearing up the conceptual misunderstandings, the next step involves an assessment 
of the tacit in relation to organizational routines. To do so, we have to go back to the 
source: its originator, Michael Polanyi. But this may not be enough as more recent 
accounts that aim to understand the tacit have emerged in sociology of knowledge. One 
of them is the work of the British sociologist Harry Collins, whose book Tacit and Explicit 
Knowledge attempts to shed fresh light on the concept because, as he argues, Polanyi’s 
account of the tacit is responsible for the many subsequent misunderstandings 
associated with it. My purpose in this Chapter is to understand whether his 
conceptualization is complementary and consistent to Polanyi’s work or whether it is 
incommensurate in some ways. This will shed more light on a number of areas that remain 
insufficiently understood such as what is tacit knowledge and what is its relation to explicit, 
how knowledge can be created, and what is the role of concepts such as ‘attention’ and 
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‘reflection’ in accounts of the process of tacit knowing. Also, this will have implications on 
how the process of knowing is understood in relation to organizational routines and their 
dynamics as routines change and stabilize within organizational settings.  
In the next section I begin this exploration by drawing on Polanyi’s work and his 
understanding of knowledge as comprising of subsidiary particulars and focal targets. 
Following this, I engage with the work of Collins, particularly his latest book contribution 
titled ‘Tacit and Explicit Knowledge’. I continue this Chapter by offering a number of 
implications from these accounts and continue my understanding by developing a 
theoretical framework which may be used to better understand tacit knowing and its close 
relation to organizational routines. 
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3.2 MICHAEL POLANYI ON THE TACIT  
One of the first writers to discuss the concept of tacit knowledge was the British 
philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1945; 1949). Ryle distinguished between two kinds of 
knowledge: knowing-that and knowing-how. By this distinction, Ryle points to the 
difference between propositional knowledge (knowing-that) and knowledge of how to 
perform cognitive tasks (knowing-how). He insisted that these two types of knowledge 
are not independent but inter-dependent and cannot be reduced to one another. Acquiring 
know-that, does not lead to being able to use it. In Ryle’s famous example, knowing the 
rules of chess does not tell you how to play chess. Thus, for Ryle, to make knowing-that 
useful, requires appropriate know-how and such knowing-how is only acquired through 
practice (Ryle, 1949: 41). 
These insights by Ryle have given credence and inspiration to another philosopher of 
knowledge, Michael Polanyi (1962; 1966). In his influential works, Polanyi went to great 
lengths to devise a theory of knowledge that centers on its tacit dimension as being the 
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most significant form of all knowledge. His basic claim is that “all knowledge falls into one 
of these two classes: it is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge” (Polanyi, 1962: 195). 
One of Polanyi’s most significant innovations in his accounts of knowing is that it consists 
of three complementary but mutually exclusive forms of comprehension: subsidiary 
particulars, a focal target, and a person (a subject) who links the two together. All 
knowledge, for Polanyi, depends on our skilled performance of integrating subsidiary 
particulars into focal targets in order to arrive at meanings. Thus, for Polanyi, knowledge 
is a personal and individualistic endeavor of continuous integration and re-integration of 
subsidiary particulars.  
These integrations, for Polanyi, are largely inarticulate. Polanyi’s most quoted line is that 
“we know more than we can tell” (Polanyi, 1966: 4), which implies that the part of 
knowledge that remains unvoiced is the tacit, inarticulate aspect of all knowing. Polanyi 
came to understand these inarticulate accomplishments humans share with other animals 
as crucial tacit contributors to human learning and knowing. Language, for instance, can 
be regarded itself as a tacit skill. In learning a new language, Polanyi insists, we have to 
attend to the separate words, even the letters of the alphabet if it is an unfamiliar one, in 
order to link them together to create meaning. But if we master the use of language, we 
no longer do that. We attend to the meaning without being aware of the letters and the 
words of the language. “[Letters, symbols, etc.] can serve as instruments of meaning, only 
by being subsidiarily known while fixing our focal attention on their meaning” (Polanyi, 
1962: 30). Crucially, for Polanyi, what is tacit must not be equated to what is unconscious, 
but, instead, it should be contrasted with what is explicit. 
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“When reading a text or listening to speech we have a completely conscious awareness of it, even 
while we remain consciously aware of the text also in terms of its message, to which we keep 
attending focally” (Polanyi, 1962: 92, emphasis in original). 
Focal awareness regards the meaning that has been contributed by subsidiary 
particulars’ integration in the structure of knowing. Knowing, in turn, for Polanyi, has a 
‘from-to’ structure: the particulars bear on the focus to which I attend from them (Tsoukas 
and Vladimirou, 2001: 982). The structure of tacit knowing, for Polanyi, is as follows: the 
subsidiary particulars that form the background of any skilful performance are integrated 
and re-integrated in order to attend to our focal targets so that meaning can be created. 
For example, one has subsidiary awareness of holding a hammer in the act of focusing 
on hitting a nail. In being subsidiarily aware of holding a hammer, the individual sees it as 
having a meaning that is eliminated if that person focuses attention on how he/she is 
holding the hammer.  
Subsidiary awareness and focal awareness are mutually exclusive (Polanyi, 1962: 56). If 
we switch our focal attention to particulars which we were only subsidiarily aware before, 
the meaning is lost and the corresponding action may become clumsy (Tsoukas, 2011: 
460). If, for instance, a speaker focuses his/her attention on the grammar being used 
rather than the act of speaking, he/she would be unable to create sense. Polanyi (1966: 
10) suggested that we must learn to rely subsidiarily on particulars for attending to 
something else, thus our knowledge of them remains tacit. Knowing something, therefore, 
comprises of the ability of an individual to connect the subsidiary particulars to a focal 
target. Such a connection is made possible through action and its realization is 
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retrospective. We do not necessarily know what to do before we actually do it and then 
reflect on it. The following figure (Figure 3.1) depicts the structure of personal knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.1 THE STRUCTURE OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
Source: Adapted from Tsoukas (2011: 460) 
An example that may be used here to demonstrate the performative character of tacit 
knowing and the integration between subsidiary particulars and focal targets is the use of 
geographical maps (see also Tsoukas, 2011: 457). A map is a printed (explicit) 
representation of a particular place or territory. As such, we may be familiar with a map 
per se (of, say, Manchester city center) but to use it, we need to be able to relate it to the 
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real world outside of the map. To do so, as Tsoukas (2011) suggests, we need to be able 
to do three things: First, we need to identify our current position in the map (e.g. ‘I am 
here, at Piccadilly Train Station’). Second, we need to be able to identify where we want 
to get to (e.g. ‘I want to go to MMU Business School’). Third, we need to be able to reach 
our destination by identifying various landmarks and relate the landscape around us (‘I 
should find the Corner House and turn left’). This means that no matter how elaborate a 
map is, its use requires the skilful judgment of a reader to relate the map to the world 
(Polanyi, 1962: 18-20). Thus, meaning is created through the skilful performance of 
integrating the subsidiary particulars (e.g. understanding how to read a map properly, 
negotiating our way through Manchester’s traffic, etc.) to our focal target (e.g. getting to 
our destination).  
These particulars are operating in our background understanding of going by in our 
everyday lives. Thus understood, meaning is inextricably linked to a personal integration 
of linking subsidiary particulars and focal targets. Polanyi called this a condition of 
‘indwelling’ in subsidiary particulars, in things around us such as tools, equipment, 
symbols, etc.: As he notes, “we pour ourselves out into them and assimilate them as part 
of our own existence. We accept them existentially by ‘dwelling’ in them” (Polanyi 1962: 
59). This is the reason why Polanyi’s dictum ‘we know more than we can tell’ bears an 
enormous significance in our investigation of tacit knowing. When we carry out a task, 
what we can tell is only what we are focally aware of. When we engage in an action, we 
cannot identify the particulars that make up the background on the basis of which our 
action is rendered possible. Our tacit knowledge of subsidiaries is manifested in our 
patterns of action (Tsoukas 2011: 460-464). 
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These observations have led authors to theorize that there is always a part of tacit 
knowledge that remains hidden, inaccessible, and difficult to communicate; in other 
words, tacit knowledge contains an ineffability which makes it impossible to verbalize or 
convert, or articulate (Chia and Holt, 2006; Tsoukas, 2005; 2003). As Polanyi (1962: 88; 
emphasis in original) suggests: 
“Subsidiary or instrumental knowledge, as I have defined it, is not known in itself but is known in 
terms of something focally known, to the quality of which it contributes; and to this extent it is 
unspecifiable. Analysis may bring subsidiary knowledge into focus and formulate it as a maxim or 
as a feature in a physiognomy, but such specification is in general not exhaustive. Although the 
expert diagnostician, taxonomist and cotton-classer can indicate their clues and formulate their 
maxims, they know many more things than they can tell, knowing them only in practice, as 
instrumental particulars, and not explicitly, as objects. The knowledge of such particulars is 
therefore ineffable, and the pondering of a judgment in terms of such particulars is an ineffable 
process of thought”. 
 
It is true that in a moment of knowing there are ineffable contributors to knowing but 
Polanyi uses the term ‘ineffable’ to point towards two factors increasingly unavailable to 
consciousness to indicate: (a) an expression of the obvious fact that when we focus on 
one thing there are innumerable contributors to the knowledge of the moment that we 
cannot at the same time be focusing upon, or (b) it is a recognition that we cannot 
articulate clearly (or, perhaps, not at all) how we carry out skills and discriminate through 
connoisseurship (Gulick, 2016). None of these aspects is, at least in principle, excluded 
from being made explicit even though they may remain ineffable within subjective 
experience. 
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This is exemplified in one of Polanyi’s famous examples of tacit knowing: our ability to 
riding a bicycle. Polanyi has shown how the knowledge involved in such an activity cannot 
be made explicit, involves a bodily skill, and cannot be easily articulated. To convince the 
reader, Polanyi (1966: 6-7) states: “...in order to compensate for a given angle of 
imbalance (a) we must take a curve on the side of the imbalance, of which the radius (r) 
should be proportionate to the square of the velocity (v) over the imbalance r~v²/a”, hence 
suggesting that bike-riding, although tacit in its execution (performance/practice) could 
consist of explicit knowledge. However, Polanyi argues, we cannot learn how to ride a 
bicycle, to keep our balance on it, by studying this mathematical formula. Such knowledge 
is only useful if we want to build a bike-balancing robot. So tacit knowing contains a 
‘personal coefficient’ (Polanyi, 1962: 17) which is always manifested in skilful 
performance carried out by the knower. Subsidiary particulars are known for as long as 
they contribute to the action performed. As Polanyi (1962: 62; emphasis in original) 
remarks: 
“This is the usual process of unconscious trial and error by which we feel our way to success and 
may continue to improve on our success without specifiably knowing how we do it—for we never 
meet the causes of our success as identifiable things which can be described in terms of classes 
of which such things are members. This is how you invent a method of swimming without knowing 
that it consists in regulating your breath in a particular manner, or discover the principle of cycling 
without realizing that it consists in the adjustment of your momentary direction and velocity, so 
as to counteract continuously your momentary accidental unbalance”. 
 
How do we ‘feel our way’ to successfully completing an action? According to Polanyi 
(1966: 10-13) (see also Tsoukas, 2011: 460-462) the structure of tacit knowing has three 
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aspects: the functional, the phenomenal, and the semantic (see Table 3.1). The functional 
aspect consists in the ‘from-to’ relation of subsidiary particulars to the focal target. We 
know the particulars tacitly for attending to a particular action focally. The phenomenal 
aspect involves the transformation of subsidiary experience into a new (sensory) 
experience. Finally, the semantic aspect is the meaning of the subsidiaries, which is the 
focal target in which they bear.  
TABLE 3.1 THE THREE-DIMENSIONAL STRUCTURE OF TACIT KNOWING 
 The functional dimension: 
From-to knowing: we know the particulars by relying on our awareness of them for attending 
to something else. 
 
 The phenomenal dimension: 
The transformation of subsidiary experience into a new (sensory) experience. 
 
 The semantic dimension: 
The meaning of subsidiaries (i.e. the focal target on which they bear). 
Source: Tsoukas (2011: 460-462) 
This may become clearer if we return to the previous example of reading a geographical 
map. In attempting to get to a particular destination (our focal target), we rely subsidiarily 
on our understanding of walking in a city, negotiating through the traffic, using the 
pedestrian paths and crossing the streets without endangering ourselves or other 
pedestrians/motorists. This is the functional aspect of tacit knowing. The phenomenal 
aspect involves locating ourselves in the city and in relation to the map, walking through 
the various landmarks and places of interest and creating new experiences of walking 
into a novel environment. Such an activity involves the transformation of our subsidiary 
experiences into new experiences. The semantic aspect, finally, involves our acquiring of 
new information (or what Polanyi means by creating new ‘meaning’) of the city center, its 
streets, people, landmarks, cafes, and so on. Overall, in all aspects of life, from a simple 
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task of moving our eye muscles when we observe something to doing a PhD in social 
sciences, we are normally focally unaware of how we do them.  
The preceding discussion demonstrates that both Ryle and Polanyi agree that in order to 
know something, you need to engage in a practice; to know chess you need to play chess, 
to speak a language you need to practice it, to ride a bicycle you need to get on it (Brown 
and Duguid, 2001; Duguid 2005, Scott, 1971). However, Ryle’s (1949) account diverges 
from that of Polanyi’s in the fact that for him know-how involves a cognitive or intellectual 
effort whereas Polanyi’s notion of ‘indwelling’ manifests a non-cognitive realm of 
understanding that we achieve in our efforts to know something.  
In cognitive psychology, for instance, the term tacit knowledge is widely used by a group 
of researchers engaged in intelligence testing and job performance prediction (Sternberg 
et al, 1993; Sternberg et al, 1995). While this group cites Polanyi’s ‘we know more than 
we can tell’ statement and frequently use the term tacit knowledge to define their 
approach, they equate their approach to Ryle’s know-how’ and to practical or ‘everyday’ 
intelligence. Polanyi’s theory of ‘tacit knowing’, however, uses both intellectual and 
practical knowing (Polanyi, 1966: 7) by integrating both Ryle’s concepts – know-how and 
know-that – in the model. Also, know-how for Ryle refers to a distinct realm of knowledge, 
not necessarily a primary understanding (Ryle, 1949: 40). This supports the view that 
Ryle sees knowledge as a spectrum where tacit and explicit knowledge are placed at 
opposite ends. For Polanyi, on the other hand, tacit and explicit knowledge cannot be 
separated; they are not distinct. They are simply the ‘two sides of the same coin’ 
(Tsoukas, 2011: 472). A sharp distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge does not 
exist. “Tacit thought forms an indispensable part of all knowledge” Polanyi (1962: 20) 
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argued, because “all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge” (Polanyi, 1966: 
7; original emphasis). 
Polanyi’s original insights on the character and structure of knowing have given credence 
and inspiration to a number of authors who attempted to critically engage with his original 
ideas. Although it is now widely accepted that there are two types of knowledge (tacit and 
explicit) as different disciplines in social sciences define it (see Chapter Two), there are 
a number of points that have not been clearly clarified. As we saw in the previous Chapter 
(Chapter Two), Gourlay (2006b) identified a number of ambiguities and areas that needed 
further clarity in relation to the concept. One of these ambiguities concerns whether 
knowledge is an individual possession that comes from one’s direct experience or 
whether it is both an individual and collective (or organizational) possession. This has 
been termed as the ‘socialization problem’ (Collins 2010: 138) of the tacit, that is, whether 
and how knowledge can (or cannot) be explicated, in what situations, and under what 
circumstances. The problem of socialization is the problem of identifying the specific 
mechanisms by which collective understandings are passed on to us as individuals. In 
the next session, I turn to the work of Collins to identify his understanding of tacit and 
explicit knowledge. 
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3.3 HARRY COLLINS ON THE TACIT AND EXPLICIT  
British sociologist, Harry Collins (2010), recently attempted to redefine tacit knowledge 
from the perspective of scientific knowledge-making. Collins identifies three reasons for 
why the concept of tacit knowledge has been misunderstood. First, he suggests that 
Polanyi is partially to blame for the confusion as in his Personal Knowledge, the argument 
is not clear or consistent and the tacit dimension is seen as mystical and special concept 
rather than an unremarkable aspect of everyday life. Second, Collins argues that tacit 
knowledge seems problematic or unusual because of our modern society’s fixation to 
explicit knowledge. Third, Collins suggests that we should be more concerned with tacit 
knowledge rather than tacit knowing. One key problem that Collins sees in our attempts 
to understand tacit knowledge is what he refers to as the ‘socialization problem’.  As he 
acknowledges, “[W]e can describe the circumstances under which [tacit knowledge] is 
acquired, but we cannot describe or explain the mechanism… until we have solved the 
socialization problem” (Collins 2010: 138). 
For Collins (2010: 1), “tacit knowledge is knowledge that is not explicated”. His account 
of the tacit is influenced by his interest in computer capability. His main endeavor is to 
understand what aspects of knowing cannot be transformed – at least at theoretical level 
– into computer language. All that can be transformed – theoretically – is what we call 
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explicit; that which cannot be transformed is the tacit. This account is quite different to 
that proposed in Polanyi’s work in which all knowing, including that which we call ‘explicit’, 
relies upon tacit processes and elements. For Polanyi, tacit knowing is no different to any 
kind of knowing, although some aspects of knowing have explicit components and some 
do not. As we saw previously, the subsidiaries upon which all knowing is dependent are 
tacit which implies that, for Polanyi, tacit knowledge includes knowledge that can be 
explicated. In addition, Collins treats knowledge as an objective entity available in society 
and culture to be analyzed. Polanyi, on the other hand, although does acknowledge a 
realm of cultural knowledge (Polanyi, 1962: 388-399), his account is built upon the notion 
of tradition to indicate a dominant vehicle of cultural continuity (Gulick, 2016). However, 
his prime concern is related to how knowledge arises in and is utilized by individuals. 
Thus, as Gulick (2016: 305) suggests, Polanyi’s title of his magnum opus should not be 
‘Personal Knowledge’ but ‘Personal Knowing’ as the attention is in the individual’s 
processes of knowing whereas Collins’ account is about the social realm of knowledge. 
It is important to note here that Collins never clams that his intent is to be consistent with 
Polanyi’s definitions and develop its implications. In Tradition and Discovery (an academic 
journal dedicated to the advancement of Polanyi’s thought), a number of authors (e.g. 
Henry, 2011 and Lowney, 2011) have provided probing discussions of Collins’ work and 
Collins himself responded with the following clarification: 
“I am a sociologist and my interest lies in the knowledge of groups, how knowledge spreads, how 
we can acquire different ways of seeing the world, and so on. I have no interest in individual 
creativity or insight except to say that without the idea of individual pioneers we could not have 
the form of life of science. Mostly, however, Polanyi’s stress on personal knowledge has tended 
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to mislead people about what I was up to when they found the term ‘tacit knowledge’ in my 
writings” (Collins, 2011: 38). 
 
In Polanyi’s view, what in one moment is tacit as a subsidiary awareness can become 
focal attention in moments of reflection, whereas for Collins the distinction between tacit 
and explicit is more strictly defined. One of the key arguments Collins makes in his book 
is the difference between transformation (strings) and translation (language). The former 
occurs in the physical world which is subjected to cause and effect forces whereas the 
latter is related to the use of language which creates meanings that are subject to 
translation by other human beings. Thus, language translation is different to string 
transformation because it always involves human interpretation and thus tacit knowledge. 
The world of transformation is the world of (often explicit) patterned ‘stings’ and, due to 
causality, all that appears tacit is – in theory – explicable. 
More specifically, a string is any physical object with some kind of pattern inscribed on it 
(for example, a photograph is comprised of patterns of ink on a paper) or spoken words 
(patterns of compressed air). Stings, for Collins, transmit information through physical 
contact, in which patterns are transformed from one medium to another (for example, 
transformation of electric currents into patterns of pixels on a computer screen). Humans 
can act in this physical world like animals do through what Collins refers to as 
‘mimeomorphic’ actions, while the physical world and human meanings can be engaged 
conceptually through ‘polimorphic’ actions. Earlier works by Collins (e.g. Collins and 
Kusch, 1998; Ribeiro and Collins, 2007) shed light on this distinction where a separation 
is established. Thus, there are two types of actions: (a) ‘mimeomorphic’, which is 
generally carried out with the same behavior exhibited indifferently in many occasions 
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(e.g. typing in a number on a telephone keyboard), and (b) ‘polimorphic’, which is 
generally executed with many different behaviors depending on the social circumstances 
(e.g. greeting) (Collins and Kusch, 1988). 
The key and perhaps innovative aspect of Collins’ work is his attention to define the 
‘explicit’. He argues that considerable attention and effort has been placed on defining 
and understanding the tacit whereas the explicit or explicable is somewhat overlooked as 
obvious. Thus, Collins reverses the order as he attempts to define the nature of the explicit 
whereas his characterization of the tacit is quite simple. His introduction of the term ‘sting’ 
denotes physical things that contain information but mean nothing in themselves unless 
they are interpreted by humans using language. He thus offers three senses of explicating 
tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge through three forms of transformation: elaboration 
(“a longer string affords meaning when a shorter one does not”), transformation (“physical 
transformation of strings enhances their causal effect and affordance”), and 
mechanization (“a sting is transformed into mechanical causes and effects that mimic 
human action”) (Collins, 2010: 81). Tacit knowledge then, for Collins, is knowledge that 
cannot be transformed into an interpretable string (Collins, 2010: 81). In other words, if 
we can represent knowledge in a string – for instance, if we can write it down –then it is 
explicit, and if we cannot, then it is tacit. 
What derives from the preceding discussion, therefore, is that Collins sets forward a 
dualistic world of ‘physical strings’ and ‘linguistic meanings’. Things can change according 
to more or less complex patterns of causal string transformation, whereas humans can 
additionally use certain types of strings, words uttered or written, to create a polymorphic 
world of meaning. The tacit aspects of our activities such as riding bicycles, reading X-
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rays, using probes, and understanding each other (these are examples that both Polanyi 
and Collins refer to) seem to belong to one category, that is, not being explicable by a 
person who experiences them. But for Collins, these represent the three distinct aspects 
of our experience of the tacit and Collins suggests that these “three kinds of tacit 
knowledge are indistinguishable when encountered in everyday experience” (Collins, 
2010: 164). 
To illustrate Collins’ three types of tacit knowledge it will be useful to use an example in 
order to demonstrate how each type of knowledge may be involved. In the example I used 
before – reading a map and getting around Manchester’s city center – let us assume that 
I have a car or a bicycle (more in line with Polanyi’s and Collins’ examples) to use in 
getting from Piccadilly station to MMU Business School. Let us also assume that I have 
done this before but on foot and, therefore, I have a fairly good idea of how to get from 
point A to point B. Also, let us say that a friend has given me some vague directions on 
how to get there easier using a bicycle. As I move around the streets I may choose one 
road that is a dead-end, so I have to go back and choose a different one but it turns out 
to be very busy without much space available to bikers. Then I decide to choose another 
street which means that I have to go around quite a bit before locating my destination. 
How this experience may be interpreted in Collins’ structure? 
Collins builds up his conceptual framework based on a ‘three phase model’. The first 
category is termed Relational (or weak) Tacit Knowledge (RTK). In the example above, I 
had knowledge of the possible route and my friend suggested some other route but 
neither he/she nor I had knowledge of how exactly I could get there. An enhanced sting 
of information could have made my trip easier, e.g. having a GPS. But I still needed tacit 
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knowledge on how to get there. So, according to Collins, if I had conversed more I may 
have understood ‘better’ as, for ordinary aspects of life, tacit knowledge is sufficient. So 
if I was perceived as ignorant on how to get from A to B, I could (and generally people 
do) have gained more knowledge through socialization. Such knowledge that is gained 
through apprenticeships, imitation and practice is, for Collins, quite enough to get us by 
with most aspects of life. 
His second category is what he refers to as Somatic (or medium) Tacit Knowledge (STK). 
The very practice of riding a bicycle is an example of this category. Collins asks how this 
knowledge is transferred from one person to another and the answer is that we learn 
“from demonstration, guided instruction, and personal contact with others who can ride – 
the modes of teaching associated with tacit knowledge. That is why we say our knowledge 
is tacit – we cannot ‘tell it’ but we can have it passed on in ways which involve close 
contact with those who already have it” (Collins, 2010: 99). This is quite different to what 
Polanyi has argued in his writings on riding a bicycle. For Polanyi socialization and 
imitation are not enough qualities for someone to learn how to ride but requires personal 
achievement based on tacit bodily feelings, i.e. embodiment. Collins here seems to 
devalue this subjective aspect of knowing that Polanyi had in mind.  He sees the tacit as 
an aspect of knowledge considered as an object of thought but an object that cannot 
adequately be put into explicit language, programmed in a computer, or transformed into 
a robotic achievement, such as balancing a bike. The laws of maintaining balance have, 
for Collins, been scientifically established and can be transformed into the cause and 
effect string behavior of a machine. For this reason, embodied skills which are 
experienced as tacit knowledge are not truly tacit since scientific investigation and 
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technological innovation can render them explicit. So, for Collins, I may not be able to 
explicitly state how I keep my balance on a bike since I do not need to use explicit thought 
to control it. This is still a string-based phenomenon which appears tacit to me even if I 
consciously attend to or try to control what I do to maintain balance (Gulick, 2016). 
Thus far, for Collins, both STK and RTK can – at least in principle – be explicable; in other 
words, neither of these two categories is truly tacit. But the third category, Collective (or 
strong) Tacit Knowledge (CTK), is. This is knowledge that an individual can acquire only 
by being embedded in society; “this is called ‘strong’, because we know of no way to 
describe it or to make machines that can possess or even mimic it. Strong tacit knowledge 
is a property of society rather than the individual” (Collins, 2010: 11).  Collins (2007: 259) 
argues, for instance, that while riding a bike requires itself only individual knowledge (i.e. 
RTK and STK),  
“[N]egotiating traffic is a problem that is different in kind to balancing a bike, because it includes 
understanding social convention of traffic management. For example, it involves how to make eye 
contact with drivers at busy junctions in just the way necessary to assure a safe passage and not 
to invite an unwanted response” (Collins, 2007: 259).  
What is expected of bike riders changes from culture to culture – it is a very different skill 
required to ride a bicycle in the U.K., for instance, to riding one in South East Asia – and 
even in one culture, expectations change over time. Riding in traffic is therefore a 
polymorphic skill in which culture, context, and thought play important roles which cannot 
be transmitted though explicit rules or sting causality. This is how I negotiated myself 
through different alternative routes in the earlier example in which my polymorphic skills 
of negotiating myself through the busy roads of Manchester city center coupled with my 
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capability of understanding the cultural and collective norms of riding a bicycle in a busy 
road, allowed me to get to my destination. 
For Collins, therefore, society – or, the collective part of knowledge – is crucial in 
influencing what humans think and do as it shapes a person’s life, values, and habits. I 
reflect upon what I have learned from other bikers and have observed about what is safe 
and what my abilities are in deciding what route I will take. But my decision is based on 
experiential individual evidence I have, rather than following or mimicking some collective 
ideal that dictates how I should go about in my everyday activities. Thus, what Collins’ 
analysis is underestimating is the importance of subjective interpretation that is counted 
as personal knowledge exhibited by individuals in their day-to-day activities. If we accept 
the premise that riding in traffic contains an uncodified tacit aspect of knowledge (or what 
Polanyi referred to as ‘ineffable’ or ‘unspecifiable’), then it should follow that individual 
experience of riding and learning a skill should too be counted upon as instances of such 
knowledge. Thus, the distinction between Somatic and Collective tacit knowledge could 
not be sustained as in both instances individual ‘felt experience’ of how to go about 
completing a task should take center stage. 
Perhaps, one of the greatest problems in Collins’ account of the tacit is his insistence that 
society “is responsible for all our collective tacit knowledge” (Collins, 2010: 170). This 
claim underestimates individual experience and responsibility for interpretation of 
evidence or action by a person who performs a particular task. Recently, Stephen Turner 
(2014), an American sociologist, in his book Understanding the Tacit, has taken a critical 
stance against that particular claim made by Collins. One of the key questions in Turner’s 
account is ‘what are the phenomena, structures, and processes that most adequately 
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provide the basis for understanding the tacit aspects of social processes and socially-
based knowledge’? Turner’s sociological notion of the tacit is as follows: it “refers to the 
taken-for-granted and the distinctive but unacknowledged habits of mind or meaning-
structures that make something taken-for-granted” (Turner, 2014: 1). Turner objects to 
how Collins interprets tacit knowledge as ‘collective’ as according to Turner (2014: 65): 
“The big question is whether there is any reason to think that there has to be anything in the way 
of tacit knowledge that is shared or collective, that is, whether functional substitutability is 
enough – that each of us can get by with sufficient tacit knowledge of our own to function in a 
group and generate utterances that others can interpret, without sharing anything ‘tacit’”. 
Turner is an advocate of sociological individualism. The social, for Turner, is the individual 
interacting in groups adjusting to each other through their use of tacit knowledge of how 
people react and interact. Beyond ‘collectivism’, Turner is also critical of Collins’s main 
arguments. “The fact that machines can stimulate something that humans do tells us 
nothing about how humans do it” (Turner, 2014: 62). He further argues that “the entire 
discussion of string transformations is irrelevant: [Collins] gives us no reasons to believe 
that what people do when they communicate has anything to do with strings, string 
transformation, or anything like it” (Turner, 2014: 62). The key argument in Collins’ 
account – as we saw above – is how string transformation can be interpreted. One can 
argue, in line with Collins, that string processes transfer information but not meaning. 
Another interpretation may be, however, that string transformation is a signal response to 
some kind of pattern recognition and that can only be made by a human who makes the 
interpretation. Collins (2010: 70) argues that “we have strings and we have interpreted 
strings” which implies that the latter interpretation is more in line with what Collins had in 
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mind. One problem, however, still remains: what, for Collins, are the origins and 
transmission of the tacit? 
There is no clear answer in Collins’s account. Turner, however, attempts to answers this 
question by suggesting that tacit knowledge is transmitted through hands-on activity or 
practice guided by an expert and is reproduced in the individual through attending to 
statements made by others and, crucially, these ‘others’ are individual persons and not 
collective objects or systems. Turner, terms this the ‘different tacit backgrounds’ of 
individuals who although may live in a shared culture or share the same traditions, their 
‘backgrounds’ are still personal or individual. When persons draw upon their tacit 
knowledge in making an evaluation or assessment or taking an action, they will draw upon 
tacit knowledge that is not exactly the same as another individual in the same situation, 
because of their differences in backgrounds. Additionally, as a person acquires new 
experiences and thus novel tacit understandings, their worldview with their tacit 
knowledge can change, even if such change is minimal. Returning to the earlier example 
with the use of language, native speakers can understand each other not because they 
have the same tacit knowledge but because they have enough similarity to understand 
and acknowledge one another as sharing similar worldviews or traditions.  
To sum up so far, for Collins, strings, whether are transformed or translated provide 
knowledge that can be applied in different situations depending on the action that an 
individual performs (e.g. mimeomorphic or polymorphic). But more crucially, the nature of 
a performed action is truly tacit when we engage in the social realm and perform actions 
that conform or otherwise within the particular societal context; and these actions can be 
said to be truly tacit because they cannot be fully explicated by a person who performs 
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them. In writing this Chapter of the PhD, for example, my Relational and Somatic tacit 
knowledge is subjected to string transformation and translation in which the meaning of 
the content of the words on the piece of paper can be represented in a string as meaning 
is ascribed to both individual words and their connection. However, the problem lies on 
whether this chapter is at a PhD level as I am not able to explicate how or why I have 
presented the arguments in this way and not another, I have used one example over 
another, or I have structured the Chapter in this way and not another. This, as I 
understand, is for Collins, the collective or social aspect of knowledge that cannot be fully 
articulated and cannot be created or mimicked by a machine. Such a polymorphic action 
is then for Collins the truly tacit aspect of all knowledge that cannot be explicated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 HOW CAN WE UNDERSTAND TACIT KNOWING? 
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As it was stated in the introduction of this Chapter, one of the purposes of reviewing the 
key authors around the concept of tacit knowledge was to reconceptualize it with a view 
to creating a novel framework for understanding the tacit and move the concept, its 
investigation, and its potentiality for analysis forward. The two major contributions to tacit 
knowledge, the work of Michael Polanyi and of Harry Collins should not be viewed as 
incommensurate accounts on the same topic, but as interpretations of different aspects 
of a very complex subject. Polanyi describes these various aspects more completely than 
Collins and his views most fully inform this section I draw from their accounts.  
As we have seen so far, for Polanyi, all knowing consists of the integration of subsidiary 
and tacitly held particulars into a focal and articulate whole. Amongst his many examples, 
one quite simple to understand is the question of how we recognize a face of a friend, 
spouse, or acquaintance from a line-up of thousands or even millions. We can instantly 
recognize a familiar face but we find it very hard to describe how exactly we know. Polanyi 
(1962: 56-57) writes that “we may know a physiognomy by integrating our awareness of 
its particulars without being able to identify these particulars”, and that, for Polanyi, is the 
essence of tacit knowing. Therefore, all knowing, for Polanyi, comprises of two types of 
awareness: the subsidiary and the focal. Focal awareness concerns the object of our 
attention; but all focal awareness is dependent on subsidiary awareness. We attend 
focally to the object of our attention while dwelling subsidiarily in a variety of clues that 
stand in the background and make attending to the focal target possible. The integration 
of these two kinds of awareness takes place in any act of knowing. 
But what are the clues that Polanyi refers to? In specifying the nature of subsidiary 
awareness, Polanyi (1969: 139-140) suggests that there are two kinds of clues that give 
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substance to subsidiary awareness, namely, subliminal and marginal. Subliminal 
subsidiary awareness involves things that we cannot experience in themselves or directly. 
Marginal awareness involves things that we could observe in themselves if we were to 
focus on them directly. Although we do not attend directly either of these two kinds of 
clues, they both contribute to the apparent reality of the object on which my attention is 
focused. As he pointed out, “we may say that our awareness of both kinds of clues is 
subsidiary to my focal awareness of that object” (Polanyi, 1969: 140).  
Returning to our previous example of navigating ourselves around a city using a 
geographical map, we may distinguish between the two kinds of awareness in the 
following way: in reading and locating ourselves in the map we use past experiences of 
dealing with maps and therefore we are able – without directly experiencing these in the 
new context – to make sense of our position and direction in the city. This is the subliminal 
subsidiary awareness in which experiences, events, and objects are not directly observed 
but, nevertheless, provide the basis for skilful action to take place. Our marginal 
subsidiary awareness is related to the things that we could observe directly but do not fix 
our attention on them in a focal manner. These may include the cars in the streets, 
pedestrian crossings, landmark buildings, and so on, that we are aware of when focusing 
our attention to get to the desired destination (focal target). We may therefore say that 
our subsidiary awareness – with its subliminal and marginal clues that are constantly 
integrated in our background understanding – constitute the structure of tacit knowing by 
which we can attend to our focal point. 
This integration of subsidiary particulars in our background understanding is what Polanyi 
referred to as ‘interiorization’. All knowing involves active participation by a person who 
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indwells in their activities and their own body.  Interiorization involves the act of observing 
something not as solely itself but in its relation to a more comprehensive entity which is 
instrumental in the service of a particular purpose. Meaning that is created by indwelling 
in an activity is central to performing and learning a particular skill. Says Polanyi (1966: 
30): 
“Two kinds of indwelling meet here. The performer co-ordinates his moves by dwelling in them 
as parts of his body, while the watcher tries to correlate these moves by seeking to dwell in them 
from the outside. By such exploratory indwelling the pupil gets a feel of a master’s skill and may 
learn to rival him”. 
Compare, for example, one who learns driving a car (or a bicycle, or indeed anything that 
involves a new skill) to someone who is an accomplished driver (see also Tsoukas, 2011). 
At the early stages of driving, the novice driver is conscious of what needs to be done 
and feels the impact of the pedals on his/her foot and the gear stick on the palm as he/she 
has not yet learned to integrate the skill of driving and the specific actions that need to 
undertake as a driver. In contrast, the experienced driver is unconscious of the actions by 
which he/she drives and thus is able to fix his/her attention on the focal target (i.e. getting 
to the desired destination). Polanyi (1962: 61) has formulated the general point that 
derives from the preceding example as follows: 
“We may say… that by the effort by which I concentrate on my chosen plane of operation I 
succeed in absorbing all the elements of the situation of which I might be aware in themselves, 
so that I become aware of them now in terms of operational results achieved through their use” 
(Polanyi, 1962: 61). 
This means that one becomes competent in the act of driving without being aware of how 
he/she does it. This is because all the subsidiary particulars (subliminal and marginal) 
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that are integrated in the act of becoming competent driver have now lapsed into 
unconsciousness. For Polanyi (1962: 62), this lapse into unconsciousness: 
“[…] is accompanied by a newly acquired consciousness of the experiences in question, on the 
operational plane. It is misleading, therefore, to describe this as a mere result of repetition; it is a 
structural change achieved by a repeated mental effort aiming at the instrumentalization of 
certain things and actions in the service of some purpose”. 
This is a very important insight provided by Polanyi.  What is subsidiarily known 
resides in the unconsciousness and new experiences expand this consciousness when 
concentrating on new experiences. Thus, pressing the accelerator or changing gears are 
particulars that are subsidiarily known while concentrating on in the act of driving; and this 
is context-specific. Our knowledge of gears in the context of driving is only applicable in 
this particular context. Tsoukas (2011) suggests, however, that such a context changes 
according to our role in different experiences. For example, if I were a car mechanic, 
gears would constitute the focus of attention, rather than being an integrated particular. 
“Knowledge has a recursive form”, writes Tsoukas (2011: 464), because “given a certain 
context, we black-box – assimilate, interiorize, instrumentalize – certain things in order to 
concentrate – focus – on others”. In this way, therefore, we are able to integrate some 
elements of that knowledge but, which ones exactly we use depend on the context. So if 
we drive a car and happen to be a mechanic and an engineer we may have acquired 
three different types of knowledge that taken together make us more sophisticated 
drivers. But, crucially, these bodies of knowledge cannot replace one another. The 
practical knowledge of driving a car cannot be replaced by the theoretical knowledge of 
combustion engines. 
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One of the areas that there is no clear evidence in relation to the structure of tacit knowing, 
is the area of new knowledge creation. If we accept that the subsidiary particulars and the 
focal targets are subjected to a ‘silent’ integration of background understandings and 
experiences, some enduring questions still remain: 
 How can we improve our skilful engagement in practice?  
 What triggers the change in our subsidiary particulars and their connections to our 
focal targets when we are confronted with a novel experience? 
 How exactly does the structure of tacit knowing changes in light of new 
experiences?  
It is important to underline that increased familiarity with the tools and relationships we 
engage in our dealings with the world of practice plays a significant role in the tacit 
integration of particulars. Repeated experiences in carrying out tasks are unconsciously 
linked by practitioners to form patterns of action (Klein, 1998: 31-33; in Tsoukas, 2011: 
469). Patterns enable practitioners to recognize situations as typical or otherwise and 
thus adopt relevant courses of actions or adapt to new ones. A similar point was made 
by Collins who, as we saw earlier, suggests that string translation or transformation 
comprises of patterns which we may or may not explicate depending on the action 
(mimeomorphic or polymorphic) we are involved in. But, Collins too, does not address 
how we recognize and adapt to new situations. 
As we saw in the previous chapter (Chapter Two), patterns of action are also an essential 
and central part of organizational routines (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Pentland and 
Feldman, 2008). These patterns are enacted by organizational members through their 
actions which in turn produce outcomes and, consequently, new ideas and the 
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relationship between these elements produces change (Feldman, 2000). What is, 
however, missing from these accounts of routines and their relationship to change (either 
as a change in routines themselves or, more broadly, a change in organizational practices 
of routines) is the source or the triggering mechanism that is responsible for this change 
to occur. The answer to the aforementioned questions and concerns then rests on terms 
such as ‘reflection’, ‘breakdowns’, and ‘mindfulness’ which I now turn in more detail. 
3.4.1. Reflection, Breakdowns, and Mindfulness 
The literature on organization and management studies has placed attention on two 
different forms of reflection: reflection-on-action and reflection-in-action. The former is 
related to the concept of ‘deliberate reflection’ (Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011; Tsoukas, 
2011; Yanow and Tsoukas, 2009); the latter is more closely linked to the phenomenon of 
‘mindfulness’ (Jordan et al 2009; Langer, 1989; Levinthal and Rerup, 2006; Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2006, 2007). 
Deliberate reflection occurs when the results of action undertaken by practitioners do not 
meet their tacit expectations with regards to the situation in which they are involved; in 
deliberate reflection, what was previously subsidiarily known now becomes the focal point 
of attention and deliberation. The literature on organization and management studies only 
recently started exploring instances in which deliberate reflection may come to the fore 
as a result of our practical engagement. Recent writings have conceptualized these 
instances as ‘disruptions’, ‘accidents’, ‘surprises’, ‘disharmonies’, or generally speaking, 
‘breakdowns’ in practical activity and suggest that they play a key role in amending or re-
orientating our understandings in the face of unfamiliar experiences so as to create novel 
vistas of how to proceed in practical activity [see for example the works of Austin et al 
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(2012); Cornelissen (2012); Garud et al (2011); Jordan (2010); Sandberg and Tsoukas 
(2011); Shotter and Tsoukas (2014); Zundel and Kokkalis (2010)]. 
In a recently published article, for example, Shotter and Tsoukas (2014: 380) provide a 
useful illustration in order to demonstrate how disruptions (or breakdowns) affect the 
structure of tacit knowing. A junior female doctor (named Shaleni) working as an 
anaesthesiologist in a State-owned South African hospital saw a senior registrar using 
drugs illegally whilst being on duty under the assumption that the drugs were being used 
for patients in theatre. Shotter and Tsoukas (2014: 385) describe the disruptive powers 
of such encounter in the following way:  
“The disruption encountered on this occasion brought Shaleni’s medical practice into focus. What 
was hitherto implicitly manifested in her practice (e.g. a doctor should act in a way that does not 
put the health of his/her patients in jeopardy) is now explicitly focused upon. However, 
articulating her response does not mean that she converts her subsidiary awareness into focal 
awareness, like, for example, one converting water into steam. It rather means that aspects of 
her ‘inarticulate background’ are brought into awareness when probed by a disruption. The latter 
creates a new background, which makes it possible for aspects of the old (inarticulate) 
background to be articulated. [I]n articulating what was implicit in her practice, she gives it a 
particular shape, prompted by the particular circumstances she has found herself in”. 
When a practitioner is absorbed in a particular practice, subsidiary awareness remains 
hidden in the background of inarticulate experiences. However, it is only when a 
practitioner is faced with a challenging or difficult situation that shakes his/her tacit 
expectations of that situation that subsidiary awareness becomes now the focal point of 
attention, deliberation, and reflection. What had been a transparent, deliberative practice 
now demands an explicit attention. Through this shifting in attention practitioners can re-
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connect, re-orient and re-view the situation they are in, in a different way. Thus, new 
knowledge comes about when our previously held tacit understandings (our subsidiary 
particulars) are re-punctuated (articulated) through disruptions, accidents and surprises. 
What in one instance appears as routine practice (supplying medicines to patients to 
improve their health), it may now be re-punctuated and articulated in a different outcome. 
The concept of ‘breakdown’ has been explored variously in relation to the practice of 
strategy, the practice of theorizing, knowledge management, reflection, and so on (Chia 
and Holt, 2006; Jordan, 2010; Patriotta, 2004; Tsoukas, 2011; Yanow and Tsoukas, 2009; 
Zundel and Kokkalis, 2010). One of the most important writers in this area has been 
Haridimos Tsoukas (and his colleagues) (Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 2013; Tsoukas, 2003, 
2011; Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011; Yanow and Tsoukas, 2009) who has conceptualized 
breakdowns as the triggering mechanism which is responsible for changing or amending 
practical activity in some way (whether major or minor). Breakdowns draw on 
discontinuities in organizational activity and point to the process whereby order is 
disrupted and eventually recomposed within organizations. Breakdowns call into question 
actors habitual ways of doing and acting thereby pointing to patterns of routinization 
underlying the smooth functioning of human activity (Chia and Holt, 2006). By disrupting 
the ongoing activity of organizational actors, breakdowns disclose the content of 
intentionality of organizational knowledge (Patriotta, 2004). To be sure, breakdowns are 
accidental, unexpected, related to the performance and the reliability of a system or an 
action and they can be more or less serious, local, or systemic. They express 
discontinuities, mismatches, disjunctions, seizures between knowledge and experience, 
representations and practices, and between the obvious and the concealed. Breakdowns 
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provide a way of voicing a taken-for-granted background and have the same function of 
“noise in a world of silence” (Patriotta, 2004: 8). 
In organizational life, more often than not, actors are absorbed in coping with business 
as usual (Chia and Holt, 2006; Zundel and Kokkalis, 2010). The content and context of 
the performed task is transparent and knowledge is functioning in an unreflective manner. 
However, when disruptions occur, the coherence of the task is called into question 
because the relationship between action and goals, activity and context, has been 
disturbed (Chia and Holt, 2006; Tsoukas, 2011; Zundel and Kokkalis, 2010). 
Consequently, the obviousness of daily activities and routines becomes problematic 
since, in these situations, the ongoing flow of action and understanding has been 
interrupted. Organizational actors need to restore normality and begin to explicitly interact 
with the tacit background against which knowledge is used. According to Tsoukas (2011), 
breakdowns in practice may range from a mere ‘malfunction’, to a ‘temporary breakdown, 
to a ‘total breakdown’. Each of these types elicits a different improvisation response from 
the part the actor ranging from ‘non-deliberate’ (mere re-adjustment), to ‘deliberate’, to 
‘thematic’ (explicitly intentional). Particularly in the latter two types, the individual is forced 
to deliberate and engage in analytic reflection which is required to re-assess and re-
evaluate a perplexing situation. 
When a breakdown occurs, therefore, tacit knowing becomes disjointed because the 
integration of subsidiary particulars and focal targets is no longer possible. Practical 
knowledge is disentangled and de-situated from its context of use and has to be restored 
for action to continue. In this regard, breakdowns can potentially provide a window 
through which it is possible to access organizational reality as actors are required to pay 
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deliberate attention to the tasks that have been disrupted in the context of performance. 
To sum up, breakdowns do not destroy organizations and their routines; instead they help 
us to understand how and why certain aspects of knowledge have become tacit. 
Breakdowns lead us to further understand organizational practices that have been 
designed to maintain stability because they have the capacity to take us back in time and 
space and assess how tacit knowing has been developed, maintained and changed in 
different situations. 
Breakdowns are thus closely connected to reflection. As we have seen in the previous 
Chapter (Chapter Two), moments of reflection are, in turn, linked to dialogical interactions 
which, according to Tsoukas (2009), provide the means for making new distinctions and 
arise from participants engaging with an organizational task. Therefore, even though 
skilled performance contains an ineffable element that is difficult to articulate, it 
nonetheless can be ‘talked about’ because by “dialogically reminding ourselves of it, we 
notice certain important features which had hitherto escaped our attention and can now 
be seen in a new context” (Tsoukas, 2011: 472). As a consequence, we are able to relate 
to our circumstances in novel ways and, therefore, ‘see’ new ways forward. 
Think, for instance, of any of the previous examples, whether it is about reading maps, or 
driving cars or riding bicycles. As we integrate our subsidiary particulars in order to attend 
to our focal target (reaching our destination), we are immersed in the act of knowing and 
connect subsidiary particulars in a specific way. If we cannot arrive effectively at our 
destination (unintended outcome), a breakdown has occurred (whether we are faced with 
too much traffic or arrive at a dead-end, or even if our car or bicycle is damaged in some 
way) which forces us back to review our situation through deliberate reflection. This is the 
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time where we ask ourselves or others: ‘what should I do now?’, ‘how should I do it 
differently?’, ‘how can I reach at my destination more effectively?’ In these situations we 
are reviewing the situation in a new light, from a different perspective, and we are able to 
create novel connections on how to effectively carry out our task.  
Such ‘re-punctuation’ (articulation) of the distinctions underlying the practical activities in 
which we are involved in creates new connections amongst items that were previously 
unnoticed and unconnected. Drawing attention to each other’s attention by instructive 
forms of talk (for example ‘look at this again’, ‘have you considered this in that way’, ‘try 
this’, ‘imagine this’, and so on) (Tsoukas, 2011), a space is created in which our situation 
can be viewed from a different angle. And this is the essence of amending and creating 
new ‘silent’ integrations in our subsidiary awareness: through dialogue “we notice certain 
important features which had hitherto escaped our attention and can now be seen in a 
new context” (Tsoukas, 2011: 472). 
Importantly, critical reflection shares similarities with the concept of mindfulness in 
organizations. The notion of mindfulness was developed by Langer (1989) and was 
introduced into organization studies by Weick and colleagues (Weick et al 1999; Weick 
and Sutcliffe 2006) in their research on high reliability organizations. Langer (1989: 138-
159) argued that individuals demonstrate mindfulness in three ways: (a) they actively 
differentiate and refine existing experiences through categories and distinctions (Langer, 
1989: 138); (b) create new, discontinuous categories out of on-going events and 
experiences (Langer, 1989: 157); and (c) appreciate more nuanced contexts, including 
the use of adaptive, alternative ways to operate in them (Langer, 1989: 159). 
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Jordan et al (2009) argue that increased mindfulness, that is, a state of active awareness 
which is characterized by a continuous creation and refinement of categories, openness 
to novel insights, and willingness to view things from different angles, is a qualitative 
disposition of individuals when enacting organizational practices. Mindfulness is 
particularly significant concept in understanding the structure of the tacit as it 
characterizes an individual’s response to unexpected events in their capacity to engage 
in a range of flexible behaviors that effectively respond to changing stimuli (Weick et al 
1999; Levinthal and Rerup, 2006). Mindfulness is also concerned with the ability of actors 
to read and anticipate signs that may impact negatively or inappropriately on actions and 
practices. In other words, mindfulness is the ability (or capability) of actors to draw high 
quality attention to contexts and respond appropriately to unanticipated cues or signals 
from one’s contexts. In previous examples, such as driving a car or riding a bicycle or 
reading maps and speaking a foreign language, mindfulness is an increased awareness 
and high quality attention to focal targets (or to outcomes)  that characterize the quality 
of the process. This is, perhaps, what distinguishes a proficient driver from a novice one 
or a proficient reader of maps to a less proficient one.  
In relation to routines, too, the concept of mindfulness plays a central role in, for example, 
how two repetitions can draw something new in the act of repetition itself (Deleuze, 2004: 
97) where novelty comes out of the mundane and the repetitive. This means that novel 
events are those that we do not expect and they disrupt our ongoing organizational activity 
(Bosma et al, 2016; Feldman et al 2016). Bosma et al (2016: 18) argues that the 
‘unexpected’ serves as a ‘novel stimulus’ that provides ‘novel responses’ including ones 
that are unconventional, improbable and ‘wild’ in nature. These responses are essential 
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for organizational survival and as such are fundamentally responsible for new and radical 
learning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 RE-CONCEPTUALIZING TACIT KNOWLEDGE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINES 
Figure 3.2 is an attempt to depict visually the key arguments and insights from the 
preceding discussion and thus synthesize the key concepts as they have emerged so far. 
FIGURE 3.2 TACIT KNOWING IN THE CONTEXT OF ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINES 
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As we have seen, the structure of tacit knowing consists of three complementary and 
mutually exclusive forms of comprehension: subsidiary particulars [a], focal targets [b], 
and a person who brings the two together in the act of knowing in practice (see also Figure 
3.1.) Such a process is silent as the person internalizes and dwells in the particulars in 
order to attend to [f] focal targets. The act of knowing builds on our background 
understandings of our experiences in which we have previously been involved in. On 
occasions, however, this largely unreflective [h] and routine-like [g] action breaks down 
[c] because of unexpected outcomes, uncertainties, or events and, therefore, an 
individual’s habitual ways of doing and acting become the issue of critical reflection [d]. 
In order to restore the normality of action, the individual engages in productive dialogue 
[e] with others actors who have experience in performing the same (or a similar) routine. 
Thus, what was previously tacit and unreflective, that is, the silent integration of subsidiary 
particulars to focal targets, has to be re-aligned [i] for practical activity to move forward. 
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In a parallel process, the reviewed literature on routines distinguishes between two 
aspects/parts of routines, namely, the performative [a1] and the ostensive [b1]. The 
former comprises of specific individual actions (processes, skills, practices) that take 
place in specific times and circumstances. The latter, which is shaped by the former, is 
the more abstract aspect of routines which resides at a more collective level and has been 
conceptualized also as the ‘outcomes’ or ‘shared understandings’ of routines. What we 
can notice in this diagrammatic depiction of the structure of tacit knowing is the way that 
it lends itself in the context of organizational routines and the process by which they are 
enacted. In routines, just as in the structure of tacit knowing, individuals perform particular 
tasks that typically belong to, or are part of, the ostensive aspect of that routine.  
For example, conducting interviews (performative aspect) for a vacant position in an 
organization is part of the hiring routine (ostensive aspect) (Feldman, 2000; Feldman and 
Rerup, 2011) and it can be said that typically organizations are able to execute such a 
routine with high levels of success in an unreflective manner. However, it cannot be said 
that interviewing takes place always in the same way. Many times, the process of 
interviewing can breakdown because, for instance, candidates’ CVs have not been 
matching the position adequately, or because the ‘ideal’ candidate has not shown up for 
the interview, or even because the ‘right’ candidate refused the job offer, and so on. In 
these instances, routine performance breaks down and needs to be restored before the 
execution of the routine takes place. 
The ostensive aspect of routines is responsible for ensuring consistency in carrying out 
routines as well as variation that can be observed in them.  In turn, the performative 
aspect creates, sustains, and modifies the ostensive aspect in practice in the same way 
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that “speaking creates, maintains, and alters a language” (Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 
107).  The ostensive aspect both constrains and enables participants in carrying out 
routines and serve as a guide to routines performance. This is the collective level of 
routines which comprises of shared individual understandings of what a routine should 
entail. The recursive relationship between the performative and the ostensive aspects 
enables for a deeper understanding of the variations observed in routines and the 
interplay between stability and change. 
The proposed framework of tacit knowing in relation to organizational routines poses a 
number of implications for researching the dynamic nature of knowing within the context 
of organizational routines. The silent, unspecifiable or ineffable clues that give rise to the 
subsidiary awareness cannot be focused upon in isolation as they contribute to the whole 
of meaning-creation by a person who performs a particular action. We are ‘focally 
ignorant’ of these particulars and on how or why they contribute to a skilful 
accomplishment. Thus, although we may be able to execute a task skilfully, we normally 
cannot identify the particulars of these comprehensive achievements. Therefore, we 
should stop trying to locate these integrations in the minds of individuals as this is an 
impossible task. Rather, we should concentrate on individual performance and how this 
is manifested in the everyday practices of individuals in organized contexts. 
This is because all knowing is manifested in actions; it is in this sense an intentional 
activity that contains a purpose, that is, a focal target. Just as in riding a bicycle the 
intention is (or may be) to arrive at a desired destination, so is the case in interviewing 
which is taking place with the intention of hiring an individual for a vacant position. As in 
the earlier example of Shaleni’s medical practice, our previously ‘inarticulate background’, 
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probed by a disruption, is now brought into focal awareness of explicit attention. It is only 
when such a shifting in attention takes place that a practitioner can review and reconnect 
subsidiary particulars to create new meanings. 
A person engaging in routines performs particular tasks by connecting silently subsidiary 
particulars to focal targets. This enables him/her to execute the routine effectively by 
attending to a focal target, that is, with intention, for the purpose of achieving an outcome. 
Interviewing, for example, is itself a performative routine where the outcome may vary 
according to particular circumstances. It is quite one thing to interview a candidate for a 
nanny’s position and quite another to interview a candidate for a Vice President’s position 
in an organization. Thus, the performative routine of interviewing would be viewed and 
perceived in a different way that largely depends on the context in which the individual 
performs the routine.  
There are moments, however, that the smooth performance of a routine would break 
down because of unintended or unexpected outcomes or novel and unanticipated events 
(Weick 1979) and uncertainties (Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013). In these moments, what 
was previously done in an unobtrusive manner, it is no longer possible and thus the 
individual involved is forced to step back (reflect) from the practice he/she participates 
and re-assess the situation in order to get the action done. This is a typical case when we 
look at performative routines. Breakdowns to performative aspects of routines are indeed 
the norm, not the exception. As Feldman (2000: 625) noted, routines involve actors 
“reflecting on what they are doing, and doing different things (or doing the same things 
differently) as a result of the reflection”. Even though variations (whether major or minor) 
in performance are important, changes in the ostensive aspects of routines (in focal 
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targets), that is, changes in the outcomes and shared understandings of routines 
themselves, are rather critical.  When participants in routines are orientated towards the 
future, they are likely to reflect on the routine beyond the immediate performance 
(Howard-Grenville, 2005) and they might decide “to alter what they do in the future 
iterations of the routine” (Pentland and Feldman, 2005: 809). This may result in changes 
to the routine’s pattern over time. 
In these moments, therefore, in moments where breakdowns occur in the context of 
organizational routines, those who participate in a practice and those who may be 
researching it become focally aware of the novel connections that may now become 
available for analysis and discussion. Through dialogue, conversation and observation, 
the researcher and the researched can create new meanings if they discuss the skilled 
performances in which we are involved. This means that we should not so much need to 
be concerned with ‘operationalizing’ tacit knowledge (see, for example, Ambrosini and 
Bowman, 2001, Sternberg et al, 2000) because this simply may not be possible. Instead, 
in line with Tsoukas’ (2011) suggestion, we need to find new ways of talking and 
interacting, distinguishing and connecting. “New knowledge comes about not when the 
tacit is converted to explicit, but when tacit knowledge is re-punctuated (articulated) 
through dialogical interaction” (Tsoukas, 2011: 473). More recently, Dionysiou and 
Tsoukas (2013: 200) stress the importance of focusing on breakdowns as they offer 
important methodological opportunities for the study of routines, since “during such 
moments participants are likely to engage mindfully or intelligently in the joint action at 
hand, thus enabling researchers to capture the surfacing of meanings and 
understandings”. 
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In the literature on routines, there are empirical descriptions of discussion/’talk’ that 
appear to be of critical importance when participants enact certain routines. For example, 
interviewing candidates is part of the ‘hiring routine’ Feldman (2000), discussion and talk 
in the operating room is part of the ‘cardiac surgery’ routine (Edmondson et al, 2001), and 
discussion and talk with customers and between marketing and sales staff are part of the 
‘pricing’ routine (Zbaracki and Bergen, 2010). Although these forms of discussion and talk 
are part of enacting the routine, they are very similar to non-verbal actions that most 
studies concentrate on. Recently, Dittrich et al (2016) described how actors talked about 
routines particularly in relation to how routines arise, become disrupted, or change. Such 
instances can be interpreted as a form of ‘collective reflection’ in which the participants 
collectively work out how to set up new or modify existing routines. 
In the next Chapter (Chapter Four) of this thesis I delve deeper into the methodological 
issues related to researching tacit knowledge in the context of organizational routines and 
describe more fully the ways that such an attempt can take place in organizational 
settings. 
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3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This Chapter has provided an in-depth review of the concept of tacit knowing by building 
primarily upon the works of M. Polanyi and H. Collins. After examining these contributors, 
a novel theoretical framework of tacit knowing is proposed which may be useful in allowing 
for a clearer perspective on how the tacit may be accessed, analyzed, and researched in 
organizational settings. In brief, it has been argued that all knowing consists of the 
integration of subsidiary particulars into a focal target by a person who links the two 
together. Knowing has a ‘from-to’ structure: the particulars bear on the focus to which I 
attend from them. These integrations are tacit, ‘silent’, and inarticulate. However, there 
are moments that these integrations breakdown because of a disruption, accident, or 
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surprise in our practical engagements. In these moments, what was hitherto subsidiarily 
known, it now becomes the focal point of attention and deliberation. 
Bearing on this novel conceptualization of the tacit, the next step involved its relevance 
and connection in the context of organizational routines. As they are currently 
conceptualized, routines consist of ostensive (what the routine should entail) and 
performative (how the routine is actually carried out) aspects and their recursive 
relationship enables a deeper understanding of variation and the interplay between 
stability and change. Crucially, however, routines are performed by humans who 
constantly connect subsidiary particulars to focal targets with the intention to perform 
specific organizational outcomes. If these outcomes are not achieved or unanticipated 
events take place, routines breakdown (in a major or minor way) and the individual 
involved is forced to step back (reflect) and re-assess the situation anew. Through 
dialogical interaction and discussion with other organizational participants we are able to 
notice novel important features that had previously escaped our attention and can now 
be viewed in a new context. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH METHODS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
In this Chapter (Chapter Four), I turn my attention to the third research question for this 
thesis: How can tacit knowing be empirically investigated in the context of organizational 
routines? In organization and management studies, very few attempts have been made 
to practically investigate this question. This, it has been argued, is because of the different 
ontological and epistemological assumptions that researchers of knowledge bring with 
them in their investigations (Swart, 2011). This means that our methodologies and 
methods for investigating tacit knowledge may not be suited for the task in question. A 
more interpretivist, or what Tsoukas (2011) refers to as ‘phenomenological’ approach to 
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the tacit, may be more suitable and, indeed, more appropriate in researching knowing in 
organizational settings. The framework that I have developed in the previous Chapter 
(Chapter Three, Figure 3.2 on page 108) may then be a way forward in our investigations 
of tacit knowing in organizations. This is because the novel conceptualization of the tacit 
and its related areas of activity bear three important methodological implications: 
 First, even if tacit knowing comprises of a silent, unspecifiable, and ineffable 
process for a person who participates in a particular activity (e.g. from riding a 
bicycle to reading and using a map to conducting interviews for a vacant 
organizational position), the actions and meanings which derive from this process 
can be manifested and thus become visible in his/her skilful accomplishments. For 
example, while a skilful bike rider or an experienced HR manager may find difficult 
to describe or explain how he/she performs their particular practice, the skilful 
performance of that practice is only exemplified in the act of bike riding or 
interviewing.  
 Second, if we accept that all knowing is manifested in skilful action, then it implies 
that tacit knowing contains intentionality, that is, a focal target or an outcome. I 
have argued that this focal target may also be viewed from the routines perspective 
as the ostensive part of a routine. New knowledge comes about when the 
integration of subsidiary particulars to focal targets is disrupted in some way and 
need to be restored for activity to move forward. In this way, we create new 
meanings and thus re-connect our subsidiary particulars in novel ways.  
 Third, it is because of these moments of breakdowns that we become reflective of 
our actions and open up to analysis and dialogue – whether we are practitioners 
104 
 
or researchers that investigate actions and practices in organized settings. Without 
disruptions in activity we remain absorbed performers in that activity and carry it 
out without the need to alter our actions (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011). Thus, the 
structure of routines, that is, the recursive relation between performative and 
ostensive aspects in which participants are involved with the purpose of achieving 
a particular outcome, may change as a result of a breakdown in the enactment of 
such as routine.   
These implications play a significant role in the way that research on tacit knowing should 
be carried out in organized settings. Rather than looking to identify the cognitive or mental 
structures that alter an individual’s learning processes, we should be more concerned 
with the actions in which these individuals participate and how they accomplish their 
everyday tasks. In so doing, researchers can come closer to the phenomenon under 
study in moments where understandings are disturbed and knowledge claims do not 
sufficiently capture the real-life goings-on. In this Chapter, therefore, my intention is to 
explain how and why a more interpretivist methodology can shed light on what has been 
referred to as the black-box of knowing in organizational settings.  
My aim is to describe and explain a methodological approach that can allow for tacit 
knowing to be adequately and appropriately researched. This requires a subjectivist 
ontology in which ‘reality’ is understood as emerging in and out of interactions with 
humans and is manifested in routines and improvisations of these humans in a context of 
action and interpretation (Cunliffe, 2011). It also requires an epistemology in which the 
purpose of the researcher is to understand how social reality is created where reflexivity 
is at the core of the inquiry (for both the researcher and the researched) (Charreire Petit 
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and Huault, 2008; Cunliffe, 2011; Lincoln et al, 2011). Such a philosophical approach to 
the study of tacit knowing requires a methodology that is ethnographic, inductive, and 
dialogic in nature and methods such as participative inquiry, storytelling, and unstructured 
interviews to elicit the processes by which humans act and the ways they understand 
such acting in organizational settings. 
The structure of this Chapter is as follows. In the next section (4.2) I begin to explore the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin the investigation of the tacit. 
This is followed by a discussion of the methodology used in this thesis (4.3) before I 
proceed with a more specific discussion on ethnographic research as a tool to understand 
individual experiences based on unstructured interviewing. The Chapter concludes by 
offering a detailed discussion on how the data have been analyzed and interpreted (4.5). 
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4.2 PHILOSOPHIES UNDERPINNING (ORGANIZATIONAL) RESEARCH 
Two important works in organizational research and the wider social sciences, those of 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) and Morgan and Smircich (1980), had a significant impact on 
the philosophical choices researchers make when investigate organizational phenomena. 
These authors largely argued that organizational researchers need to figure out and be 
sensitive to the choices about ontology (the nature of reality) and epistemology (how do 
we know about the phenomena) before deciding on the overall methodology and research 
methods that can be used to investigate such phenomena. This is because our 
philosophical considerations have a profound impact not only on the knowledge claims 
we, as researchers, make but also on the knowledge claims of those we investigate. 
These assumptions, in turn, have an impact on the overall research design that drives 
and guides any empirical investigation.  
In the following Table (Table 4.1) I have attempted to synthesize five areas that are 
significant in any (and, of course, in my) investigation. Distinguishing between subjective 
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(interpretive) and objective (positivism and realism) paradigms, I argue that an 
investigation of tacit knowledge requires a subjective ontology coupled with a 
constructivist/interpretivist epistemology. This means that the role of the researcher is a 
reflective one and the methodologies appropriate for investigating the tacit should be 
more inductive, ethnographic, and phenomenological in nature. This, in turn, means that 
the research methods that may be more appropriate in that investigation should be based 
on storytelling and narrative approaches; on unstructured interviews and potentially, 
unstructured observations. This may offer a solid research approach that may provide 
novel vantage points from which tacit knowledge may be accessed, researched, 
understood, and articulated in organizational settings. In what follows I expand on these 
claims starting from the ontological and epistemological underpinnings.  
TABLE 4.1 CONTRASTING INTERPRETIVE (SUBJECTIVE) AND NORMATIVE (OBJECTIVE) 
PARADIGMS IN RESEARCHING (TACIT) KNOWLEDGE 
 
Paradigm 
     
SUBJECTIVE                                                                   OBJECTIVE 
Ontological 
assumptions of 
research methodology 
 
Multiple local and specific 
‘constructed’ realities 
 
Socially constructed realities, 
emerging, objectified and sometimes 
contested in the routines and 
improvisations of people. Context is 
human action and interpretation. 
 
Positivism 
Reality is real and apprehensible 
 
Reality as concrete structures and 
behavioral patterns, subject to rules and 
laws. Structural integration or disintegration 
  
Realism 
Reality is ‘real’ but only imperfectly and 
probabilistically apprehensible 
 
Reality as process: interrelated actions, 
elements, structures, and systems. 
Generalizable or context-dependent. 
 
Epistemology (how we 
know about the 
phenomena) 
 
          INTERPRETIVISM 
 
Created findings 
 
To understand how social reality is 
created 
NORMATIVE (POSITIVISM and 
REALISM) 
Positivism 
Findings true 
 
To construct a positivistic science 
 
Realism 
Findings probably true 
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To study systems, process and change 
 
Conception of the 
Researcher’s Role 
 
Commitment to the system under 
study (speaking from the inside) 
Reflexivity regarding the status of the 
tools and the researcher 
 
Exteriorized position (speaking from the 
outside)  
Limitation of contamination bias, distancing 
from methodological tools 
Methodology 
(techniques used to 
investigate reality) 
 
Ethnographic, existential 
phenomenology, hermeneutic. 
Constructionism and 
constructivism. 
Dialogic. Inductive. 
Positivism, empiricism, functionalism, 
nomothetic science, statistical or structural 
connections. A-temporal laws and validity 
criteria. Rational choice models. Deductive 
approaches. 
 
Research Methods  
 
Narrative and discourse analysis, 
Storytelling, grounded theory, content 
analysis, poetry, participative inquiry, 
Ethnography 
Autobiography. Unstructured 
interviews 
 
Surveys, observation, triangulations, 
experimentations, 
structured/coded interviews, case studies, 
focus groups, grounded theory, action 
research. 
Source: Adapted from Burrell and Morgan (1979); Charreire Petit and Huault (2008); Cunliffe (2011); 
Lincoln et al (2011); Morgan and Smircich (1980); Sanders (1982); Thompson and Perry (2004) 
4.2.1 Ontology 
The term ontology derives from two Greek words, namely -on(to) and -logos with the 
former referring to ‘being’ or ‘existence’ and the latter to discourse, theory or science. 
Thus, ontology is the ‘theory of being’ or, as Duberley et al (2012) suggest, a branch of 
philosophy that deals with the essence of phenomena and the nature of their existence. 
Thus, ontological questions concern the existence of phenomena in a real or illusionary 
state. In other words, ontology deals with whether phenomena under investigation exist 
independently of our knowledge of them.  
Two contrasting and conflicting approaches have emerged in the social sciences that 
shed light on this problematic: objectivism and subjectivism. This distinction appears in a 
number of publications and initiated debates about (tacit) knowledge and its role in 
organizations. Publications that draw their approach from economics, for example, are 
largely based on a positivistic understanding whereas those authors who utilize 
interpretivist philosophies tend to emphasize the processual and contextual account of 
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knowledge. More specifically, how knowledge is understood and conceptualized is a good 
indication as to whether the approach has drawn upon objectivist or subjectivist 
ontological underpinnings.  
In an empirical study of the most influential publications on knowledge management, 
Nonaka and Peltokorpi (2006) found that there is a large divide between objectivist and 
subjectivist ontological accounts in the way that knowledge, humans, and social entities 
(such as organizations) are conceptualized. In relation to knowledge, especially, there 
are two important differences concerning: (a) the nature of knowledge and the distinction 
between its tacit and explicit parts, and (b) the question whether knowledge is individual, 
social or collective entity, and whether it exists in organizations, and in what form. In 
relation to the nature of knowledge, a number of scholars (drawing primarily on 
economics) divide knowledge into tacit and explicit or knowledge-how (tacit) and knowing-
that (explicit) (e.g. Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Leonard and 
Sensiper, 1998). These authors largely argue that tacit knowledge is hard to articulate 
and transfer whereas explicit knowledge is relatively easy to articulate, codify, transfer 
and store in organizational settings. These taxonomies show that knowledge contains 
both objective and subjective dimensions. Drawing on a more interpretivist tradition, other 
authors have avoided to sharply divide these two forms of knowledge. Nonaka (1994) 
and his colleagues (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka and Toyama, 2003; Nonaka 
and von Krogh, 2009), for instance, are sensitive in their accounts of knowledge and 
suggest that tacit and explicit knowledge should not be viewed as exclusive but 
complementary. Other authors, drawing deeper in the interpretivist ontology, argue that 
knowledge categorization is impossible because of its holistic and processual nature (e.g. 
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Brown and Duguid, 1991; 2001; Tsoukas, 1996; 2003; Gourlay 2006a, Tsoukas and 
Vladimirou, 2001; Peters et al, 2011). These authors largely suggest that a separation 
between tacit and explicit knowledge is erroneous because knowledge is closely related 
to action and practice which, in effect, means that knowing and doing are inseparable. 
This is also in line with Polanyi’s (1962; 1966) understanding that all knowledge is either 
tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge. 
In addition to the ongoing disagreements about the nature of knowledge, there is also 
discrepancy as to whether knowledge is an individual procession or a collective entity. 
Early publications in organization and management studies suggest that knowledge 
exists in the heads of individuals and is ultimately attached to the knower (e.g. Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Davenport et al, 1998). More recent publications regard tacit knowledge 
as personal or private endeavor which should be treated only at an individual level 
(Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001; Boiral, 2002). Other authors treat it at a collective or 
organizational level by linking it to resources and capabilities (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Spender, 1996; Leonard and Sensiper, 1998). Others yet argue that tacit knowledge is 
belongs to a collective realm (Collins, 2010; Ribeiro and Collins, 2007). 
The discussion in Chapter Three of this thesis has shed light onto my ontological stance 
regarding the nature of knowledge and the distinction between tacit and explicit and 
whether knowledge is an individual possession or a collective entity. Regarding the 
former, and following Polanyi and Tsoukas, I have suggested that there is no distinction 
between tacit and explicit knowledge and, perhaps more importantly, knowledge (whether 
unspoken or not) is subjected to countless (subsidiary) integrations that individuals 
engage in their day-to-day activities. This means that rather than viewing tacit and explicit 
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as separate forms of knowing, they should be viewed as mutually constitutive in practice 
or, as Tsoukas (2005) suggested, as the two sides of the same coin. Regarding the latter, 
that is, whether knowledge is an individual or a collective entity, I have argued that in 
order to know something, we need to engage in practices, and practices are social 
phenomena. 
Feldman and Orlikowski (2011: 1241-1243) suggest that research that is sensitive to 
practice theory and its main features shares some common themes. First, situated actions 
are consequential in the production of social life, that is, human agency is at the core of 
any engaged activity that collectively produces practices; second, dualisms such as mind 
vs. body, cognition vs. action, objective vs. subjective, are rejected as a way of theorizing. 
Third, relations are mutually constitutive in that all actions and therefore all practices are 
related with one another in the production of meaningful systems. It then follows that 
practices are the central locus of organizing and it is through situated and recurring 
activities that organizational consequences are produced and become reinforced or 
change over time. Thus, everyday activity becomes the object of analysis which requires 
deep engagement in the field, observing, and interacting with practitioners in action 
(Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011). 
4.2.2 Epistemology 
Like the term ontology, epistemology, too, derives from two Greek words: -episteme 
which means ‘knowledge’ or ‘science’ and -logos which refers to ‘knowledge’, 
‘information’, ‘theory’ or ‘account’ (Duberley et al 2012). This demonstrates how 
epistemology is usually understood as being concerned with knowledge about 
knowledge. In other words, epistemology is the study of the criteria by which we can know 
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what does and does not constitute warranted, or scientific knowledge (Duberley et al 
2012: 16). The question of epistemology is central to any investigation of social sciences 
and, of course, organization and management studies. The question of ‘how do we know 
what we know?’ is not only related to the ways that knowledge is acquired by social actors 
but is also related to the ways that researchers acquire knowledge about the knowledge 
of social actors. This is not an easy task at all especially when the researcher investigates 
the multifaceted and socially complex nature of (tacit) knowledge. Thus, epistemological 
questions are of utmost importance when dealing with humans who have diverse 
experiences, backgrounds, and cultures in socially organized settings. 
Broadly speaking, there are three dominant epistemological approaches in the social 
sciences: positivism, (critical) realism, and constructivism. Positivism is a dominant 
branch of philosophy of the social (and the natural) sciences and suggests that the only 
legitimate source of knowledge are sense data through which reality is experienced 
(Clegg, 2008). The role of the researcher is to uncover ‘laws’ or to test whether theories 
are true using the hypothetico-deductive method. Subjects (e.g. humans) and objects 
(e.g. organizations) are treated as two separate and independent entities and their 
relationship is one of causality. Given the dominance of positivism in the natural sciences, 
a number of researchers have tried to emulate its success in organization and 
management studies. Works rooted mainly in economics conceptualize knowledge as an 
objective asset in the Resource-based View of the firm (Barney, 1991), Capabilities 
(Teece et al, 1997), and the Knowledge-based View of the Firm (Grant, 1996). As Nonaka 
and Peltokorpi (2006) argue, these studies separate knowledge from other organizational 
resources in that it is objectified, immobilized, and functionalized in order to present it as 
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another strategic asset. Tacit knowledge, in turn, either seems to have a linear impact on 
organizational performance or is simply left as a ‘black box’. 
Research that fails to open the ‘black box’ – whether it is concerned with (dynamic) 
capabilities, (organizational) routines, or (tacit) knowledge – tends to treat these as static 
and unchanging. Work on routines, for example, argue for a departure from such an 
approach if we are to obtain better insights on the dynamics of routines within situated 
organizational practices (Feldman and Pentland, 2008; Pentland et al, 2011). Similarly, 
Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville (2011) suggest that research on capabilities and 
routines have remained mainly interested in the purpose and motivation of routines and 
capabilities and their impact on firm performance. Recently, Mciver et al (2013) argue that 
research on knowledge management has mainly concentrated on the relationship of 
knowledge management programs and initiatives and their impact on firm performance 
thus limiting our understanding on how knowledge work actually takes place in 
organizational settings. Thus, positivist-based research has only limitedly provided us 
with the inner parts of what and how organizations achieve (or not) positive performance. 
Critical realism – a grown philosophical approach in the social sciences – can be viewed 
both as ontology and epistemology. On the one hand, critical realism posits a realist 
ontology – the existence of an external world – and, on the other hand, it holds a ‘fallibilist’ 
epistemology (Miller and Tsang, 2010: 144) in which researcher’s knowledge of the world 
is socially produced. Critical realism distinguishes between three realms: the real (which 
consists of unobservable structures and causal powers), the actual (which consists of 
events and processes in the world), and the empirical (which consists of the experience 
of human beings) (Bhaskar, 1978; Fairclough, 2005). Thus, for critical realism, as Reed 
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(2005) points out, even if there are unobservable structures and forces in organizations, 
their operations can still be investigated using ethnographic and historical research 
(rather than quantitative methods) (Kilduff et al, 2011). 
This is also relevant to the research of tacit knowledge. As it has been argued before, 
tacit knowledge is unobservable, hidden, and inaccessible even by those possessing it. 
A critical realist perspective would argue that even if one cannot observe it, he/she can 
still research it as it is manifested in routines, organizational structures, mechanisms, and 
so on. Nonaka and Toyama (2003: 3), have explicitly acknowledged the contribution of 
critical realism in their work in the following passage: “[we utilize] critical realism…mainly 
to explain the interrelation between the agents and the context, and critical realism as a 
methodology to explain the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge or between 
the invisible and visible”. Also, a number of studies that have attempted to capture and 
measure organizational knowledge (Berman et al, 2002; Borgatti and Carboni, 2007; 
Wilcox King and Zeithalm, 2003) or measure the impact of knowledge transfer between 
and/or across organizational settings (Cummings and Teng 2003; Inkpen and Chang, 
2005; Wei et al 2011) build, either implicitly or explicitly, upon critical realist approaches. 
Finally, constructivism and its related versions (e.g. social constructivism, 
constructionism, and interpretivism) is a branch of philosophy that, according to Crotty 
(1998: 42), stipulates that “all knowledge and therefore all meaningful reality as such is 
constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and 
developed and transmitted within an essentially social context”. In other words, meaning 
or truth is neither subjective nor objective (as it is the case in positivism/critical realism) 
but socially constructed through the interaction amongst humans and their experiences. 
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Experiences, in turn, “do not constitute a sphere of subjective reality separate from, and 
in contrast to, the objective realm of the external world” (Crotty, 1998: 45). Crucially, 
constructivist approaches view the researcher and the researched as inseparable, co-
creators of meanings and understandings and, therefore, the philosophical position of the 
researcher determines his/her findings. One of the early works of knowledge arguing for 
a constructivist approach is that of Tsoukas (1996: 13) who argued that “individuals are 
now seen as agents, active co-producers of their surrounding reality. How agents 
construe themselves and their environments become the focus of study”. According to 
numerous authors (Blackler, 1995; Brown and Duguid, 1991; Charreire Petit and Huault, 
2008; Gherardi, 2000), the process of knowledge development is chiefly a social and 
cultural phenomenon, historical and indeterminate without an apparent separation 
between subject, object, and context. 
A crucial aspect of constructivism (or constructionist) philosophies is the centrality of 
practice as the foundational core of all meaningful activity. Practice-centered approaches 
see the world as socially constructed by human agents and it is brought into being through 
everyday activity (Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011: 1241). As Feldman and Orlikowski 
(2011) argue, practice-centered perspectives answer the ‘why’ questions of employing 
such an approach as the focus remains on everyday activity as practices are understood 
to be the building blocks of social reality. One of the most prominent writers on practice 
theory, the American philosopher Theodor Schatzki (2001), view practice theory as an 
ontology: “The social is a field of embodied, materially interwoven practices centrally 
organized around shared practical understandings” (Schatzki 2001: 3).  
116 
 
Feldman and Orlikowski (2011: 1240-1241), however, remind us that besides being an 
ontology, practice theory offers two further avenues that need to be taken into 
consideration. The first is the theoretical approach to practice which, although it is 
concerned with everyday activity, it is also concerned with a specific explanation of that 
activity.  This means that a practice-centered approach answers the ‘how’ question of a 
particular practice, such as the theoretical relationships that explain the dynamics of 
everyday activities, how these activities are generated, and how they operate in different 
contexts and in different times. Therefore, researchers who employ a practice lens are 
engaged with the core ‘logic of practice’ (Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011) and the ways 
that they are produced, reinforced, and change as well as their intended or unintended 
consequences. The second consideration involves the empirical approach to practice and 
the centrality of people’s actions to organizational outcomes. It also reflects the 
importance of practices in the ongoing operations of organizations. This approach 
answers the ‘what’ of a practice lens with its focus on the everyday activity of organizing 
in both its routine and improvised forms.  
A number of scholars within organization and management studies have thus turned to 
practice theory in order to (re)formulate notions of knowledge commonly used in 
management literature. Drawing primarily on the works of Giddens (1984) and Bourdieu 
(1990), these scholars have understood knowing in practice as the knowledgeability that 
is continually enacted through ongoing action. Knowing, as Orlikowski (2002: 252) 
suggests “is an ongoing social accomplishment, constituted and reconstituted in everyday 
practice”.  This view of knowing as enacted is strongly evident in research on knowledge 
production and sharing within organizations [Bechky (2003), Brown and Duguid (1991), 
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Cook and Brown (1999), Gherardi (2006), Kaplan and Orlikowski (2013), Nicolini et al 
(2003) and Tsoukas (2005; 2009)]. What these studies have in common is the idea that 
knowledge is not a static or stable disposition but an ongoing and dynamic production 
that is recurrently enacted as actors engage in the world of practices (Feldman and 
Orlikowski, 2011). 
In the next section I describe and explain the methodological approach of my investigation 
and describe the methods which have been used to understand tacit knowing and its 
relation to organizational routines. 
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4.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
One of the main problems in any inquiry into tacit knowledge is the difficulty associated 
with its empirical investigation. This, as Gourlay (2006a) suggests, is not only because of 
the multifaceted and socially complex character of knowledge but also because most 
researchers to-date have largely concentrated in further clarifying the concept. This has 
meant that very few studies have attempted to empirically investigate such knowledge in 
organizations. However, there is a good reason for this. If one thinks back at Polanyi’s 
(1966: 4) statement that “we know more than we can tell”, a number of authors have 
argued that tacit knowledge is unconscious (Easterby-Smith and Lyles, 2003: 8) or even 
ineffable (Tsoukas, 2003; 2011) and, thus, not open to empirical investigation. 
However, Tsoukas later suggests (Tsoukas, 2009) that the ineffability associated with 
tacit knowing does not necessarily imply that we cannot discuss the performances in 
which we are involved. He argues that although discussion in the form of dialogue has 
been suggested or implied by several organizational researchers to be a significant 
mechanism through which new knowledge emerges (see, for example, Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995: 64; Tsoukas, 2003; von Krogh et al 2000: 84-88), it has not been 
adequately theorized.  We need to know more, Tsoukas asserts, about how dialogue 
works to generate new organizational knowledge. In brief, Tsoukas summarizes his 
argument as follows: from a dialogical perspective, new organizational knowledge 
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originates in the individual’s ability to make distinctions in relation to the task he/she is 
engaged in. New distinctions may be developed because organizational practitioners 
experience their situations in terms of already constituted distinctions, which lend 
themselves to further articulations. Further articulations develop when organizational 
members engage in productive dialogical exchanges. Dialogue becomes productive 
when the modality of interaction is that of relational engagement, that is, when participants 
take active responsibility for joint tasks and the relationships in which they are involved. 
Through productive dialogue, participants make themselves open to influence and thus 
are led to ‘self-distanciation’, that is, take a distance from their customary, unreflective 
ways of acting and doing things. 
Productive dialogue is characterized by four properties, namely, collaborative 
emergence, constrained novelty, incremental emergence, and indexical creativity. These 
properties indicate participants’ efforts to assimilate mutually experienced strangeness. 
Such assimilation occurs through conceptual combination, conceptual expansion, and/or 
conceptual reframing. Through these three processes of conceptual change, new 
distinctions are made which, when accepted inter-subjectively, constitute new knowledge. 
Such new knowledge, over time, fades into accepted knowledge and forms part of the 
inherited background thus providing the context for new organizational issues, causing 
unsettledness to emerge, and the dialogical processes to be reactivated (Tsoukas, 2009: 
949-950).  
The usefulness and utility of dialogue (or conversation, or talk) in researching engaged 
activity in organizational contexts has been addressed by a number of researchers. Talk, 
for example, has been shown to enable collective sensemaking, learning and reflection 
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(Garud et al 2011, Rerup, 2009; Weick et al 2005). The functions of talk and discussion 
which appear to be particularly important when investigating change – where participants 
in organizations must collectively find new ways of acting and doing things – have also 
been discussed by scholars researching change in organizational routines (Dittrich et al 
2016; Edmondson et al, 2001).  Dittrich et al (2016), for example, examined the role of 
reflective talk in how routines change. The authors argued that talk enables routine 
participants to collectively reflect on the routine and find new ways of enacting it. This 
enactment of collective reflection enables participants to name and situate the issue to 
be discussed regarding the performative and ostensive parts of routines, envisage and 
explore alternative ways of enacting the routine, and evaluate and question these 
suggestions from different angles. Edmondson et al (2001), too, found that reflective talk 
can be catalytic in routine change whereas restrictions or problems encountered in 
organizations may prevent or delay routine changing. In their study of a cardiac surgery 
routine, Edmondson et al (2001) described in detail how participants engaged in talk to 
reflect on changes of their routine and subsequently change its performance. Weick’s 
(1993) seminal study also showed that lack of reflective talk in the face of disruptive 
events can lead to fatal breakdowns of routines. 
These studies share one more thing in common: they draw on the principles of 
ethnography and along with a number of other studies share the view that ethnographic 
approaches to data collection can provide important insights to our understanding of 
everyday work and practices in organized contexts. In the next section, I delve deeper in 
the principles of ethnographic research and its usefulness. It seems appropriate, 
therefore, to concentrate on how we can discuss the skilled performances of 
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organizational actors and the ways these manifest themselves in organizational 
structures, processes and routines. Such methodologies draw upon the premises of 
subjective ontology and constructivist epistemologies in order to derive to an appropriate 
methodology that can shed light to the tacit, hidden and inaccessible part of knowledge.  
4.3.1 Ethnography 
I take methodology to mean “the theory of how research should be undertaken including 
the theoretical and philosophical assumptions upon which research is based and the 
implications of these for the method or methods adopted” (Saunders et al, 2015: 602). 
This definition implies that our philosophical underpinnings have to be consistent with the 
methods we use to investigate reality. As it has been shown in Table 4.1. (page 109), 
constructivist methodologies rely heavily on inductive, ethnographic approaches to theory 
building, with emphasis on dialogue and discussion (Cunliffe, 2011).  Ethnography is a 
research methodology comprising of a variety of methods (Brannan and Oultram, 2012) 
that could include in-depth interviews, discourse analysis, personal documents, 
participant observation, visual methods (video, photography, drawings), and the internet. 
Ethnographic approaches, thus, allow the researcher to investigate the social character 
of knowledge building on different methods which can be used in conjunction (e.g. 
participant observation – or ‘participant-as-observer’ [Anderson, 2008: 150; Brannan and 
Oultram, 2012: 298] and in-depth, unstructured interviews) to permit for the emergence a 
fuller picture of knowledge.  
Watson (2011: 205) defines ethnography as “a style of social science writing which draws 
upon the writer’s close observation of and involvement with people in a particular social 
setting and relates the words spoken and the practices observed or experienced to the 
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overall cultural framework within which they occurred”. In recent years there is an 
observed proliferation of ethnographic research in organization and management studies 
(Brannan et al, 2012; Cunliffe, 2010; Rouleau et al, 2014; Van Maanen, 2011; Watson 
2011, Yanow et al, 2012), in strategy process (Langley et al, 2013;  Van de Ven, 1992), 
in strategy-as-practice (Rasche and Chia, 2009; Rouleau, 2005), and other areas of 
organization work (Huising, 2014; Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013; Nicolini et al, 2012). In 
the Annual Academy of Management meeting in 2013, one of the pioneering figures in 
ethnographic research, John Van Maanen, suggested that ethnography is more of a logic 
(or, stance) rather than a given method of inquiry. It is not a recipe; rather,  
“it involves fieldwork, headwork and textwork, and results typically in a written representation of 
cultural understandings held by others… that are closely tied to a specific context and always 
provisional and partial. It is both dynamic and recursive but the encounter with the ‘foreign’ or 
‘unknown’ or ‘strange’ is the very essence of ethnography” (Van Maanen, 2015: 40). 
 This is an important insight provided by Van Maanen as ethnographic research is 
context-specific whereby the strange and unknown are the norm rather than the 
exception. Towards this end, as I have indicated earlier, this research deals with 
surprises, breakdowns and accidents which imply that an ethnographic approach in a 
study of knowledge is appropriate. This is emphasized also by Van Maanen in the 
following passage:  
“Our knowledge accumulates and changes over time as we come closer to understanding the 
perspectives – the venerable, if mythical, ‘native’s point of view’ – of the people from whom we 
are learning. Knowledge emerges in part because surprise – the Holy Grail of ethnography – is 
inevitable and taken seriously. When people do or say what we least expect, explanations are 
called for, however limited and tentative they may be at the moment” (Van Maanen, 2015: 41). 
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In addition, the thesis bears upon contemporary theories of practice which place 
emphasis on individuals’ practical knowledge understood as the ability to act in 
appropriate and/or effective ways. A practice perspective on knowledge emphasizes the 
role of the tacit: individuals are unable to state, in general terms, how it is appropriate 
and/or effective to act in different circumstances. As I have shown in Chapter Three, 
individuals are usually unable to articulate under what circumstances it is appropriate to 
greet somebody by way of shaking their hand or how to ride a bicycle or, even, how to 
conduct interviews. Given these circumstances, the social scientist will not be able to find 
out about this knowledge by simply asking individuals to tell him/her how it is appropriate 
and/or effective to act in various situations (Zahle, 2012). With this in mind, and being 
sensitive to the multifaceted and complex nature of tacit knowledge in organized contexts, 
the approach I propose to adopt in my investigation of the tacit builds on a subjective 
ontology, a constructivist epistemology and an ethnographic, dialogical and inductive 
methodology. 
Such an approach, although theoretically consistent, lacks application in our research on 
tacit knowledge. Within organization and management studies ethnographic work covers 
a range of sociological-based studies grounded in ethnography (Watson, 1994), 
ethnomethodology (Samra-Fredericks, 2003) and discursive approaches (Boje, 1991), 
amongst others. One of the most influential works in the field has been Julian Orr’s (1996) 
ethnographic study of photocopy-repair technicians at Xerox Corporation. Orr described 
how an organization’s view of how work is carried out contrasts with what it really takes 
to do the job done. Orr studied the practices of the technicians whose work he 
characterized as “a continuous, highly skilled improvisation within a triangular relationship 
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of technician, customer, and machine” (Orr, 1996: 1). This triadic relationship creates 
challenges that the technicians need to understand and control that relate not only to 
machines themselves but also to the customers that these machines belong to. This is 
because the corporation assumes that the machines are identical and therefore, any 
problems or issues encountered in relation to their smooth operation should also be 
identical. This means that these problems can be diagnosed and solved by technicians 
using standard documentation that the corporation provides. As Orr (1996: 111) 
suggested, “in providing directive documentation the corporation is assuming 
responsibility for solving the machine problem and in the eyes of the corporation 
technicians are only responsible for failing to fix a machine if they have not used the 
documentation”. Orr found, however, that this is not the case. His deep knowledge of the 
corporation he studied, his experience of working as a technician, and his skills as an 
ethnographer enabled him to write a powerful ‘thick description’ with insights on how 
technicians used their tacit knowledge and skills of repairing photocopy machines without 
relying on manuals or other explicit forms of knowledge. Orr built a compelling picture of 
the work practices of technicians and showed how the technician teams diagnose and 
solve problems through ‘situated talk’ about the machines (Beckhy, 2006: 1769). These 
‘war stories’, are not only capable of transferring existing knowledge but, more 
importantly, are capable of solving novel problems at hand.  
Orr’s study is also important for the emphasis he placed on conversation and dialogue. 
Cunliffe (2008: 130) argues that the dialogic nature of situated, ‘moment-to-moment 
dialogue’ has the ability to shape our understandings of socially shared worlds and the 
ways we orient ourselves in these worlds by acting and practicing everyday tasks. To 
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paraphrase Cunliffe’s (2008) example, as I am sitting at my computer writing this chapter, 
which to an observer may look as a solitary and individual activity, but there is a whole 
history of conversations with my classmates, my supervisors, my friends, myself, and 
texts that play into my writing. My friend comes and asks me what I am writing and our 
conversation helps me to see that I need to include this example in my writing. This, for 
Cunliffe (2008: 130), is the relational and mundane nature of dialogue: “not purely 
reflective but also intuitive and taken-for-granted”.  
Building more or less explicitly on Orr’s approach, a number of studies have attempted to 
understand reflective practices (Jordan, 2010; Yanow and Tsoukas, 2009), unusual 
organizational experiences (Garud et al 2011), the role of objects in cross-disciplinary 
collaboration (Nicolini et al 2012), amongst others. Also, work on organizational routines 
and routine dynamics pays particular attention to ethnographic data collection as an 
important methodological tool which, coupled with practice theoretical approaches, can 
be effectively utilized to understand the micro foundations of routines in organized 
contexts (Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011; Feldman and Pentland, 2008).  What these 
studies have in common is a novel insight on everyday practices, activities, and dynamics 
which would otherwise remain obscured and inaccessible to organizational researchers. 
Recently, Bosma et al (2016) highlighted the importance of creative dialogue in opening 
up ‘semantic spaces’ that are essential for radical learning to take place.  The authors 
define dialogue as “the verbal utterances we use in informal conversations, when 
communicating directly with others” (Bosma et al 2016: 20). Dialogue is processional and 
co-creative effort through which meaning is arrived at through novel and experimental 
attempts at articulating lived experiences. Dialogue, also, allow us to find the way towards 
126 
 
shared meanings and is instrumental in discarding accepted meanings. In dialogue we 
become aware of each other’s thoughts even if meaning is not yet established. Dialogue 
does not necessarily create a unity of understanding; Tsoukas suggested that it is the 
recognition of difference in meanings that allow us to understand each other in dialogue 
and to potentially alter our own understandings (Tsoukas 2009: 943). 
Therefore, it is through dialogue, conversation, and observation, that the researcher can 
become a reflective inquirer by incorporating aspects of the everyday experience into the 
research process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS  
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In this section I describe the particular methods that have been used to understand the 
role of tacit knowing in the context of organizational routines. What I have argued so far 
in this Chapter is that the apparent difficulty associated with researching the tacit stems 
from a pre-occupation to understand cognitive and mental structures that may (or may 
not) alter an individual’s learning process. This, as Tsoukas has suggested, has been 
valuable in so far as it has provided us with insights that link knowledge (and, more 
importantly, tacit knowing) with organizational performance or with competitive 
advantage. However, more interpretivist methodologies that build on ethnographic, 
dialogical and inductive approaches may be more suited and perhaps more appropriate 
in investigating tacit knowing. This is because knowing is a social accomplishment which 
is constituted and enacted in everyday practices. This means then that the particular 
methods that can be utilized should take these principles into consideration. 
In the next section I describe the research setting and explain the reasons behind this 
choice. Following discussion of this, I describe the ways that data presented in this thesis 
have been collected. Consistent with recent studies in organization and management 
research, I describe and explain the use of interviews (with emphasis on critical incidents) 
and archival data. This is followed by a discussion on ethical considerations and how they 
have been addressed in the thesis before I conclude the Chapter by offering an 
explanation on data analysis. 
4.4.1 The Research Setting 
Despite the plethora of studies, perspectives, and approaches to tacit knowledge and 
organizational routines as independent fields of inquiry and the wealth of empirical studies 
that have been generated in different disciplines, one important oversight has been 
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observed: There is virtually no empirical study (at least not at the time that this thesis is 
written) that concentrates on organizational settings operating in the Middle-East region 
and, more specifically, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Almost every empirical study 
presented in top-tier academic journal publications derives its findings from data collected 
within ‘Western’ organizational settings that are typically based in the USA, UK, or 
continental Europe. This poses an opportunity for this thesis to be one of the first studies 
to investigate the link between tacit knowledge and organizational routines within Middle-
Eastern organizational settings. 
In a recent paper, Venkitachalam and Busch (2012) argued that a considerable driver for 
the recognition of organizational knowledge as a significant organizational phenomenon 
has been the increasing migration in the workplace from manufacturing to more service-
based industries. This is particularly important when one looks at key economic figures in 
the Gulf region, especially in the UAE, where such a migration is set to continue strongly 
as oil and gas reserves would not be available for ever. What is particularly important to 
consider is that besides the obvious competitive advantages gained through lower labor 
costs for manufacturing, one other reason for the service orientation is due to the 
emphasis placed towards individual competences, know-how and collectively the 
intellectual capacity of the organization (Venkitachalam and Busch, 2012: 365). The 
following Table (4.2) presents the UAE’s top-ten sectors ranked in terms of value added 
to UAE’s economic growth. What is interesting to note is that these ten sectors account 
for almost 75% of the country’s GDP. 
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TABLE 4.2 UAE’S TOP-10 SECTORS RANKED BY VALUE ADDED 
 
Source: Word Industries Service IHS (2016) 
In addition, UAE’s economy is ranked the second largest is the Middle Eastern 
region and the 26 th largest economy in the world as per GDP (World Industry 
Service IHS, 2016) and it is projected to grow even further within the next few 
years. Table 4.3 shows the changes in GDP from 2012 to 2019.  
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TABLE 4.3 UAE ECONOMIC GROWTH INDICATORS  
 
Source: World Industry Service IHS (2016) 
It is therefore quite important and perhaps more timely than ever to investigate how 
knowing and, in particular its tacit element, can be understood, theorized, and researched 
in organizations based in the UAE. Following recent studies in the wider organization and 
management research (Baralou and Tsoukas 2015; Bucher and Langley, 2016; 
Cornelissen 2012; Huising, 2014; Jordan, 2010; Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2012; Nicolini et 
al, 2012; Nicolini 2011; Pentland et al, 2011), I use an inductive approach to analyze real-
time and retrospective, unstructured interviews to understand how managers deal with 
critical organizational experiences in the context of organizational routines. The 
identification of individual, professional, and organizational influences on tacit knowledge 
implies a need for an understanding of the context in which these individuals conduct their 
daily activities and requires a set of accounts that bear upon ‘critical organizational 
experience’. By critical organizational experiences, I mean instances where processes 
and practices have gone through some kind of change (major or minor), transition or 
transformation in the eyes of those who experience them. This does not mean that critical 
experiences may be construed as ‘dangerous’ but as ones that have had an impact on 
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the participant’s organizational life. To put it differently, my purpose was to understand 
how participants who have been engaging in organizational routines understand and 
reflect on the routines they have been involved in. To do so, I wanted to ask participants 
to reflect on their (critical) organizational experiences so that they can account for a 
breakdown in the process of performing organizational routines; I wanted to get to the 
participants’ reflective accounts on how they have reflected when outcomes have been 
disrupted and how the subsidiary connections have been re-aligned in the face of novel 
experiences/routines. 
This thesis therefore records critical organizational experiences based on breakdowns of 
20 interviewees in two large pubic-owned firms based in U.A.E. which I call ‘M’ and ‘R’ 
respectively (to maintain anonymity and confidentiality). The study was carried out over 
a period of almost one and a half years, from January 2013 to May 2014. ‘M’ is a 
corporation established in 2002 by the government of Abu Dhabi (capital city of UAE) as 
a principal agent of the city’s economic growth with the purpose to facilitate investments 
in the city and meet the government’s socioeconomic targets. With a portfolio of business 
of over 60 billion USD and more than 39,000 employees across the group, the company 
invests in diverse sectors including aerospace, financial services, healthcare, metals and 
mining, oil and gas, real-estate and renewable energy, amongst others. ‘R’, is an 
investment firm that attracts investments from the domestic and foreign markets to create 
wealth and raise the standard of living for the people of a particular Emirate. The firm is 
divided into 8 strategic units which include, amongst others, Education, Technology, Real 
Estate, Transportation, Manufacturing and Energy, and comprises of a portfolio of over 
7,000 companies. 
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The rationale for the choice of these two organizations as research settings is four-fold:  
(1) The present study is the first attempt to investigate the role of tacit knowing in 
organizational routines in the Middle-East and as such, this study aims to offer 
insights that go beyond the cultural settings of organizational research based 
mostly on European and American companies with a view to understanding 
another important context that varies in terms of rules, regulations and 
relations. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) call this a ‘prototypical case’ that is 
exemplary and high revelatory of the process by which individual participants 
construct their understandings on the presence or absence of social pressures 
to align with or accommodate the expectations of relevant others. 
(2) The two companies selected in this thesis are large public organizations and 
this is another important characteristic that make these settings ‘prototypical’ in 
terms of complexity of operations and the accountability of the companies’ 
actions to the country’s communities and stakeholders. In addition, the 
combined workforce of these two companies exceeds 50,000 employees which 
means that the companies are particularly significant in terms of the socio-
economic impact they exert not only in the two cities they operate, but also in 
the wider context of the UAE. 
(3) The author has been offered to work in the form of placement in ‘R’ while 
working on a full time basis in ‘M’ in the company’s offices in London. This has 
afforded me a unique opportunity to research deeper the two organizations and 
endeavor to understand the context of operations and the struggles and 
tensions of day-to-day business. Such access is very important in ethnographic 
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approaches as it encourages engagement with organizational activities that 
would otherwise remain inaccessible. 
(4) The issue of ‘accessing’ such large organizational contexts requires significant 
pre-work in terms of communication, connections, and agreements that can be 
time-consuming and complex.  As it will be shown in later parts of this thesis, 
an important component in gaining (and maintaining) unprecedented access to 
large corporations in UAE relates to  the level of ‘social capital’ employed by 
the part of the individuals involved in negotiating such access. Two important 
reasons played a crucial role towards gaining such access: (a) the researcher 
is an Emirati citizen and decedent of one of the royal families in UAE; and (b) 
the researcher’s mobilization of key contacts in the two organizations who have 
acted as mediators in providing the necessary leverage for such access to 
materialize.  
4.4.2 Data Collection 
Consistent with recent work in organization and management studies (Dittrich et al 2016; 
Huising, 2014; Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013; Nicolini 2011) I used ethnographic data 
collection methods that allowed me to observe in real time the experiences of the actors 
in both organizations. I began my work on observing the actors and their interactions in 
‘M’ during July and September of 2013 and in ‘R’ during March and May 2014. My 
purpose was to understand participants’ experiences on a daily basis and for this reason 
I observed various professionals/managers as their practices in the organizations 
unfolded. In both organizations I undertook various positions because placement 
contracts (or internships) were based on a rotation system for all the new-comers with the 
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purpose to familiarizing themselves with different organizational activities. In ‘M’, for 
instance, I worked on a full time basis before I was given the opportunity for the internship 
at different departments. 
Part of the agreement with the organization was to rotate to various positions and 
departments based on my preferences and interests. This created for me an 
unprecedented opportunity to come closer to key participants (i.e. managers and 
directors) and observe, talk, and interview (informally in most cases) these individuals in 
an attempt to understand why they acted the way they acted in particular situations. In 
‘R’, I rotated on a monthly basis from the Marketing division to the Finance division to the 
Business Development division. After the first month of merely observing executives and 
managers while conducting their daily activities, I begun to engage more actively with 
them by conversing, informally interviewing, and collecting documentation on various 
projects that the organization was involved in. In both organizations, I attended meetings 
with suppliers and customers, observed interactions between managers and clients, 
attended meetings between directors and managers, discussed informally various 
activities that managers undertook in the organization and took notes in most cases. 
Due to the fact that the selected companies are public rather than private entities, a 
number of challenges needed to be overcome that related to the collection of written data:  
(a)  I was not permitted to take away from the office any documentation that was 
related to the companies’ policies, procedures and manuals since these were 
marked as ‘private and confidential’ and were only available for internal viewing. 
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(b) My notes on the observations were viewed for approval and validation from the 
line manager – typically the department head – to ensure that what I observed and 
noted and what had actually happened was believed to be ‘accurate’ by the 
participant involved. 
(c) Sometimes, discussions were quite private (only between the researcher and one 
or two employees) as there was a ‘felt tension’ that whatever was said should have 
been kept private and confidential.   
In addition to the informal discussions, I also conducted 20 formal, in-depth, largely 
unstructured interviews, using a qualitative version of the Critical Incident Technique (CIT) 
(Butterfield, et al. 2005; Chell, 2004; Kokkalis, 2008) to evoke the complexity of assessing 
organizational experience and understand how tacit knowing has been altered in view of 
novel organizational experiences and to allow for self-critical reflection in my engagement 
with the participants. Interviews were used to explore different meanings, perceptions, 
and interpretations of organizational members. Interviews are seen in this context as 
conversations or discussions in which participants jointly reflecting on issues and discuss 
insights (Boje, 1991; Cunliffe, 2002). The main aim of the interviews was to uncover the 
tacit knowing of individual participants and understand how they have shaped their 
experiences in the selected organizations. More specifically, building on my theoretical 
understanding on the structure of tacit knowing and its relation to organizational routines, 
I was interested in understanding how breakdowns in the structure of tacit knowing 
impacted or altered the relationship between meanings and practices and led to new 
performances.  
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The use of the Critical Incident Technique as a way of eliciting tacit understandings and 
reflective accounts of managers and professionals has recently been discussed in a 
number of studies (Cornelissen, 2012; Jordan, 2010; Leitch et al 2010; Mantere, et al. 
2012). For example, Cornelissen (2012) used the technique to identify how corporate 
communication professionals made sense of anomalous circumstances while maintaining 
accountability to others. Jordan (2010) used the technique to find out how an 
anaesthesiology department used organizational practices to help novice nurses to 
become more reflective of their engagements. Mantere et al (2012), too, used the 
technique to identify how managers deal with cancelled planed strategic changes. The 
usefulness of critical incidents as a method for researching tacit knowledge in 
organizations has been discussed extensively as a way of eliciting the tacit, hidden and 
inaccessible experiences of organizational members (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001; 
Tsoukas and Sandberg, 2011) or deal with unusual organizational experiences 
(Cornelissen, 2012; Garud et al 2011). Other studies have also acknowledged the ‘critical’ 
aspect of organizational experience and discussed how unstructured or ‘loosely’ 
structured interviews can have benefits when exploring areas as diverse as managerial 
and organizational ignorance (Roberts, 2013), accidental innovation (Austin et al, 2012) 
and sensemaking (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007).  
It does seem then that unexpected experiences (breakdowns, surprises, accidents and 
so on) play an important role not only in organizational life but also in the researcher’s life 
(Oliver and Roos, 2003). Exploring multiple interpretations and reflections of participants 
builds up a relational bond between the researcher and the researched. As Cunliffe (2011: 
663) suggests participants’ perspectives that are centered on stories that incorporate 
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feelings, reactions, similarities and differences is a meaning-making process that is 
contextual, evocative, and negotiated. Surprises, errors, breakdowns, accidents, 
ignorance, and so on are areas that have very recently begun to be discussed in 
organization and management studies. What they have in common is that moments of 
surprise have the potential to make people become more aware (shift the attention from 
focal targets to subsidiary particulars, in Polanyi’s work) of their actions and practices as 
they reflect on their tacit knowledge and taken-for-granted assumptions.  
4.4.2.1. The Interview Process 
As indicated above, 20 formal interviews in total have been conducted with managers, 
senior managers, and executives in both firms. In ‘M’, formal interviews took place 
between August and September 2013 whereas in ‘R’ interviews were conducted during 
April and May 2014. Shortly after I joined both organizations, I conducted a number of 
meetings with managers and senior managers of different departments to explain the 
purpose of the study and assure all participants that their responses would be made 
anonymous and treated confidentially. In these initial meetings I explained to the 
participants my research aims and objectives, my role in the organization both as an intern 
and a researcher, and emphasized the importance and contribution of studying tacit 
knowing in UAE-based organizations. I also asked participants to provide an account of 
their roles and responsibilities in the company and think of examples of critical 
experiences that shaped their understanding of ‘how things are done’ in the organization. 
After these initial meetings, a small number of participants (three in ‘M’ and two in ‘R’) 
who had initially agreed to participate in the research informed me that they would not be 
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able to participate in the study citing different reasons (e.g. workload problems, time 
constrains, unwillingness to participate, and so on).  
The formal interviewing process begun a few weeks later. Formal interviews were 
performed at each organization and lasted approximately one hour on average. The 
interview protocol was such that participants were asked to firstly describe their role in 
the organization and to subsequently describe the handling of at least two (or three) 
critical incidents that had happened within the last two years. I defined critical incidents 
as ‘unprecedented events’ for the participants that required them to make a decision in 
relation to a situation that was perceived as perplexing or difficult in their organizational 
experience. Consistent with recent studies that have utilized the same approach to 
interviewing based on critical incidents (see, for example, Cornelissen, 2012; Jordan, 
2010, Mantere, et al. 2012), participants were asked to recall specific events from their 
personal perspectives and their own worlds which gave them a ‘voice’ (Nag and Gioia, 
2012; Leitch, et al. 2010). This permitted ‘self-defined criticality’ where the focus is on 
participants’ personal representation of ‘salient moments’ (Cope, 2003: 436). This, as 
Chell (2004) and Kokkalis (2008) suggest, yields an understanding of the critical incident 
from the point of view of the individual participant.  
The use of critical incidents enabled the creation of detailed records of events and rich 
set of data. Kokkalis (2008) has pointed out that in designing such interviews – which 
allow the participants to lead and set the dialogue (Thompson et al. 1989) – the 
researcher needs to find a good balance between pre-understanding (i.e. the theoretical 
background understanding that he/she brings along in the investigation) and unbiased 
‘openness’ towards the phenomenon under investigation. Thus, it is the participant who 
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effectively defines what constitutes an incident, its criticality, and how or why he/she has 
acted in one way rather than another. To ensure that participants have been prepared for 
their accounts of critical incidents as much as it is possible, they were asked to think about 
them prior to the day of the interview. In this way, participants were given more time to 
reflect on their experiences and during the interviews they could analyze in more depth 
their accounts. During the interviews, I asked participants to talk at length about each 
incident, its background and development, and what they did and thought at various 
points. Only when there was a noticeable pause or end to the talk I stepped in and asked 
them further questions about the incident. The intension of this particular tactic during 
interviewing is, as Cornelissen (2012: 121) also argues, to capture uninterrupted and on-
line understanding in speech, where frequent breaks through questioning could have led 
to turns in the understanding or summarization and contrast. 
For this reason, interviews in this context were largely unstructured. In searching for 
changes in the process of knowing, therefore, emphasis is placed on how interviewees 
have changed their actions and practices in light of their new understandings. As the 
interviews unfolded, a number of questions were used to elicit richer details, descriptions 
and understandings on why the narrated events were indeed critical (e.g. “why this event 
was important to you?”, “what was your reaction with respect to that particular event?”, 
“could you give me an example of how exactly you dealt with that particular situation?”, 
etc.). At the end of each narrated incident, questions were asked in relation to any other 
details or information that the participant felt relevant to add to their stories. The following 
questions were used to probe further details: “what were the actions taken by the people 
involved in the incident?” and “what were the outcomes and the effects of these actions?”. 
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Narrative stories are ‘contextually embedded’ (Boje, 1991: 109), and “reflect the complex 
social web within which work takes place” (Brown and Duguid, 1991: 44).  
In the middle and at the end of each interview, I summarized and fed my interpretations 
of participants’ accounts back to each individual as a way of strengthening my 
interpretations and to check against alternative interpretations (Cornelissen, 2012: 122). 
This was also done because although most of the interviews were conducted in Arabic 
language (my native language), three or four individuals preferred to be interviewed in 
English language (and one or two were native English speakers). All interviews were 
recorded and transcribed within two days after each interview took place. Table 4.4 
provides an overview of research participants, their role in the organizations, and the 
critical incidents they narrated. 
TABLE 4.4 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS, THEIR ROLE IN THE TWO 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND CRITICAL INCIDENTS NARRATED 
Participant 
(Pseudonym) 
Role in the 
Organization 
Narrated Critical Incidents 
Company M 
 
AM Financial Manager (a) Behavior of people and personalities in the organization 
that impact psychologically the wider environment 
within and across departments. 
(b) Payments and rewards that do not reflect the actual 
work of individual employee performance.   
BM Customer Services 
Manager 
(Telecommunications) 
(a) Problems and concerns regarding the customer services 
in the current organization and the impact of this on the 
specific department and the company overall. 
(b) Issues related to the ways that the company was 
handling customer inquiries and complains and the ways 
that these were handled by the department. 
CM Manager of Operations (a) Miscommunications and concerns regarding formal 
operating procedures, rules and company 
documentation versus managerial command. 
(b) Collegiate conflict, personality clashes, and managerial 
favoritism amongst colleagues from the same 
department. 
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DM Human Resources Manager 
(Telecommunications) 
(a) Issues related to the ways that customers were handled 
by certain employees and the implications of this for the 
organization. 
(b) Connections of certain employees to powerful 
individuals within or outside the organization and the 
difficulties associated with managing these individuals. 
EM Managing Director (a) Tensions between expatriate managers and local 
subordinates and the issues related to payments, 
rewards, experience in the organization, and connection 
in the form of ‘Wasta’. 
(b) Difficulties and issues associated with moving the 
organization to electronic system of work by 
implementing appropriate technologies.  
FM Senior Manager 
(Petroleum) 
(a) Lack of promotional opportunities in the company as he 
was considered ‘young’ for getting important company 
projects under his authority.  
(b) Disregard and disrespect of employees’ personal 
circumstances by senior managers in the company. 
GM Vice President of Human 
Resources  
(Petroleum) 
(a) The difficulties associated with the initiation and 
implementation of a new HR system. 
(b) Communication problems when the company had to go 
through restructuring following the global financial crisis 
of 2008-2009. 
HM Senior Financial Manager  
(Petroleum) 
(a) Fear of losing jobs due to minor mistakes (in the Finance 
department). 
(b) Disrespect and lack of attention to personal 
circumstances of employees and inability of HR Unit to 
solve problems  
(this manager resigned shortly after the interview took 
place)  
IM Assistant Financial 
Controller  
(Petroleum) 
(a) Differences between local and international workforce 
related to project handling, execution, and general 
management. Also, problems of communication 
between departments and managers. 
(b) Corruption and contractual issues in various joint 
venture projects (including auditing problems for the 
current organization). 
JM Senior Financial Analyst (a) Lack of understanding between what policies, 
procedures and regulations state and how management 
interprets these depending on the circumstances. 
(b) Cultural differences that pose issues between local and 
expatriate workforce in the organization, namely 
managers and subordinates – the use (and, misuse) of 
‘Wasta’ to get things done for personal gain.  
Company R 
 
AR Marketing Manager (a) Issues, problems, and concerns regarding a rebranding 
exercise in the company. 
(b) Issues and problems related to measuring the 
effectiveness and efficiency of marketing and other 
company communication activities. 
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BR Senior Manager of 
Accounts and Finance 
(a) Ethical issues related to financial matters in the 
organization. 
(b) Fraudulent practices that have been uncovered during 
his involvement in the auditing of the company. 
CR Business Development 
Executive 
(a) Risks associated with organizing particular events for the 
company and its stakeholders that stem from 
communication misunderstandings, lack of commitment 
and budgetary restrictions. 
(b) Project rotation in the company resulted in lack of 
ownership and control of projects which, consequently, 
were delayed and incomplete. 
DR Marketing Consultant (a) Issues related to the completion of marketing projects 
that required inputs and services outside of the 
company. 
(b) Substantial differences in the management style in the 
organization (old vs. new management) and the 
implications of this for all employees. 
(c) Serious mistakes in company’s accounts (in his capacity 
as auditing assistant) that could have had a significant 
impact on the credibility and trustworthiness of the 
organization.   
ER Manager of Security and 
Inspection 
(a) Responsibilities around projects and the managerial 
blame when things go wrong; rule-following as an 
important element in getting on the management’s side. 
(b) The misunderstandings and miscommunications 
surrounding the effective organization of international 
events. 
FR Senior Executive of 
Business Development 
(a) Loosing ownership of projects that have been 
championing and the implications of this for the 
understanding of his/her role and responsibility in the 
firm. 
(b) The handling (or, mishandling) of projects in the 
company and the tight delivery times set by 
management. 
GR Manager of Customer 
Services 
(a) Loosing custody of a project (auditing) after a 
mishandling of important documentation. 
(b) Managerial ignorance on issues related to personal 
problems both inside the company and outside of it. 
HR Senior Executive of 
Marketing and 
Communications 
(a) Issues and problems with more experienced colleagues 
in the beginning of the employment in the company 
(trust and confidence). 
(b) Lack of communication and commitment with external 
contractors when projects are expected to be delivered 
on certain timeframe.  
IR Principal Business 
Associate to the CEO 
(a) The difficulties around the structure of the organization 
in terms of lack of flexibility, communication and 
outreach to important stakeholders. 
(b) Problems, issues, and concerns regarding a rebranding 
exercise that currently takes place in the organization. 
JR Manager of Finance and 
Accounts 
(a) Fraudulent practices (auditing) that have been taken 
place in the company and the implications of this for the 
firm. 
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(b) Lack of responsibility and ethical conduct of managers to 
handle serious situations that have taken place in the 
company. 
 
It is important to highlight at this stage that since the research settings were large, 
government-owned entities, some of the participants have been particularly concerned 
about expressing their views openly in their offices or within the company’s doors. In order 
to overcome this problem, there have been agreements to discuss and carry out the 
interviews at the participants’ homes or at other mutually convenient locations that were 
agreed upon between the researcher and the participant. This has meant that a number 
of participants discussed more personal rather than organizational matters or incidents 
and the role of the researcher to direct the conversation into the area of investigation has 
been instrumental and, at the same time, challenging.  For example, some participants 
discussed how a sense of fear of losing one’s job in the company because of a simple 
error or omission has been a major feature of organizational life, particularly evident in 
the last five years of operation.  
 4.4.3 Ethical Considerations 
To enhance the quality of the research and ensure that both the process and the 
outcomes of this thesis would not pose any issues or concerns to the research 
participants and the organizations these were part of, a number of procedures and 
measures were employed at various stages of the research process. These measures 
are consistent with the principles related to ethical considerations as outlined by Bryman 
and Bell (2007) and other studies that have utilized similar approaches to data collection 
(e.g. Bucher and Langley, 2016; Cornelissen, 2012; Dittrich et al, 2016; Jordan, 2010). 
First, before access was granted to the research settings, I held two meetings with top 
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managers in the two organizations (different dates) with the purpose of explaining the 
research aims and objectives. In these meetings it was also stressed that respondents’ 
participation in the research is voluntary and they have the right to withdraw at any stage 
if they wish to do so. Upon agreement with the managers, access to the two organizations 
was granted.  
The second stage involved the steps undertaken during my participation in the research 
settings. To increase trustworthiness (Guba and Lincoln, 1985) between the participants 
and myself, considerable time was spent in engaging in various internal (attending 
meetings, presentations, conversations) and external (lunch breaks, dinners with 
colleagues, social gatherings) activities. Through this prolonged engagement, persistent 
observations of various situations were indeed possible. In addition, as indicated in the 
previous section (4.4.2.1), respondents participated in the research voluntarily and on the 
basis of informed consent. All participants were fully informed and assured that all 
information provided by them would be treated strictly confidentially and only for the 
purpose of the thesis (or other publications that may derive from it). Moreover, all 
participants were informed that although interviews would be recorded and notes would 
be taken in meetings and other conversations inside the organizations, all material would 
be anonymized and treated confidentially. To ensure anonymity, for example, participants 
were given a letter of the alphabet in order in which they have been interviewed followed 
by the letter ‘M’ or ‘R’ to connote the company in which they were part of (e.g. AM, BM, 
CM,…AR, BR, CR, etc.).  
To enhance the ethical standards of the research approach, the third and final stage 
involved the agreement to treat all internal company publications with the utmost 
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confidentiality and ensure that none of these publications would be taken away from the 
companies’ premises in any form (hard or electronic copy). For the purpose of the thesis, 
however, it was agreed that reference to internally published material could be made if 
and only if the document quoted would remain anonymous and confidential. For example, 
an extract from the ‘Staff Handbook’ should be referred to as ‘Internal Company 
Document’. In addition, the final thesis would be presented to the participants and senior 
management in a workshop which will be organized shortly after receiving the Doctorate 
award. In this way, the companies can benefit from the contributions made by this thesis 
and discuss the implications of the findings for current and future practices. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
146 
 
4.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
Flick (2013: 5) defined qualitative data analysis as “the classification and interpretation of 
linguistic […] material to make statements about implicit or explicit dimensions and 
structures of meaning making in the material and what is represented in it”. Such an 
analysis can also be applied to discover and describe issues in the field of structures and 
processes in routines and practices (Flick, 2013). This involves “working with data, 
organizing it, breaking it into manageable units, synthesizing it, searching for patterns, 
discovering what is important and what to be learned, and deciding what you will tell 
others” (Bogdan and Biklen, 1982: 145). Qualitative data analysis allows research 
findings to be drawn from the dominant or significant themes emerging from the raw data 
without the constraints of more structured methodologies (Leitch et al, 2010). The primary 
goal is to generate understanding of the participants’ understanding in the research 
situation.  
In line with other qualitative studies in the field of organizational routines and general 
management and organization studies (Bucher and Langley, 2016; Dittrich et al 2016; 
Howard-Grenville 2005; Kaplan and Orlikowski, 2013; Mantere et al 2012; Rerup and 
Feldman 2011; Sonenshein, 2016; Turner and Rindova, 2012), I followed an iterative and 
inductive approach to data analysis, going back and forth between the empirical material, 
the emerging interpretations, and the literature. The analysis was a lengthy, complex, and 
sometimes frustrating process as several rounds of analyses were carried out during 
fieldwork and after it was completed. This involved listening to the interview transcripts; 
transcribing the interviews; translating most of the interviews – from Arabic into English; 
reading the transcripts several times; summarizing the transcripts and choosing 
categories; coding statements; linking themes; selecting appropriate quotations; and 
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ultimately, generating theory grounded in the data and writing it up in a coherent fashion. 
The overall analysis aimed to understand how breakdowns in practical engagement of 
the participants in their daily routines altered their understanding of the practices involved 
in enacting these routines. 
In line with the data analysis approach developed and presented by Dittrich et al (2016: 
4-6) who investigated the role of reflective talk in organizational routines, the overall 
analysis presented here proceeded in a similar pattern encompassing four stages. In the 
first stage, I interrogated the data for emergent contents and interactional patterns and 
recursively going back and forth between transcripts, original recordings, and field notes 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006). Then I started 
reading the textual documents from the recorded and transcribed interviews to identify 
and separate the narrated critical incidents. In total, forty one (41) critical incident 
accounts were identified in the twenty (20) interview transcripts.  Out of these initial 
incidents, I separated and coded the ones that had been quite substantial in terms of 
background information provided in the incident, reflections on how the respective 
participant responded to the incident, and evidence in individual accounts on how and 
why each participant dealt with the event and its outcomes. This process yielded thirty 
four (34) critical incident accounts that were usable and ready for the subsequent 
analysis. The remaining seven (7) incidents were deemed incomplete or inadequate for 
the purposes of this thesis and were thus discarded.  
In the second stage, I started to re-read the thirty four incidents in detail to identify 
common themes and categories. I soon came to realization that these accounts were 
revealing several interrelated themes that could be connected to the literature on 
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organizational routines. This is because the data started revealing patterns in the narrated 
accounts that could be thought of as belonging to particular organizational routines. For 
example, a number of incidents narrated by different individuals touched upon critical 
experiences related to the ways that customer services are understood and employed in 
the researched organizations; various marketing activities related to a recent re-branding 
exercise in one of the two companies; errors and omissions that took place during 
auditing; the ways that policies and procedures are understood in both organizations; and 
Human Resource practices and systems and their utility in both organizations.  
At this point, I started matching the narrated accounts to the general themes that later in 
the analysis were refined and renamed as ‘organizational routines’. It is important to note 
here that when the first round of analysis took place, the focus of the interviews were on 
individuals accounts on how and why participants have acted in a particular way within 
the context of a critical organizational experience. However, data can have surprising 
powers (Miles et al 2014); moments which can themselves be construed as ‘breakdowns’ 
in the connection between the researcher and the researched. Miles and Huberman 
(1994: 262) argue that such moments of surprise should be followed up by the qualitative 
researcher as they can reveal nuances in the data that had not been thought of before. 
Therefore, even though the focus of the interviews was not put explicitly on organizational 
routines, participants’ accounts appeared to concentrate on six or seven themes that I 
construed as ‘ostensive routines’. This was an important step in the analysis as it 
illuminated what Feldman and Pentland (2003) noted that routines are “repetitive, 
recognizable patterns of interdependent actions, carried out by multiple actors” (Feldman 
and Pentland, 2003: 95). What I can add to this point is that the actions that give shape 
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to routines may also be ‘talked about’ by multiple participants who have engaged in the 
enactment of organizational routines and, retrospectively, try to make sense of these 
experiences. This is because participants talked about breakdowns in routines that were 
broadly used (for example, carried out by multiple actors such as managers and 
employees), frequently used (for example, critical aspects of the organization’s operations 
repeated several times during my engagement in the companies), identifiable to 
participants (for example, referred to explicitly in the data) based on independent actions 
(for example, the output of one action served as an input to another), and considered by 
research participants (managers, senior managers, and employees) to be important for 
the operation of the business. 
Hence, since most of the narrated incidents were related, more or less explicitly, to these 
five routines, I decided to group the narrated critical incident accounts under these 
‘ostensive routines’, i.e. Rebranding, Hiring and Promotions, Human Resource Systems 
Implementation, Customer Services, and Auditing. I had realized at that point that I had 
observed at least some aspects of these routines being enacted in the two organizations 
and had observed some steps of these routines enacted several times in the course of 
my engagement (internship) with the two organizations. I had also interviewed key 
individuals who were responsible for the enactment of these routines without knowing this 
crucial fact in advance. In the analysis that followed, I chose to concentrate on four of 
these routines: Hiring and Promotions, Rebranding, HR Systems Implementation, and 
Customer Services. I have excluded the Auditing routine from the later stages of analysis 
and subsequent discussion in the thesis because I have judged the critical incident 
accounts provided by participants in relation to this routine to be rather ‘sensitive’ – and, 
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at times, inappropriate – for public disclosure in terms of information and evidence 
provided. Table 4.5 outlines the initial categories used to frame coding of the data with 
the use of examples. 
TABLE 4.5 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CODING CATEGORIES 
Initial Categories 
(the Routines) 
Critical Incidents 
Hiring and 
Promotions 
(a) Payments and rewards that do not reflect the actual work of individual employee 
performance. 
(b) Collegiate conflict, personality clashes, and managerial favouritism amongst colleagues from 
the same department. 
(c) Connections of certain employees to powerful individuals within or outside the organization 
and the difficulties associated with managing these individuals. 
(d) Tensions between expatriate managers and local subordinates and the issues related to 
payments, rewards, experience in the organization, and connection in the form of ‘Wasta’. 
(e) Lack of promotional opportunities in the company as he was considered ‘young’ for getting 
important company projects under his authority. 
(f) Disrespect and lack of attention to personal circumstances of employees and inability of HR 
Unit to solve problems. 
(g) Differences between local and international workforce related to project handling, 
execution, and general management. Also, problems of communication between 
departments and managers. 
(h) Lack of understanding between what policies, procedures and regulations state and how 
management interprets these depending on the circumstances. 
(i) Cultural differences that pose issues between local and expatriate workforce in the 
organization, namely managers and subordinates – the use (and, misuse) of ‘Wasta’ to get 
things done for personal gain. 
(j) Substantial differences in the management style in the organization (old vs. new 
management) and the implications of this for all employees. 
(k) Responsibilities around projects and the managerial blame when things go wrong; rule-
following as an important element in getting on the management’s side. 
(l) Loosing ownership of projects that have been championing and the implications of this for 
the understanding of his/her role and responsibility in the firm. 
Rebranding (a) Issues, problems, and concerns regarding a rebranding exercise in the company.  
(b) Issues and problems related to measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of marketing and 
other company communication activities. 
(c) Risks associated with organizing particular events for the company and its stakeholders that 
stem from communication misunderstandings, lack of commitment and budgetary 
restrictions. 
(d) Issues related to the completion of marketing projects that required inputs and services 
outside of the company. 
(e) Lack of communication and commitment with external contractors when projects are 
expected to be delivered on certain timeframe. 
(f) The difficulties around the structure of the organization in terms of lack of flexibility, 
communication and outreach to important stakeholders.  
(g) Problems, issues, and concerns regarding a rebranding exercise that currently takes place in 
the organization. 
HR Systems 
Implementation 
(a) Difficulties and issues associated with moving the organization to electronic system of work 
by implementing appropriate technologies. 
(b) The difficulties associated with the initiation and implementation of a new HR system. 
Customer Services (a) Problems and concerns regarding the customer services in the current organization and the 
impact of this on the specific department and the company overall.  
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(b) Issues related to the ways that the company was handling customer inquiries and complains 
and the ways that these were handled by the department. 
(c) Miscommunications and concerns regarding formal operating procedures, rules and 
company documentation versus managerial command. 
(d) Issues related to the ways that customers were handled by certain employees and the 
implications of this for the organization. 
Auditing (a) Fear of losing jobs due to minor mistakes (in the Finance department. 
(b) Corruption and contractual issues in various joint venture projects (including auditing 
problems for the current organization). 
(c) Ethical issues related to financial matters in the organization.  
(d) Fraudulent practices that have been uncovered during his involvement in the auditing of 
the company. 
(e) Serious mistakes in company’s accounts (in his capacity as auditing assistant) that could 
have had a significant impact on the credibility and trustworthiness of the organization. 
(f) Loosing custody of a project (auditing) after a mishandling of important documentation. 
(g) Fraudulent practices (auditing) that have been taken place in the company and the 
implications of this for the firm. 
(h) Lack of responsibility and ethical conduct of managers to handle serious situations that 
have taken place in the company. 
 
In light of this new focus in the research approach and analysis, the third stage involved 
the development and classification of ‘descriptive codes’ that were related to moments of 
breakdown in the practical engagement of participants within the aforementioned four 
routines. At this stage I proceeded by ascribing preliminary codes or categories deriving 
from the interview narratives. This process of ‘open coding’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) 
allowed me to create a ‘start list’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994) from the interview data, the 
critical incidents and the breakdowns. More specifically, I turned my attention to an 
inductive coding scheme that allowed me to analyze participants’ interpretations from the 
ground up. I searched for patterns in terminology on how participants described and 
explained their involvement in certain practices and routines and examined how these 
practices produced (or failed to produce) certain outcomes.  
This led me to explore more closely the ways that participants understood their roles, 
actions, and outcomes of their actions and how they have conceptualized these in 
retrospect, that is, after the actions and outcomes have been produced. It was in these 
moments where the breakdown in the structure of tacit knowing became visible for 
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research and analysis. For example, moments of breakdown related to the Customer 
Service routine revolved around four different accounts of critical incidents. Each of these 
incidents was centered on breakdowns in the structure and outcome of this particular 
routine. The customer services manager, for instance, described in detail the problems 
associated with the performance of this routine in the organization and the various steps 
he undertook in order to make it work more effective. On the other hand, the marketing 
manager described in his account how the ineffective performance of customer services 
impacted the department he was heading and the implications of this for the organization 
as a whole.   
As the analysis of breakdowns in the context of organizational routines unfolded, I treated 
instances of breakdowns in a similar way to that developed by Jordan (2010) who treated 
these instances as learning process in the participants’ experiences that contributed to 
changing patterns of thinking and acting. As indicated earlier in section 4.4.2.1, interviews 
were loosely structured, and, in many cases, totally unstructured to allow participants to 
discuss their experiences in an uninterrupted manner. A number of times during the 
interviews, however, I asked participants ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions in order to prompt 
them to delve deeper into their narrated incidents and thus stimulate moments of 
reflection and in-depth consideration. For example, critical incidents centring on the Hiring 
and Promotions routine revealed instances where participants’ retrospective accounts on 
how and why they acted in one way rather than another brought forward accounts of re-
action to the breakdown as a means to restore the order of practices and routines. Some 
participants, for instance, argued that it was through dialogue, discussions, and 
conversation with other participants that the routine was effectively carried forward.   
153 
 
This led me to further review the literature, seeking insights into what triggers breakdowns 
and how these can be overcome. Organization and management studies literature, 
particularly research that draws on a Heideggerian practice-theoretical perspective (Chia 
and Holt, 2006; Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011; Tsoukas 2010; Zundel and Kokkalis, 2010) 
helped me to understand how reflexivity emerges from moments in which the practical, 
unreflective coping activities of organizational actors become the focus of attention and 
reflection in their attempts to move forward the activities they participate. In addition, I 
gained insights from the literature on dialogue (Cunliffe, 2002; Tsoukas, 2009) and 
mindfulness (Jordan et al 2009; Langer, 1997; Levinthal and Rerup, 2006; Weick and 
Sucliffe, 2006). Research in the case of the former helped me to understand how following 
moments of breakdown, organizational participants restore their understandings by 
engaging in productive dialogical interactions with other organizational members. In the 
case of the latter, I realized that mindfulness in action plays a critical role in the execution 
of routines and practices as they help participants to become more aware of the actions 
they participate and thus foresee or avoid instances of disturbance. Referring back to the 
interview transcripts, I realized that participants’ narrative accounts of critical 
organizational experiences involved instances in which their tacitly held assumptions and 
understandings had broken down because of their inability to connect subsidiary 
particulars and focal targets.   
In the next stage, I engaged in a more focused coding of breakdowns and sought to 
identify and analyze all instances in the narratives that were related to similar areas. In 
so doing, judgments have been made in relation to what should be included and what 
should be left out. At this stage, the analysis became more theory-driven as I was intent 
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on discovering the theoretical contribution contained in the empirical results of this thesis. 
This was not an easy process and the assistance of my supervisor at this stage was very 
important as we both read the transcripts and assigned codes related to breakdowns. We 
identified nine different areas that all accounts of breakdowns could/would fit in. These 
included: RULES, POLICIES, REGULATIONS, ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, 
ARTIFACTS, OBJECTS AND TOOLS, IDENTITIES, and RELATIONSHIPS. After several 
rounds of validation and discussions with the supervisory team, these areas appear to 
represent three areas of breakdown where participants could not be able to integrate 
tacitly subsidiary particulars and focal targets in the context of organizational routines. 
These categories were revised, refined, and summarized into three areas of breakdown: 
integration with one’s identity, roles, and responsibilities, integration with others and 
various relationships, and integration with artifacts (objects or tools). Table 4.6 
demonstrates the final coding of categories and sub-categories.  
As a final note, it is worth mentioning at this stage that the analysis of the critical incidents 
presented in this thesis is one of the many potential interpretations (Van Maanen, 1988). 
However, the rigorous practice that was followed in producing and analyzing the data 
helped me to avoid “fitting the data to illustrate a theory” (Wodak, 2004: 200) as I 
constantly interrogated the emergent theory as well as the data through the process. 
 
TABLE 4.6 FINAL CODING OF CATEGORIES AND SUB-CATEGORIES 
 Routines 
Areas of 
Breakdown 
Rebranding Hiring and 
Promotion 
HR Systems 
(and their 
implementation) 
Customer 
Service 
 
155 
 
Integrations with 
identities, roles 
and 
responsibilities  
Lack of experience 
on how to perform 
certain activities 
Favoritism 
 
‘Wasta’ 
 
Cultural 
misunderstandings 
Tensions between 
managers and 
employees regarding 
the use and purpose 
of technologies 
Management 
taking away roles 
and 
responsibilities 
 
Movement of 
colleagues across 
different 
departments  
 
Integrations with 
others and 
various 
relationships 
Lack of 
experienced 
colleagues 
(others) 
 
Lack of 
communication 
Concerns about 
unethical practices  
 
Lack of trust in 
management 
Sense of senior 
management control 
over managers and 
employees 
Performance in 
one department 
affects other 
departments 
 
Integrations with 
artifacts (objects 
and tools)  
Difficulties around 
measuring the 
effectiveness and 
efficiency of 
marketing 
campaigns 
Disrespect of rules, 
written 
documentations, 
and various policies 
Differing perceptions 
of policies, 
regulations, and 
technologies 
Suspicion over 
implementing new 
technologies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
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This Chapter provides an overview of the philosophical and methodological approaches 
underpinning this thesis. The question I wanted to address in this Chapter was how can 
we, as organizational researchers, empirically investigate tacit knowing in the context of 
organizational routines? My aim was to describe and explain a methodological approach 
that can be used to adequately and appropriately research such a phenomenon. After 
reviewing the main philosophical perspectives in terms of their ontological and 
epistemological assumptions, conceptions about the role of the researcher in the process 
of investigation, the methodological techniques used to investigate organizational reality, 
and the particular methods that may be used to uncover the phenomena under study, it 
has been argued that an investigation of tacit knowing should rest on a subjective 
ontology, a constructivist/interpretivist epistemology, an inductive and ethnographic 
methodology, and research methods that place emphasis on storytelling,  interviews, and, 
wherever possible, observations. This is because the role of the researcher in this 
process is a reflective one who studies the phenomenon from within the system and is 
sensitive to the multifaceted and complex nature of tacit knowing in organized contexts. 
To-date, empirical research on tacit knowing is rather scarce. This is because, it is argued, 
researchers start from the wrong premise: they assume that the tacit resides in mental 
models and schemata that alter one’s own learning process. In this Chapter it is argued 
that in order to come closer to the phenomenon we need to look at the actions of 
participants while they attempt to accomplish particular tasks (organizational routines). 
Such an engagement with various organizational tasks do not always run uninterrupted 
and smoothly. There are occasions that participants’ understandings get disturbed or 
breakdown and thus provide avenues for analysis and explanation. In line with recent 
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studies in organization and management studies, such analysis can be achieved through 
dialogical exchanges between the researcher and the researched and this can lead to 
new distinctions and thoughts that had hitherto been unnoticed. 
Therefore, bearing on the premises of ethnography and the importance of dialogue, the 
Chapter describes the particular methods that facilitated such dialogical exchanges in 
search of tacit understandings in the context of routines. Informal discussions coupled 
with formal interviews (conversations) building on critical incidents were used to identify 
how and why participants did what they claimed they did when performing particular tasks 
and how these have changed in the light of novel experiences and outcomes. In this 
context critical incidents are linked to breakdowns in organizational routines as they are 
seen as moments of interruption in the ongoing activity and thus ‘voices’ of a background 
that is typically taken for granted. Breakdowns in the context of critical incidents are, of 
course, ‘accidental’ and unexpected and they can be more or less serious and contextual. 
But, they can stimulate reflection and thus disengage knowledge from solid practices and 
routines. 
In designing such an interpretivist inquiry into tacit knowing in the realm of routines, there 
are three important questions that need to be addressed. First, what and who is 
investigated; second, how the data are collected; and third, how the data are analyzed. 
This thesis investigates tacit knowing in the context of organizational routines and for this 
I have sought to identify organizations and participants that have the potential to yield rich 
and reliable data. Data have been collected using informal discussions, company 
documentation, and formal (largely unstructured) interviews with twenty participants 
operating within two public-owned companies in the UAE. Data were analyzed using an 
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iterative and inductive approach, going back and forth between the empirical material, the 
emerging interpretations, and the literature. The analysis of data was intended to answer 
the following question: how breakdowns (accidents or surprises) in practical engagement 
of the participants in their daily routines altered their understanding of the practices 
involved in enacting these routines. It is believed that the chosen methodology represents 
a coherent framework that supports the research aims of this thesis. The following 
Chapter (Chapter Five) provides the evidence from the analysis of the data in relation to 
tacit knowing in organizational routines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS OF DATA 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION  
At the end of the previous Chapter (Chapter Four, Section 4.5) I provided an overview of 
how the data have been analyzed. In this Chapter, I present a detailed analysis of the 
data and the major findings of this research. The retrospective, largely unstructured 
interviews that took place with 20 managers, senior managers, directors, and vice 
presidents in the two organizations were used to understand how they have dealt with 
critical organizational experiences in the face of changing routines and organizational 
practices. Consistent with recent work on organizational routines and the role of ‘talk’ and 
‘conversation’ (Dittrich et al 2016) in changing routines, my intention was to understand 
how breakdowns in practical engagement of the participants in their daily routines altered 
their understanding of the practices involved in enacting these routines. 
The analysis of the retrospective interviews of participants who have/are involved in 
organizational routines is important in that the capacity for routines to change from within 
is rooted in part in people’s ability to “remember the past, imagine the future, and respond 
to present circumstances” (Feldman and Pentland 2003: 95). How participants discuss or 
‘talk about’ routines has been shown to enable collective sensemaking (Weick et al 2005), 
collective learning (Rerup 2009), and, more generally, collective reflection (Garud et al 
2011).  Feldman and Pentland (2003: 95) have also emphasized the role of self-reflection 
in routines change when they assert that “[organizational routines] entail self-reflective 
and other-reflective behavior”. Therefore, the self-reflective accounts of participants who 
engage in routines have provided evidence of how the past has been construed, what the 
future should be, and how the present can be changed in order to achieve this. Thus, the 
narrated self-reflective accounts of breakdowns in routines provide an important access 
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to the process of change and attempts to answer why and how routines change in 
organizations. 
Careful inquiry into critical incidents brought forward instances in which individual 
practical activity in organizational contexts became an issue for reflection and change in 
relation to organizational routines. Participants discussed, in varieties of length and detail, 
their experiences in their organization, they described the incidents they faced in their 
current job (but not necessarily their current roles), they attempted to explain and describe 
their actions and re-actions before and after the incidents occurred, and they have 
attempted to synthesize and interpret their learning from this process. In line with previous 
research on critical incidents or more broadly, critical organizational events (Cornelissen 
2012; Jordan 2010; Mantere et al 2012; Isabella 1990), participants viewed these as 
moments of unbalancing established routines and evoked thoughts on the part of 
organizational members by their very nature.  
The interviewed participants discussed their experiences in the organization when they 
engaged in particular routines. These routines that pertain to both ostensive (the 
collective perception of what the routine is – or, ought to be – Feldman and Pentland 
2003: 101-102) and the performative aspect (‘the specific actions, taken by specific 
people, at specific times when they engage in organizational routines’) have been broken 
down and the critical incidents provide insights in the areas of these disturbances in 
organizational experience. The analysis of data centers on four routines that were 
surfaced during the interviews, namely, Hiring and Promotions, Rebranding, HR System 
Implementation, and Customer Services, and were discussed by participants in relation 
to their respective roles. The analysis of the critical incidents revealed that within these 
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broadly defined ostensive routines (i.e. the abstract, collective understanding of the 
routine), a number of reasons have occurred that challenged the enactment of the 
performative aspect of the routine involved. For example, the Rebranding routine was 
characterized by lack of communication and resistance to change by those who 
participated in the enactment of this particular routine. 
The findings indicate that the breakdown of a particular routine is connected to three 
interrelated areas that potentially reveal the role of tacit knowing in changing routines. As 
it was argued in Chapters Two and Three, the ability of the individual to connect effectively 
subsidiary particulars and focal targets is the major aspect of the structure of knowing. As 
ostensive routines represent the abstract ‘patterning’ (Feldman 2016) of the actions that 
such routines comprise of and performative routines represent the set of enacted actions 
that are put together in order to carry out the routine, similarly, focal targets represent the 
focus of our actions whereas subsidiary particulars represent the silent integrations that 
contribute to the action itself. The ability of the individual to integrate these actions is of 
crucial importance. The analysis revealed that participants in these organizational 
contexts fail to integrate their actions in three areas: 
(a) Integrations related to one’s own identity, roles and responsibilities; 
(b) Integrations related to the use of tools, objects or other artefacts; and  
(c) Integrations related to others and various relationships.  
The Chapter unfolds as follows: in the next section I describe the findings from the 
interview data and internal company documentation. This is followed by a description of 
four routines that participants’ accounts (mostly) concentrated on, i.e. Hiring and 
Promotions, Rebranding, HR Systems Implementation, and Customer Service. Section 
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5.3 establishes the link between the breakdown of routines and the breakdown of tacit 
knowing. The Chapter concludes with a summary of the major findings.    
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TABLE 5.1 OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS: AREAS OF BREAKDOWN IN THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS 
Areas of 
Breakdown 
 
(Failed integration of 
subsidiary particulars 
and focal targets) 
Routines 
 Rebranding 
 
Hiring and Promotion HR systems 
(and their 
implementation) 
Customer Service 
Integration with 
one’s own identity, 
roles and 
responsibilities 
 
“There was a lot of 
resistance towards this 
change; as you know 
change is something that 
people find very hard to 
accept because when they 
are moving with the flow 
it is fine but when they 
would move against it… 
this is why people resist 
any changes. It is not very 
easy for that to be 
managed” 
“The problem is that the specific 
manager had just come to the 
country [one year in the 
company] and he didn’t 
understand the culture or the 
rules and regulations here. He is 
like these types of managers that 
don’t understand the local 
people, especially the educated 
ones, and that they have the 
right to get the opportunities not 
because we [they] are locals but 
because we [they] studied, they 
have been well educated in the 
best Universities here [UAE] and 
abroad”. 
 “Once I joined the company 
[and the specific department] I 
was shocked by how they were 
handling customers and the 
way the current system was 
working. Customers were 
handled randomly; they were 
standing there like they are 
going to watch movies, like 
they are waiting in a queue to 
buy tickets for a movie… It was 
honestly shocking and 
unacceptable; this is a 
government entity, it should 
not be like this”. 
 
Integration with 
others and various 
relationships  
 
“I would like to say it is 
[partially] lack of 
communication. As a team 
we assumed that all the 
decision makers were 
aware of the details. 
Because when we 
forwarded this proposal 
for the change or 
recommendation we 
“We are a modern organization, 
a modern business, and 
therefore our evaluations should 
be based on best practice from 
the best businesses. But 
managers here want to call ‘M’ a 
global company but they pay 
little attention to how they 
perform evaluations”. 
 
“Quite honestly, we have a 
lot of problems with 
communication [in the 
organization]. I worked with 
international companies 
around the world and I can 
say that they focus on 
communications much more 
than we do. Government- or 
semi-government-owned 
“[In our organization] you have 
to do what the boss wants you 
to do. You have to bend the 
rules, break the rules, go above 
or under the rules, no matter 
what, you have to do what they 
say, even if your integrity is in 
jeopardy”.  
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assumed that all 
information has been 
shared with everyone. 
They haven’t, and we 
could not check to see if 
everything has been 
communicated. We 
should have 
communicated more 
ourselves to see whether 
the details are known to 
the decision makers” 
“we had faced a lot of problems 
and what we realized was that 
the main issue started from the 
people in charge in the 
departments surrounding us. 
Those people are uneducated 
and they have been in the 
company for ages so they didn’t 
want to hire educated people to 
replace them. They are also 
concerned that in 5 years-time 
those educated people are going 
to take their places”. 
companies or even some 
private local companies 
don’t focus on 
communications as I think 
[they] see these as ‘soft’ 
elements and they don’t put 
a lot of value on that; when 
you advise them about it, 
most of the times they 
ignore you” 
Integration with 
artifacts (objects or 
tools) 
 
 “After I graduate from my MBA I 
will get a good position here 
which will match my degree. 
Unfortunately, that did not 
happen. I don’t think it is 
because they break a promise… I 
think it is because they have 
their own ideas of who will be 
promoted and who will not. I 
know this, they don’t take the 
policies very seriously in here” 
“I find it rather embarrassing 
that we are still working [in 
almost every department of 
the organization] with 
papers and pens; we are 
characterized by slack… we 
must be using the latest 
technologies, electronic 
government, and networks 
just like the rest of the 
world. The reason was that 
people were worried of 
losing their jobs because of 
moving to new electronic 
generation or technology. 
When you have electronic 
government in place 
everything is transparent”. 
“When a phone call comes in, 
you have to judge the 
customer’s problem whether it 
is a serious matter or not and 
then follow a particular set of 
procedures. In one phone call, 
I judged the problem not to be 
very serious and I told the 
customer that I cannot help 
him and he has to call in the 
morning to finish with this 
problem. The customer was 
not satisfied and I told him we 
got rules and that I cannot skip 
the rules and that if I could 
helped him I would have done 
it. He got angry…”. 
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5.2 THE BREAKDOWN OF ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINES 
The analysis of the interview data yielded important insights in relation to organizational 
routines, their understanding by interviewees, the ways that they have been broken down, 
and their re-establishment (or otherwise) in the organizational context.  Particularly within 
the context of critical incidents – or ‘key moments’ as some of the participants referred to 
– the analysis revealed that the narrated organizational accounts were rather complex 
events or sequences of events that unfolded over a period of time, and in cases, not easy 
to negotiate their boundaries. The focus on critical incidents as salient moments in 
individuals’ organizational experience is in line with previous research (Cornelissen, 2012; 
Jordan, 2010) that treats these as breakdowns in practice and ascribes significance not 
only to the individual who experiences them, but also to the organizational level due to 
the power of these experiences in changing practices and routines. Critical incidents can 
be construed as ‘unprecedented events’ which account for learning processes in the ways 
that experiences contribute to changing patterns of thinking and acting in organizational 
contexts. They are also individual retrospective and evaluative judgments of events which 
one way or another have had significance for the individual who experiences them. 
Overall, the critical incidents narrated by participants were not isolated, discrete moments 
but a mix of mutually influencing instances that were construed as arrival and departure 
points in their organizational experiences. As a result of experiencing critical incidents, in 
many cases, there appeared to be a change in perception, awareness, and activities of 
those involved. 
As indicated in Chapter Four, the intention behind the interviews was to identify instances 
in which participants’ understanding of a particular practice or a routine and its outcomes 
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had shifted following a breakdown (whether major or minor) in the performance of the 
practice/routine itself. This has meant that the focus of the interviews was not centered 
exclusively on ostensive and performative routines and how participants understand 
them, but more generally on the performances that constituted these routines. Only after 
the fieldwork was completed and the data had been gathered, there was a realization that 
the generic framework of routine research may provide a foundation for description, 
explanation, and analysis within which breakdowns occurred in organizational practices. 
Put differently, instead of asking interviewees to analyze and explain breakdowns (in the 
form of critical organizational experiences) that occurred in the understanding or 
performance of a particular routine, the focus had been on each individual’s account of 
breakdowns in their organizational experiences and the impact of this in their 
understanding of the practice in which they participated. 
Therefore, the interpretations of what constitutes an organizational routine and the 
definition of ostensive and performative aspects of routines were not discussed during 
the interviews but were negotiated during my observations of these routines and informal 
discussions with interview participants in the two organizations. During these discussions, 
participants engaging in their day-to-day activities were able to explain which one of their 
performances contribute to which overall (ostensive) routine. For example, in the 
Marketing department of one of the organizations, a number of meetings were called upon 
to discuss the proposals of a new name for the organization. These meetings were part 
of the ostensive routine of ‘re-branding’ in which although the activities that contributed to 
these routines were easily distinguished, the overall understanding of the routine was not 
entirely clear in its abstract and generalized way. 
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Despite this, participants’ narratives centered on their organizational experiences that in 
some way (major or minor) had been disturbed and the resulting breakdowns were 
considered as critical in their learning and understanding of their organizational life. In 
what follows, I attempt to elaborate on four routines most participants referred to. It is 
important to note that these critical incidents were important to the participants at the time 
of this research and the context in which they took place.  
5.2.1 Hiring and Promotions  
During the field study in both organizations, there was a topic that was rather frequently 
brought in conversations (typically amongst colleagues who were considering one 
another as friends). That was related to promotions (and other company rewards) and the 
ways that the companies acknowledged individuals’ service in the organization and 
rewarded employees that deserved to take a better position in the company based on 
their contributions and years of experience with each organization. Both companies had 
a set of policies and rules that were explicitly stated in various company publications (e.g. 
Policies and Procedures Manual and the Staff Book) and they were available to all 
employees not only during their orientation time with the company in the form of 
presentations and open discussions – particularly concerning new comers to the 
organizations – but could also be accessed through the company’s intranet pages at any 
time during working hours (only available from within the company’s system).  
In their Staff Book, both companies had set out explicitly their policies related to the 
conditions and process by which employment and promotion takes place. For example, 
the ‘Employment Policy’ section of the Staff Book (internal company publication) at 
company ‘R’ was referring to areas such as ‘Equal Employment Opportunity’, 
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‘Employment Eligibility Verification’, ‘Outside Employment’, ‘Company Ethics’, ‘Conflict of 
Interest’, ‘Nepotism’, ‘Open Records’, ‘Position Announcements’, and other interrelated 
areas of interest for both potential and current employees. This was followed by a section 
on the ‘Terms of Employment’ (with areas such as ‘Status and Records’, ‘Probation 
Period’, ‘Performance Evaluations’, ‘Personal Data Changes’, ‘Access to Personnel 
Files’, ‘Duration of Contracts’, ‘Procedures for Contract Renewal’, ‘Resignation’, and 
‘Termination of Employment’). Moreover, the publication included a ‘Promotion Policy’ 
section which included an ‘Overview of the Promotion Policy and Statement’, ‘Eligibility’, 
‘Implementation’, ‘Procedures of Promotion’, ‘Responsibilities of the HR Manager’, and 
‘Effective Dates for Promotion’.  
Hiring and promotions can be considered as ostensive routines, in this context, since the 
abstract rules and general idea of what the routine entails take the form of standard 
operating procedures, norms, and artifacts (e.g. written hiring procedures) (Feldman and 
Pentland 2003: 101). However, understanding the ostensive aspect of a routine is not 
sufficient in telling participants in organizations how to execute the routine effectively. 
How to do so requires performances and these are the specific actions that people take 
when they are engaging in organizational routines. Particularly hiring as a routine has 
been discussed in the literature of organizational routines by Feldman (2000), Feldman 
and Pentland (2003), and Rerup and Feldman (2011). In their interviews, a number of 
participants referred to instances where both their understanding of the process of 
promotion (ostensive part) and the process itself (performative part) within the 
organization had been broken down because of a perceived lack of transparency from 
the part of the organization and little regard of the rules and regulations surrounding 
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promotions. One manager (Senior Financial Analyst) started explaining how her 
qualifications and years of experience have been overlooked by the company’s 
management when her promotion to a new position was due. As she described: 
“I finished my bachelor from the University of Sharjah (UAE) and then I stayed at home searching 
for a job. I had a good work experience for 7 years. I started at the beginning working in hotels for 
2 years and then I moved to real estate industry for another 5 years. At my current job I got a 
chance to study MBA (FT) in Australia for two years as [my employer] offered me a scholarship to 
do that. I had been promised [by a senior manager in the company] that after I graduate from my 
MBA I will get a good position here which will match my degree. Unfortunately, that did not 
happen. I don’t think it is because they break a promise… I think it is because they have their own 
ideas of who will be promoted and who will not. I know this, they don’t take the policies very 
seriously in here”. 
An important claim that this particular manager makes with regards to the promotion 
routine relates to her understanding of the promotion as something that is not so much 
bound by company policies and regulations as it is down to the management to make 
choices regarding who is to be promoted and who is not. Such a claim has also been 
confirmed by other interviewees who expressed a general dissatisfaction with the ways 
that these policies where utilized by senior management. Some of them, however, 
understood that managerial intervention and decision making regarding promotions is 
important as it is the responsibility of the line manager, his/her recommendation for the 
respective employee (it could be positive or negative), the yearly evaluations of the 
person who has applied for the promotion, and the years of experience within the 
company that, to a large extent, determine the outcome of the application for a promotion. 
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As indicated above, these policies are also explicated in the company’s publications and 
leave little room for misunderstanding. One of the areas of concern, however, relates to 
a particular section in the Staff Book which refers to managers’ responsibilities in the 
process of promoting employees: 
“Managers who are keen to promote staff members in their respective areas, they need to pay 
particular attention to past annual performance evaluations. These documents indicate prior 
performance levels and accomplishments in the department demonstrating, for example, how 
effectively the tasks assigned were completed” (Staff Book – internal publication – private and 
confidential).  
It follows, therefore, that for a current employee to be promoted the managerial decision 
based on past evaluations is of crucial importance. Another area of contention, however, 
arose that relates to the company evaluations of staff and how this had been carried out. 
For example, a number of participants referred to a lack of transparency in the evaluation 
process and that some of the areas of work are not being reflected in the annual 
evaluation documentation whereas other areas are. In addition, participants felt that the 
annual evaluation is too subjective from the point of view of the manager who is delegated 
to carry out the evaluation and rather than concentrating on the actual work carried out 
by the employee, the focus remains on the employee him/herself. This has created 
tension at times as people felt that the evaluation is not reflective of their work and the 
tasks accomplished by the concerned employee in the past year. One particular manager 
took this a step further when he argued that the company’s process of evaluating 
performance is not up-to-date or up to international norms. As he explained:  
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“We are a modern organization, a modern business, and therefore our evaluations should be 
based on best practice from the best businesses. But managers here want to call ‘M’ a global 
company but they pay little attention to how they perform evaluations. Other companies use the 
360 degree approach like other big companies in the world but here we are still using the pen and 
paper approach where the manager looks at you and makes the evaluation on a paper”. 
Clearly for this manager the process is person-based rather than performance-based and 
the way it is carried out not particularly suited with what the company is actually 
emphasizing to be in its internal and external audiences. Another manager put this into a 
different perspective when she argued that there is a difference in the cultural perspective 
between managers and employees. She referred to this in the following way (IM – 
Assistant Financial Controller): 
“The problem is that the specific manager had just come to the country [one year in the company] 
and he didn’t understand the culture or the rules and regulations here. He is like these types of 
managers that don’t understand the local people, especially the educated ones, and that they 
have the right to get the opportunities not because we [they] are locals but because we [they] 
studied, they have been well educated in the best Universities here [UAE] and abroad. So he didn’t 
understand that but he thought that I am a manager here and I will do what I want. He had already 
identified two locals to be put in some low positions and this may have solved the problem – you 
know – they [locals] will not complain”. 
The concerns raised by this particular manager are not totally unfounded. A similar point 
of view was shared by a senior manager in company ‘M’ who had been involved in the 
selection and hiring of people in the last five years and expressed how some policies and 
procedures changed in the last few years because of an apparent disconnection between 
managers and employees.  As he explained (EM – Managing Director): 
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“One important incident that I faced in the organization relates to the under-employment 
problem and, I believe, it is one of these problematic cases worldwide. In terms of employment 
issues we have here many educated people whether they have Bachelors, Masters or PhDs. 
Before this, however, we had faced a lot of problems and what we realized was that the main 
issue started from the people in charge in the departments surrounding us. Those people are 
uneducated and they have been in the company for ages so they didn’t want to hire educated 
people to replace them. They are also concerned that in 5 years-time those educated people are 
going to take their places. Therefore, it is better to avoid hiring them inside now so it is better to 
hiring expatriates due to lower wages. Plus, expatriates can be intimidated [sic] and worry about 
their jobs. For example, expatriates can take 5,000 AED whereas locals/Emiratis will take 10,000 
to 15,000 AED for exactly the same job and also they might be well educated and this can pose a 
serious threat to the position of the one in charge”. 
This manager here acknowledges a significant problem in the process of hiring individuals 
in the organization. A lot of previous appointments in the company had not been made 
on the basis of qualifications, experience or education but, as he suggested, “on a 
personal basis – you could bring into the company one of your relatives without going 
through HR; it was all about friendships and exchange of benefits”.  This has meant that 
a serious problem of proper ethical conduct in the workplace was now addressed. A 
number of participants referred to this – more or less directly – and expressed 
dissatisfaction with the way that managers have been performing the routine of hiring or 
promotion. One manager in particular raised the issue in a more direct way when she 
narrated the following: 
“Management actually fabricates things, they keep creating things and they try to interrogate you 
or make things against you in order to look bad in the organization. This is what was happening in 
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the organization because people are not qualified, first of all. When they find somebody who has 
a diploma from [names a particular higher educational institution in UAE], they give him or her a 
really high position. Clearly, that individual will do anything to maintain his/her job because they 
will not find a job like that. They [management] also change their salaries, from 40,000 AED to 
80,000 AED monthly. Do you think they are crazy to lose this money? For who? For me or for the 
country? They will try to maintain their position as much as possible regardless of any ethical or 
unethical considerations. They will do whatever it takes”. 
Probing participants to delve deeper into the reasons for management to, sometimes, 
conduct its responsibilities in a less ethical manner, a number of participants referred to 
a word that is commonly used in the Arab countries (particularly so in the UAE and more 
so in the Dubai area). That word is, ‘Wasta’, which commonly translates as something 
such as authority, influence, political (or other) power, or a combination of these things. 
The common English expression ‘it is not what you know but who you know’ is perhaps 
the closest equivalent of ‘Wasta’. Having varying degrees of ‘Wasta’ is regarded as a way 
to surpass bureaucratic or official procedures, speed up business transactions, waive 
traffic fines, save one from consequences of dubious activities, or achieve hiring and 
promotion in a particular job.  Although the word itself appeared only twice in the interview 
transcripts, a number of participants referred indirectly to it when they suggested that 
many people used their ‘connections’ (an indirect reference to ‘Wasta’) to get favorable 
treatment in the company. This has taken the form of hiring particular individuals in the 
organization without the necessary qualifications and experience, promoting others who 
have not been particularly strong in their yearly evaluations or even referring to instances 
174 
 
where organizational members have avoided negative consequences of actions in 
situations where punishment should have been enforced.  
Thus, the apparent dissatisfaction expressed by various managers with reference to the 
routine of hiring and/or promoting individuals in the organization brings forward a ‘clash 
of cultures’ not only between expatriates versus locals but also between old versus new 
ideas, actions and practices. It was observed during interviews, and it was confirmed 
during the researcher’s internship in both research settings that whenever younger (in 
terms of age) managers wanted to propose or make changes to policies, procedures, and 
practices, the reactions from older managers was often quite negative. This resistance by 
management to change was received with frustration and, at times, anger by younger 
managers who believed that the ‘archaic’ management style of dealing with staff 
members had to be overcome in some way. It was also apparent that a number of staff 
members had been complaining – mostly amongst themselves and to one another – 
about the ways that expatriate managers treated them in various situations. In other 
words, they have felt that being an expatriate in a high position within the organization will 
make a big difference for subordinates who are mostly Emirati nationals.   
Responding to the growing demand for Emirati/local participation in the workforce of UAE, 
the Government of UAE launched the ‘Emiratization’ initiative which is dedicated on the 
inclusion of Emiratis in the job sector, particularly in the country’s private sector. The aim 
of the initiative is to increase the number of Emiratis in the job market and their 
contribution to the country’s economy (www.government.ae). According to Haak-Saheem 
(2016: 2), employment market characteristics in the UAE are unique as the ratio of 
nationals to expatriates is one of the most disproportionate in the world. Less than 20 
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percent of UAE’s total population comprises of local citizens which makes them a 
minority.  Al-Waqfi and Forstenlechner (2014) noted that the situation in the country’s 
private sector is even more concerning as almost 99 percent of all employees are 
expatriates.  
The concept of ‘Emiratizing’ the country’s workforce is based on three core tenets (Haak-
Saheem, 2016: 11): first, the long-term target of diversifying the economy and reducing 
the overt reliance on the capital-intensive oil and gas sector; second, overhauling the 
education system in order to align education to market needs; and, third, implementing a 
range of labor market intervention measures such as quotas and allocation of jobs to local 
people in order to reduce reliance on international labor (it is worth noting that any 
termination of a local employee’s contract must be approved by the country’s Ministry of 
Labor). 
However, the initiative faces challenges on two fronts: the first relates to how to meet 
young Emirati’s high and often unrealistic expectations (in terms of salary packages and 
other rewards); the second relates to how can anyone convince expatriates on generous 
salary packages that they have a responsibility to assist in a program of which its success 
will most likely lead them to redundancy (https://knowledge.insead.edu). As it is already 
documented in the national press and international forums, there have been many cases 
of young Emirati graduates in particular who have been employed by private companies 
only as ‘Emirati faces’. Their employers have also raised concerns that although they 
have spent time and money training Emirati staff, these have left their companies for 
better-paid jobs in the public sector. 
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The implications of the ‘Emiratization’ initiative therefore can be said to have an impact 
on the company in this research. A few months after the completion of the fieldwork, the 
company put forward a document that was circulated in internal publications for review 
and eventually published in the website stating clearly their commitment to the 
‘Emiratization’ initiative. Under the ‘Careers’ section, the following statement appeared:  
‘With knowledge sharing opportunities and working alongside expert leaders within the ‘M’ 
Group, UAE nationals will benefit from the hands-on experiences and challenging projects that 
contribute the [a particular Emirate’s] infrastructure. These opportunities, combined with 
dedicated professional planning, help accelerate the growth of UAE nationals, and eventually 
achieve our long-term vision of creating a globally competitive workforce’. 
The preceding analysis brings to the fore a number of important issues related to the 
ways that this particular routine is understood and/or performed. In this particular routine 
the breakdown begins at the ostensive level and then it is diffused down to the 
performative. Standard operating procedures, policies and rules appear to be in 
disharmony with current practices and the ways that the routine is actually performed by 
those who are responsible to execute it. In addition, the ways that employees working in 
the company understand the ostensive part of the routine is in contrast with the actions 
managers take when they perform it (the performative aspect). This creates tensions not 
only between managers and subordinates but, more crucially, between expatriates 
(managers) and Emiratis (employees). Crucially, however, the analysis revealed a deep 
cultural problem that was brought forward during interviews (and it was observed during 
the researcher’s internship at the company): hiring and promoting individuals was not so 
much based on the ‘right’ qualifications and experience of the candidate but on the ‘right’ 
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connections (‘Wasta’) within and beyond this particular company. The initiative for 
‘Emiratization’ has still a long way to go in order to be properly implemented and this can 
lead to further tensions in the future. 
5.2.2 Rebranding 
During the field study in one of the organizations (‘R’), there was a lot of discussion 
amongst colleagues that a rebranding exercise for the company is in process. This was 
also confirmed during the interviews as some of the participants referred to it as a critical 
organizational experience from their own point of view. The decision for re-branding of 
the company was initiated by the board of directors and communicated to senior 
managers shortly after it was agreed upon. The responsibility of this activity was allocated 
to the Marketing Manager in the company who although had many years of experience 
in marketing and PR departments in USA and France before joining the current 
organization, he had not been engaged with such an activity during the last four to five 
years since he had been in his current job. This particular manager had a fair 
understanding of what a re-branding exercise would involve, what activities should be 
undertaken to complete it, and how these activities needed to be coordinated to achieve 
the best possible outcome. He explained that these activities would range from graphic 
designing to market research and encompass many hours of hard work in order to 
achieve an outcome that senior management would appreciate and eventually approve. 
However, one of the initial concerns he raised in a conversation before the formal 
interview took place was centered on the inexperience of his staff in doing this exercise 
effectively and in a timely manner. This is because, as he explained, most of his team 
members had never been involved in an activity of this type in the past which he 
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considered as a drawback in getting this exercise completed. In short, for this particular 
manager, previous experience in similar exercises would have made the process 
smoother and easier to complete.  
During the interview, this particular participant explained in more detail what he recalled 
as the first critical incident during his time in the company. He said that the name of the 
organization did not reflect what the company is actually doing or is interested in doing in 
the future and this posed serious concerns in senior management about the current and 
future status of the company. As he explained: 
“As you know we are going through rebranding exercise because we are an investment-based 
authority which means that we manage industrial parts [in this Emirate] and free zone facilities. 
So what happens is because of the name in initial years [names the company] we used to be 
involved in different investments as part of government [of the particular Emirate] such as 
investments in different infrastructure projects, real-estate projects, etc. Now the focus has been 
shifted completely to include investment promotions, especially, promoting industrial 
investments into [the Emirate]. So, when we talk about [name of the company], it doesn’t fit well 
with people’s perceptions of what we really do”. 
At this stage, it appears that the participant identifies that the name of the company has 
been misunderstood in people’s minds and the perception of what the company actually 
does is not clear. In other words, the participant was able to identify a breakdown which 
relates to the company’s identity and its competitiveness in the market. Another 
participant identified why the rebranding of the company was, at the time, necessary. As 
he (IR – Principal Business Associate to the CEO) noted:  
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“[The company] really exists to promote industries in [the particular Emirate]. We have at about 
30 million square meters of land of which we invite multinational companies and local companies 
in order to come and set up their base and operate from here. So, although we are called [name 
of company] investment authority, a lot of companies globally, especially, hedge funds in New 
York think that we are a sovereign wealth fund of [the Emirate] sitting on billions of dollars waiting 
to invest in all parts of the world. Therefore, we will get emails and phone calls from those hedge 
funds and other large mutual funds pitching their services to us; basically telling us that we give 
you x million dollars and we can help you invest that in different sectors globally and we can 
promise you can make a return of 20% - 25% per annum and we share profits. So the problem 
here is that we are not [names the company] investment authority in this sense. So this is a critical 
incident that happened in the past and it is something that continues to happen today because a 
lot of people think that we are something which we are not”. 
A number of participants discussed that the re-branding of the company is necessary 
because the company needs to clearly differentiate in relation to other similar companies, 
create a brand identity that reflects the activities more accurately, and communicate these 
to the target audience. As one of the participants revealed, “We knew that we had to call 
ourselves something else but we didn’t know what it was”. Therefore, the participants 
have realized the problem and, as the interviews unfolded, attempted to explain the 
difficulties associated with getting this exercise finished at the most efficient and effective 
way. The critical incident, in this sense, becomes the starting point for exploration of both 
performances and outcomes in the participant’s experience in the organization. Thus, the 
breakdown (the identification of the problem) pertains to the organizational experience 
which the participant referred to during the interview. A series of obstacles that the 
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rebranding exercise had been facing was then exemplified. For example, it was narrated 
that a number of steps were taken in order to complete the project – the performative 
aspects of the routine – such as market researches, consideration of different scenarios, 
analysis of different concepts and the new name, tags, elements, and brand identity were 
drafted and presented to the management of the organization.   After the presentation, 
however, a number of managers did not feel comfortable with the idea of this change. 
When a participant was asked to elaborate on the reasons for this, he said:  
“There was a lot of resistance towards this change; as you know change is something that people 
find very hard to accept because when they are moving with the flow it is fine but when they 
would move against it… this is why people resist any changes. It is not very easy for that to be 
managed”. 
Further exploration into this issue revealed that this resistance was not totally unfounded 
and that there were some important elements that were missing or were poorly identified 
during the presentation of concepts, ideas, and activities to the other managers. 
Therefore, participants started to reflect further on how this exercise will be most 
beneficial for the organization and for their own roles in the company. After many rounds 
of dialogue and conversation amongst team members in the marketing department and 
taking on board the feedback from the first presentation, a number of new elements were 
identified and analyzed in order to be more transparent on why the rebranding is 
necessary. As the marketing manager explained:  
“We prepared a case study. What is the scenario now? What are the major challenges that we 
will face? For instance, looking at a current business card you can see that there are many 
challenges. First, it is not very straightforward what we actually do as an entity and a person who 
181 
 
doesn’t know about us will get confused. Second, the name doesn’t speak anything about our 
identity or reflect on any kind of identity. Third, the colors and the combinations… then, it is our 
logo… it is very conservative and traditional; we are generations behind the current age. We did 
not get these explained first time [in the first presentation]”. 
In retrospect, it appears that participants become more aware of what the omissions have 
been and what challenges had to be overcome in order execute the specific project 
effectively. This implies that from the narration of this critical incident, the participant 
identified the breakdown and the possible reasons associated with it. Prompted to reflect 
even further during the interview, participants discussed that the major problem of this 
exercise and the way that it unfolded relates to an apparent lack of communication which 
is not only evidenced in the team that was working in the rebranding exercise but more 
so within departments and units in the organization as a whole. As one manager 
explained: 
“I would like to say it is [partially] lack of communication. As a team we assumed that all the 
decision makers were aware of the details. Because when we forwarded this proposal for the 
change or recommendation we assumed that all information has been shared with everyone. 
They haven’t, and we could not check to see if everything has been communicated. We should 
have communicated more ourselves to see whether the details are known to the decision 
makers”. 
Further reflection led this participant to identify a larger organizational problem, that is, 
lack (or, inappropriate means) of communication. Through his narrative, the participant 
was able to connect problems of communication with other areas of organizational activity 
and attribute these problems to the culture of the company. For example, he suggested 
182 
 
that the team working in the project ‘misjudged’ some of the deadlines as well as the 
timeline for activities to be completed and this led to more effort being put in the project 
by the manager. Importantly, for this manager, lack of communication between team 
members and between different departments played a significant role in the way that the 
project was carried out and the time that it took to be completed.  
After three months of deliberation and discussions in the organization, the company 
eventually did change its name by replacing the word ‘Investment’ that appeared in the 
initial acronym, to the word ‘Industrial’. Even if this may be considered as a rather small 
change (the acronym of the company’s name remained the same), managers were 
hopeful that this would address and reduce (or, at best, eliminate) the difficulties and 
challenges that the company faced with its identity and brand in the past. As one 
participant commented, “I think this [the change in the name] will solve the problems we 
had with other financial institutions and set us apart from similar companies in the field”. 
The new company logo was also approved by senior management and changed forty five 
days later. 
What this incident tells us about the breakdown of organizational routines? The 
identification of the breakdown, namely, the company’s identity and place in the market, 
is very important in revealing the various steps that this process went through before it 
was finalized some four months later. The identification of the breakdown led the 
participants to identify that the company had to go through a rebranding exercise. 
Rebranding itself may represent, in this case, the ostensive part of the routine as it is 
related to the abstract, generalized idea of what the routine is and how it may be carried 
out most effectively. Since only the marketing manager had been involved in similar 
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exercises in the past, his understanding of the ostensive routine is crucial in 
communicating its other performative aspects to the team that the responsibility laid with.  
Here the manager in charge of the project has construed the steps that were required in 
order to execute the routine most effectively. These steps, namely, market research, 
scenario planning, analysis of names and concepts, and so on, can be said to belong to 
the specific activities that comprise the performative aspect of the routine. However, these 
activities were also disturbed in some way. For example, the identification of 
communication gaps amongst team members and the management team, coupled with 
and apparent lack of clarity of information distributed within the organization, led to a 
number of changes and amendments of the process in which the execution of the routine 
takes place.  
Therefore, of the four components of the definition of routines that Feldman and Pentland 
(2003) put forward and include repetition, recognizable patterns of action, multiple 
participants, and interdependent actions, only the latter three have confirmed that 
‘rebranding’ may constitute an (ostensive) routine. This is because, the former 
component, repetition, has not been exhibited before in the organization but the manager 
involved in exemplifying the routine has been involved in this very routine in different 
companies. Nevertheless, rebranding as an ostensive routine may be a less frequently 
performed one, or a routine that has not been practiced for long time by the organization. 
It remains, however, a recognizable patterning of actions and its various performances 
can be understood differently by many people in the organization. 
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5.2.3 HR Systems (and their implementation) 
One of the critical incidents narrated by a number of participants was concerned with the 
ostensive routine of HR system implementation and relates to a number of other areas in 
the organization that the use and implementation of new technology becomes the point 
of attention and reflection. The use and implementation of a new system in any 
organization can be considered as an ostensive routine as it is abstract in nature, 
comprises of various standard operating procedures, and involves a number of 
participants in its setting up and execution. Like all ostensive routines, the ways 
participants understand this routine varies across different roles and responsibilities within 
the organization. For example, an IT manager’s responsibility and role is centered on 
creating, developing and maintaining the system whereas an HR manager’s 
responsibilities and role will be related to the utilization of the system in assessing 
individual performance. A finance manager, too, will use the system in a different way 
with the purpose of assessing the costs involved in the development and maintenance of 
the system for the whole organization. Performing the routine, on the other hand, 
comprises of the specific actions and the specific people who are engaging in the routine 
itself. In this case, the way that the new HR system is used, for what purpose, and to what 
effect, is part of the overall performance of the routine. 
One of the important figures who had been assigned to implement and use a new HR 
system in company ‘M’ was GM who was holding, at the time of the field study, the 
position of Vice President of Human Resources in the Petroleum division of the 
organization. In his capacity, this manager was assigned the responsibility to oversee all 
aspects related to the establishment of the new system in the company from its initial 
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stage, i.e. finding the most suitable system for the company, to its final use, i.e. use the 
system to assess employee performance and link it to rewards at the end of the year. He 
started his narration of the critical incident in the following way: 
“The first incident that I can share with you is a recent project that we were working in as we have 
faced difficulty with shareholder(s). We designed a new [HR] system that is a little different than 
what used to be at the corporate-level. This new system fits more or better if you like with our 
industry and knowledge of the company”. 
When prompted to elaborate on the reasons behind the need for this system to change, 
he suggested that there was a desire from senior management (President and CEOs) of 
the organization, in this particular division, to move to more standardized ways of 
monitoring and controlling employees’ compensations, benefits, and rewards, and it was 
believed that the current system used until that point was not doing what senior 
management wanted it to do. This manager, however, was not able to understand fully – 
or, at least, he did not share this information during the interview – on the motives and 
expectations of the management behind such a move towards a new system 
implementation but he was able to articulate the process by which the implementation of 
the new system would take shape. One critical reason that he suggested was related to 
the purpose of the new system and that it needed to be understood and communicated 
clearly by all parties involved. If the purpose of the implementation was clear and 
communicated appropriately to senior management of the company, it would be much 
easier to facilitate the move to the new system with little or no resistance by lower 
management, administrators, and employees. 
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Another important reason that he referred to was related to the communication of the 
purpose of implementing the new system in the most effective way. It is important to note 
at this point that communicating various aspects of work within the organization appeared 
to be rather problematic as it was used by a number of participants who were interviewed 
during this study. It was also noted during the field study that one form of communication, 
for example the use of email, was not used as often as one would expect in a company 
of this size. Rather, most communication was done using the telephone (internal phone 
calls) in order to convey simple or more complex matters to other colleagues. In addition, 
a number of employees preferred to discuss matters about work on a face-to-face basis 
rather than using the email to communicate with other colleagues. When prompted to 
explain further why he believes that there is a problem in communications within the 
organization, the manager said the following:  
“Quite honestly, we have a lot of problems with communication [in the organization]. I worked 
with international companies around the world and I can say that they focus on communications 
much more than we do. Government- or semi-government-owned companies or even some 
private local companies don’t focus on communications as I think [they] see these as ‘soft’ 
elements and they don’t put a lot of value on this; when you advise them about it, most of the 
times they ignore you”. 
The manager continued his narration about the implementation of the new system. After 
referring to the purpose of the system and the communication of the purpose, a third 
reason he discussed was related to the quality of feedback received by managers and 
employees. He explained that for the process to be effectively communicated, it needed 
to be disseminated and discussed in meetings at senior managerial level. After months 
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of continuous dialogue and involvement in the process for both parties, the received 
feedback has not always been of the desired quality and, on occasions, it has not been 
of value at all. When the manager was asked to elaborate on why he thinks that this is 
important for the project implementation stage, he replied: 
“When we came at the end to present it to them [senior management] they already know it and 
they feel part of developing it because they came and helped us with their feedback every time 
we have done something. This was done for two reasons and it was intentional: The first reason 
was that we wanted to get their feedback and have a few more eyes looking into what we are 
doing. The second reason is that we wanted them to get involved in order to be easier at the end 
for us and for them”.  
At the end, the execution of the implementation of the new system was (supposed) to be 
based on certain ‘principles’ that need to be followed in the implementation of any project 
within organization ‘M’. These principles were this manager’s reflection of the many years 
in HR-related jobs and his particular experiences in company ‘M’. The manager was able 
to articulate his learning of these experiences and state the particular elements that he 
found to be rather disturbed, some more than others, during his time in the company. As 
he explained these involved the following: 
“[The first principle is to try] not to make peoples’ lives complicated but simple and easy to use 
when we implement something and we try to stick to. If you don’t want to make it complicated 
then don’t make it complicated! Another principle is to get people (i.e. users of the system and 
other stakeholders) involved in the project early so that they can feel that they have the 
ownership of this and they will also feel that are part of this. They have to become advocates for 
the system and the project. Third principle, we don’t look for what is referred to as the ‘best’ 
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system but we look for the best fit and simplest system. We don’t have to bring the best system 
in the world but we need to look at what would fit us now or what will get us what we want. Forth 
principle is timing of the implementation. We need to consider that we don’t do it when the 
businesses are busy. Last principle, get management support such as senior leadership support 
and take ownership and we do this in many ways, through the communication with the CEO, 
through emails or town hall meetings, and so on”.  
These ‘guiding principles’ have become the steps in the implementation of systems 
technology within the organization after many trial and error attempts to implement 
various technologies within this and the other organization. As one manager said: 
“We like to think that we have a good implementation strategy here but it is never black and 
white. I mean that we never get it 100 percent right or 100 percent wrong because most of the 
times people in [the organization] are resisting new things because they think that their jobs will 
be affected. This is the reason but it is not true”. 
This is an important insight offered by the particular manager. The implementation and 
use of new technologies in the organization are perceived as upsetting the ordinary 
performance of routines. A number of other managers have also commented on this 
breakdown of routines and their consequences for employees from different points of 
view. For example, the Managing Director of Telecommunications division in company 
‘M’ viewed technology from the point of view of the organization as a whole and how its 
implementation was met with resistance from a number of employees. As he described:  
“I find it rather embarrassing that we are still working [in almost every department of the 
organization] with papers and pens; we are characterized by slack… we must be using the latest 
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technologies, electronic government, and networks just like the rest of the world. The reason was 
that people were worried of losing their jobs because of moving to new electronic generation or 
technology. When you have electronic government in place everything is transparent; you can 
check everything just by one-click or do a quick survey through this method”. 
The ostensive aspect of the routine, that is, the effective and efficient use of the latest 
technologies to get the job done in the organization is not integrated appropriately due to 
‘fear’ and ‘reluctance’ of staff that their job would be ‘transparent’ and more ‘efficient’. 
Such resistance has meant that even attempts to force the technologies deeper in the 
organization had not been successful until: 
“It took us two years to implement [the new technology] because we had to hire professionals or 
experts in this area and we had to put a plan in order to set up a network and educate people. By 
doing so we saved a lot of jobs as well as money. Furthermore, we are now going within the world 
cycle by having almost the same services”. 
The implementation and use of technology is a recurring theme in the investigation of 
organizational routines. Like the use of any artifacts, objects or tools, its effective use 
depends on experience and familiarity with the action undertaken. Also, routines in this 
context can be viewed as interconnected as one may influence the other in quite 
significant way. For example, the use of technology affects the performance of the routine 
and the ways that other routines (e.g. customer service) are enacted. As Feldman and 
Pentland (2003: 104) note, actions within routines are interdependent as many actors 
involved in the routine that somehow have to ‘dance’ in synchronicity with other actors. 
The same can be said, however, for apparently independent routines and actors such as 
the case of participants in the use and implementation of the HR system routine and those 
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involved in the company’s customer services. For instance, when a new technology was 
implemented in the organization to monitor and assess the level of customer satisfaction, 
it was found that the latter was very poorly perceived as there was little or no monitoring 
of the activities performed by those involved in the enactment of this particular routine. 
This was confirmed by the Manager of Customer Services in company ‘M’. As he 
remarked: 
“There were a lot of complains coming in about the customers service. Employees were taking 
the customer service not very seriously. For example, they were thinking that whether we serve 
the customer well or not we will get our salary at the end of the month because no one is 
monitoring us or no one is checking the customer service level”.  
And he added: 
“From here I start to find out the link between the employees and the customers on this issue. 
[After the implementation of the technology] I found that everyone was panicking but at the same 
time they started to serve the customer well. I was also monitoring them in person, sometimes 
by standing with customers and I realized that the level of service increased dramatically. Maybe 
it was the fear that I will jump in at any time and interfere but it worked very effectively”. 
The preceding analysis brings forward a number of important issues in relation to the 
ways that routines are understood and carried out in this particular organizational context. 
Starting again from the breakdown of this particular routine in the form of a critical 
organizational experience, that is, the implementation and use of an HR system, brought 
forward a number of significant aspects that relate to the ostensive and the performative 
parts of the routine. First, in relation to the ostensive part of the routine, it was found that 
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the new technology is understood differently by those who are working in the organization. 
For example, senior management is concerned more with transparency, monitoring, and 
control of organizational activities whereas other employees perceive the use of new 
technology as a means for management to interfere and instil ‘control’ in the everyday 
activities and practices. Such a difference in understanding or perception that a change 
may bring about in organizations is not uncommon. The divide between the management 
and employees has been particularly evident in the two organizational settings that this 
research was carried out. This may be because of cultural differences that are a common 
feature in UAE public and private organizations. As it was briefly discussed earlier, top 
management comprises of expatriates (typically British, American, or Australian) whereas 
middle managers are normally local Emirate citizens and thus tensions arise in the 
relationships of those involved in the execution of routines. There was more often than 
not, blame from both sides if things were not done effectively or efficiently.  
Second, in relation to the performative aspect of the routine, it was revealed that the 
effective or otherwise enactment of a particular routine (e.g. the effective use of 
technology) has an impact on how other routines are carried out. For example, an 
individual who is not carrying out his/her duty to log customer calls in the system, may 
influence the ways that complains are handled and resolved by other colleagues in the 
same department. This, in turn, may affect the overall appraisal and evaluation of the 
individuals when line managers conduct the annual evaluation (typically starting the 
process in the middle of September and complete it at the end of December each year) 
based on the evidence in the form of reports provided by the new system. The 
interconnection of performative routines, therefore, is a particularly significant aspect in 
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the enactment of the routine and its appropriate execution is particularly evident in all 
routines that require the use of technologies or other artifacts. 
5.2.4 Customer Services  
A number of participants referred to the ostensive routine of ‘customer services’ and how 
breakdowns related to this have impacted organizational performance, altered meanings, 
and re-aligned practices within both organizations. This particular routine comprises of a 
number of interconnected performative aspects that make it quite complex to observe 
and difficult to articulate in the interviews that took place. These aspects involve, but are 
not limited to, listening and responding to customer complaints, updating, verifying and 
correcting customers’ account information (including cancelling or upgrading accounts), 
providing customers with information about companies’ product and services, assisting 
customers when products or services do not work as expected, identifying and escalating 
high priority or complex cases for resolution, producing weekly reports for management, 
and so on.   
A number of participants described their critical organizational experiences around this 
routine within their respective organizations. BM (Customer Services manager in 
company ‘M’), for instance, identified how his understanding of the ostensive aspect of 
the routine had been disrupted based on his experiences of working in different 
organizations before he joined ‘M’ in his current role. As he put it:  
“Once I joined the company [and the specific department] I was shocked by how they were 
handling customers and the way the current system was working. Customers were handled 
randomly; they were standing there like they are going to watch movies, like they are waiting in 
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a queue to buy tickets for a movie… It was honestly shocking and unacceptable; this is a 
government entity, it should not be like this”. 
The breakdown of the ostensive aspect of the routine, that is, the understanding of what 
a ‘customer service’ routine should entail, has been disrupted in a significant way. His 
use of strong words such as ‘shocking’ and ‘unacceptable’ to describe this particular 
routine signifies a heightened level of breakdown in the meanings and patterns that his 
experience was built upon in previous working environments (before joining ‘M’ he was 
working in a large private company). His reference to the type of entity (i.e. ‘a government 
organization’) is also important as his interpretation of how something ‘should work’, 
especially if it is a government-owned organization, denotes his experiential background 
with entities such as this one. When he was prompted to find the solution to the problem, 
he replied that what was needed is the development and implementation of a queuing 
system that can handle the traffic at specific times, especially during increased rush hour 
trading times. In what followed he described in detail the procedures that he undertook in 
order to make customers’ experiences more enjoyable from their point of view. As he 
remarked: 
“The solution was to develop a queuing system that can handle all this traffic within a certain 
time. So we first studied other services related to telecommunication industry and we measured 
the time that each should take to serve each customer. [Thus], we defined each service inside the 
queuing system for 7 minutes of serving (each customer) and 5 minutes waiting time. So once the 
customer walked into our entity, he/she takes a token number and waits. The waiting time should 
be no more than 5 minutes, what we defined previously inside the system. If it goes above that 
time, there will be a late system beep which informs the supervisor of the service center. So in 
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that case we will try to manage it as fast as we can, and if needed, the supervisor can take action 
in serving the customer as soon as possible. Once the customer is called to the service desk, the 
starting time for the service will begin. The serving time is defined in seven minutes. But in some 
cases, in complex cases, or when the customer does not have the necessary documentation, it 
might take more but we inform the customer of what they need to have in order to complete the 
service”. 
The narration of this solution to the critical incident identified before brings forward 
another important element in the ways that routines (both ostensive and performative) 
are defined and understood. For this manager, previous experience was one way of 
identifying the problems of the customer service but perhaps the most important aspect 
of this narrative relates to how he identified the source of the solution. He was able to 
benchmark the new queuing system against other systems in the same industry (i.e. 
telecommunications) and develop a new company queuing system that takes into account 
waiting service times within the same sector. The benchmarking for this manager is of 
particular importance here. Based on his past working experience and being himself a 
customer in other service companies in UAE, he was able to suggest solutions to the 
identified problem. At the time of the study, a new draft of the benchmarking policy was 
circulated to managers for review and commenting. The document had set out an 
overview of the benchmarking policy in the following way:  
“The purpose of the benchmarking policy is to ensure that [the company’s] performance is 
comparable to national and international standards and it acts as a means of improving 
performance and assuring these standards. The policy also aims to ensure that the concerned 
departments are more coordinated and systematic in their approach to benchmarking that 
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supports [the company’s] overall strategic plan and is linked to its performance targets and quality 
improvement systems” (Internal Company Documentation – strictly private and confidential). 
From the above extract we can infer that the purpose of benchmarking is the comparison 
of key performance and activities within the company in relation to other companies in the 
same industry – both national and international. This creates a starting point in the 
initiation of change in the organization as the comparison may reveal areas of concern 
that need to be fixed and adjusted to the best standards available in the industry. The 
manager was aware of the policy during the interview and he used this information to 
emphasize the importance of the department to run in the most efficient and effective 
way. Since the customer service routine comprises of a number of performances that 
sometimes overlap between departments, it was important to set the standards that all 
those involved in the routine can understand and relate to it when enacting it.  
After many attempts and months of trial-and-error efforts, this particular manager 
achieved the target of getting the customer in and out of a service office in less than 15 
minutes (waiting and serving time combined). As he remarked: 
“[Customers] have to be served in a quality way as best as we can; as long as we do this, I believe 
we achieve our target. Our objective is to satisfy our customer in terms of providing excellent 
services”. 
A recurring theme that came to the fore in the narration of critical incidents and routines 
were related to organizational rules and regulations. Particularly within the context of the 
customer service routine, one manager described how rules and regulations influenced 
his practice within the particular context. Within his role and capacity in the organization 
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(Manager of Operations in company ‘M’), he described a situation in which employees – 
and himself – dealt with customer phone calls. In that division, a phone call from a 
customer is very important as it implies that there is a problem or inquiry related to an 
operational matter and needs to be dealt with quickly, efficiently, and effectively. The 
particular manager described the situation in the following way:  
“When a phone call comes in, you have to judge the customer’s problem whether it is a serious 
matter or not and then follow a particular set of procedures. In one phone call, I judged the 
problem not to be very serious and I told the customer that I cannot help him and he has to call 
in the morning to finish with this problem. The customer was not satisfied and I told him we got 
rules and that I cannot skip the rules and that if I could help him I would have done it. He got 
angry… The next day I got a phone call from a senior manager in the organization. He told me that 
a customer had a problem (yesterday) and you didn’t help him. I responded to him that you have 
taught me that we should not do that because our department only deals with emergency 
situations and his [customer] problem was not an emergency problem. The manager said that I 
was wrong and the next day they issued me a warning”.   
For this manager, this has meant that although he believed he followed the protocol and 
the policies and rules around an incoming phone call, in that particular instance, the 
customer filed a complaint that his problem was not taken seriously and that the person 
on the phone had not considered carefully all the circumstances. Consequently, the 
manager’s case was examined by the HR department and he was given a warning as a 
way of not only sanctioning his actions but also as a way of alerting other colleagues who 
may have treated similar situations in a similar manner. For this manager, this has been 
a learning curve in his experience in the organization. He was able to reflect on this 
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incident and make changes to his behavior and even, at times, having to go against the 
policy rules – or, at least, his interpretation of the policies and rules. The result from this 
incident for him was that: 
“Any phone call I received, even if they seem to be less important, I have tried to solve them at 
that moment… so I had to abandon the rules. These rules were set by the management team, not 
the company. Now it is different. I want the company to look good, not the (respective) manager”. 
The above mentioned incident reveals an interesting and, at the same time, challenging 
situation in the enactment of performative routines. As routines are specific in context and 
in time of their enactment, they are also bound by certain rules that are in place in order 
to maintain a consistency and coherence in the routine pattern. However, these rules may 
breakdown either because of an external interference (e.g. managerial decision) or 
because of an internal moment of improvisation and creativity by a participant who enacts 
the routine. Nevertheless, this can be thought of as a tension in the enactment of a 
performative routine between the organizational and the managerial rule enforcement. 
For example, what managers want employees to do and what the organization dictates 
what employees should do, has to be negotiated in the enactment of the routine without 
breaking away from established patterns of the ostensive routine. This tension in the rule-
following actions of participants enacting organizational routines, especially in large 
organizational contexts within the UAE, should be approached with the right judgment by 
the participant involved in order to maintain stability in routine patterns. One manager 
(Financial Manager in company ‘M’) was particularly revealing when he described this 
tension in the following way:  
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“[In our organization] you have to do what the boss wants you to do. You have to bend the rules, 
break the rules, go above or under the rules, no matter what, you have to do what they say, even 
if your integrity is in jeopardy”.  
The word ‘integrity’ for this manager is very important in this context. Understanding what 
is required to execute a routine effectively may involve breaking away from past 
experiences in order to envisage a novel outcome. ‘How things are done around here’ is 
taking a new meaning for the participants involved in the enactment of the routine. As 
indicated above, for instance, a number of managers narrated how their past 
organizational experiences have helped them to envisage what actions need to be taken 
in order to carry out a routine in the most appropriate and beneficial manner (e.g. the 
rebranding routine). In this case, however, this may not suffice to get things done. Past 
experience becomes an issue that needs to be reflected upon and re-evaluated. Even if 
one has engaged in and enacted the same routine several times, there are still moments 
that new actions need to be carried out even if these actions mean that the individual has 
to come at odds with his/her personal beliefs and previously held assumptions.  
In addition, the interview data revealed such moments where personal experiences have 
come under scrutiny by the participants involved. These are moments that relate to 
personal aspirations and targets that needed to be re-evaluated and re-aligned in light of 
new experiences and represent a very subjective element of organizational work in which 
what one wants to achieve through his engagement in organizational life can differ 
substantially from person to person. When prompted to reflect on the issue of integrity 
and why the particular participant felt that this affects his personal aspirations and values, 
the following dialogue took place: 
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Interviewer (I): Can you please elaborate on that point about ‘integrity’? What do you actually 
mean? 
Participant (P): Well, if you want to do something that you believe it to be right and your boss 
does not want it, it is a matter of integrity… 
I: OK, but why would you not do it regardless of what the boss says? 
P: Because you cannot. You have to think seriously about not upsetting him – he says ‘no’, that’s 
it. You cannot do it. 
I: You are faced then with a moral issue here… 
P: Yes, you are. All the time. So you leave these [morality] back home. You come to work without 
them. 
What the above dialogue signifies is that although there is a clearly defined aspect of 
work that has been disjointed, for this particular participant, its re-alignment is difficult or 
impossible to be achieved. In these cases, the exercise of reflection as a mechanism that 
allows participants to make changes to the ways that routine enactment is carried out 
becomes less meaningful because no matter how much one wants to change, there are 
forces at play that do not provide a space for the necessary change to occur.  
What the preceding analysis reveals in relation to this particular routine? The data 
revealed and it has been observed from the researcher’s participation in both 
organizational settings that the customer service routine is rather complex as it comprises 
of a number of interrelated areas and a number of departments, each of which play their 
own role in getting the organizational actions coordinated and consistently enacted. This 
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has meant that the ostensive routine has been difficult to be observed and more difficult 
to be analyzed. However, a number of participants talked about how their experience in 
dealing with this routine has impacted the way of understanding what ‘customer service’ 
means, and executing the appropriate activities that this routine comprises of. Particularly 
in relation to the performative activities of this routine, the above analysis indicates that 
participants attempted to build on previous organizational experiences – not necessarily 
in the same organizational context – in order to get the broken down activities fixed and 
up-and-running. Previous experience has also been useful in enabling participants to 
draw on the wider industry and identify ‘best practice’ in relation to how other companies 
in the same industry attempt to solve problems related to their customer service routine.  
An important finding from the interviews was that the execution and enactment of this 
particular routine require personal judgments by those who participate in its execution. 
These judgments are important in so far as they determine and distinguish what actions 
are appropriate to do (or not to do) when the routine is enacted. However, these 
judgments and their associated actions are bound by rules, policies and procedures that 
can be either organization-wide or enforced by managerial intervention. When the former 
is the case, judgments are based on previous experiences and the knowledge and 
familiarity of the individual with these rules and regulations. In these instances, a protocol 
may be followed in the form of standard operating procedures that have little or no impact 
in the execution of the routine (e.g. following up on a phone call by a customer who 
requested a price list for particular services). When the latter is the case, however, tension 
arises that relates to what is appropriate and correct procedure to follow: standard 
operating procedures or management’s suggestion? Interviews revealed that individuals 
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have to comply with managerial suggestions of what needs to be done in specific 
circumstances. As there is no unified framework for how cases should be dealt with, 
participants face breakdowns that relate to their personal role, responsibility and identity 
in the organization. Ultimately, this creates implications for one’s reflective capacity as, 
what previous experience has taught, no longer suffices to get things done. This may be 
the reason why some routines remain the same for longer periods of time and some 
others change often as improvisation and creativity within accepted norms and 
procedures takes a more center stage.  
5.3 THE BREAKDOWN OF THE TACIT  
In the previous section (5.2) I concentrated more on the narratives of participants around 
routines, their understanding of these, and the practices or performances that they have 
been involved in when enacting a particular routine. My intention was to bring forward the 
ways that people talk about the routines they have participated and whether or how these 
have changed or altered and resulted in new performances and new understandings. In 
order to achieve this, the discussions were centred on critical incidents which create a 
wider context in which organizational experiences take place. Within such a context, 
participants cantered their narratives on moments of breakdown in practice; moments in 
which previous understandings no longer sufficed and new meanings needed to be 
created in order to move experiences and practices forward. Breakdowns, in this 
research, represent the overall framework for the investigation of routines and the role of 
tacit knowing in them. Breakdowns upset the ordinary, everyday practices and actions 
and therefore the routine ways of doing things in organizations. During a breakdown, 
whether major or minor, the upsetting of routines also upsets the tacit integrations by 
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which organizational participants tacitly draw upon when performing a particular task. 
Breakdowns then are vital in instigating (critical) reflection as the otherwise undisturbed 
practical engagement in organizational contexts becomes an issue for reflection and 
potential change.  
As it has already been discussed in Chapter Three, knowing something comprises of the 
ability of an individual to integrate subsidiary particulars and focal targets. The individual 
is only subsidiarily aware of these integrations, i.e. knowing the integrations only in 
practice without being able to say what it is that he/she knows. From reading maps to 
riding bicycles, these integrations remain silent and point towards what an individual 
wants to accomplish, that is, point towards focal targets. Focal targets comprise of the 
individual’s attention to achieving something (e.g. arriving at a destination by reading a 
map or by riding a bicycle) as an outcome of engaging in a particular action. Similarly, 
knowing how to perform a routine comprises of the ability of an individual to understand 
its ostensive part, in order to integrate performances that will lead to the effective 
execution of the routine. These performances, however, become upset and breakdown 
and their effective enactment depends on the individual’s ability to connect actions to 
meanings. Informed by Polanyi’s understanding of the structure of tacit knowing, there 
are three areas were these integrations fail to meet expectations of effective performance. 
The first one relates to integrations in relation to one’s role, identity, and responsibilities 
in the organizational context. The second relates to integrations with others and various 
relationships that become upset in the course of organizational experience. The third 
relates to integrations with artifacts, tools or objects that are utilized by participants in 
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order to perform a routine effectively. In what follows I elaborate on three areas in which 
breakdowns reveal the relationship of tacit knowing to organizational routines.  
5.3.1 Integrations with one’s own identity, roles, and responsibilities 
The first area of breakdown of tacit integrations within routines relates to how participants 
made sense of their own identity, roles, and responsibilities in their respective 
organizations. This means that the performances that give shape to routine patterns and 
the understandings related to these performances have been broken down when 
participants see that their own identities in the organization or their roles and 
responsibilities no longer conform to current practices. For example, in the re-branding 
routine, some of the interviewees suggested that when the project was assigned to the 
marketing department, a number of employees felt difficulty in understanding what their 
roles in the project would be and what kinds of responsibilities would be assigned to them 
by senior management. This was also confirmed by the manager who revealed that a 
number of employees in the department lacked the experience and knowledge of 
completing such a task and they felt overwhelmed by the amount of work needed to be 
carried out in order to finish the project in a given timeframe. On the other hand, the 
manager who had experience of similar projects of rebranding in other organizational 
settings felt that although the work would require a lot of time and effort, it can be 
effectively completed in the provided time frame. He did however acknowledge that for 
him the lack of experienced staff to carry on the task effectively was an issue of concern. 
In other routines, such as the customer service routine, one manager narrated how an 
incoming senior manager downplayed her role in a particular project and eventually ‘took 
away’ her responsibilities to complete what she felt was her own effort and time 
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investment in this particular task. As she (FR – Senior Executive Business Developer – 
Company ‘R’) said:   
“One of my first projects in the company was to develop a program for our clients and let them 
feel that they are part of the community and that [the company] is taking care of them, not just 
have the land, lease it, and then forget about them. I have developed some programs that add 
value and create new ideas for our clients and I was doing it for almost 12 months. When the new 
management came in, all of a sudden I have been told to stop doing this and focus on other 
assignments. So this was a tragedy for me because personally, I didn’t want to stop the project 
that I dedicate myself and my time into it. But I could not reject their request; this was their 
demand. So I kept aside and what I developed I had to give it to someone and let them do what 
they have to do”.  
When asked to elaborate on the importance of such a move for her, she acknowledged 
that although working in other projects is perhaps a good thing in terms of experience 
gained, losing the one that she felt had been very proactive and engaged with had been 
quite difficult to fathom and cope with. What this signifies is that the individual makes an 
attempt to reconnect what for her has been disjointed because of an experienced 
breakdown of her role in the organization and in that particular project. As her role breaks 
away due to managerial intervention, she tries to re-adjust her positioning in the firm by 
identifying other areas in which her experience can have an impact in the organization.  
This is not uncommon in the interviews that participants narrated. Another manager (GR 
– Manager of Customer Service in company ‘R’) discussed how he lost custody of a 
particular project – and then, eventually, of the department – after he had misplaced a 
check-book that the auditing team identified as missing at the end of the year. Because 
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of this incident, the manager was deemed irresponsible and for this reason he was 
replaced by another colleague in the department. This particular type of breakdown had 
negative consequences on this manager as he came to realize that even the most 
‘routine’ checks that he was responsible of doing before, they have now become an issue 
for reflection and concern. He said that since this incident occurred he has been re-
instated into his position (four months later) and he is now able to be particularly careful 
with mundane activities. He has also been taking initiatives in the company to raise other 
colleagues’ awareness about carrying out their responsibilities in the most effective way 
possible. For this manager then and for others before, the breakdown that occurred 
related to his role and responsibilities in the organization has become a learning curve in 
which he has now been able to understand in retrospect. 
Breakdowns that affect one’s own identity, role, and responsibility in the organization 
therefore represent one aspect of upsetting organizational routines. As routines are 
characterized by stable and discernible patterns of action, these patterns can sometimes 
change because of a tension between actual performances and desirable or expected 
outcomes. This, too, is a characteristic of tacit knowing, namely, the inability of a person 
to effectively integrate subsidiary particulars and focal targets. In other words, within a 
routine setting, breakdowns in the performative part can affect its ostensive aspect 
because of the inability of the individual to cope with current actions in the enactment of 
routines. In order for a routine to be enacted, the individual who participates in its 
performance needs to re-adjust his/her actions (i.e. to re-integrate subsidiary particulars) 
in light of novel organizational experiences. 
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5.3.2 Integration with others and various relationships 
The second area of breakdown of tacit integrations within routines relates to how 
participants understand their relationships with other people in the organization – whether 
managers or subordinates. As it was indicated in the previous section and it was revealed 
during the interviews, a number of managers indicated that their relationship with other 
colleagues have been broken down and what used to be a normal and unobstructed 
relationship amongst colleagues, it was now re-assessed, re-evaluated, and re-
considered in light of new  experiences. For example, IM (Assistant Financial Controller) 
narrated in her interview how ‘connections’ (in the form of ‘Wasta’) within and across the 
company and between managers and other people (whether colleagues in the same or 
different departments or colleagues at other organizations) have impacted on ethical 
practices that were previously had gone unnoticed. First-hand experiences of these 
relations play a crucial role in the understanding of one’s own position and actions in the 
organization as they disrupt the ongoing flow of organizational life. It is quite one thing to 
know about these connections and how others have been affected by them and quite 
another to experience this on a personal level. As this manager pointed out in another 
part of her interview, “I knew that some people here [in the company] have ‘favorites’ and 
others are not treated nicely but I did not know how serious it is”. 
Another manager raised the issue of ethical conduct in the company in the form of ethical 
standards that should be implemented to avoid or eliminate such behaviors in the future. 
As he (KR – Manager in Finance and Accounts in company ‘R’) put it: 
“I personally feel ethics is the main thing which should be implemented in the organization. 
Employees need to go through proper training not only on specific subject matters but at the 
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wider professional conduct which should be carried out in the company. [We need] an ethical 
policy which is crucial in all organizations and especially in this one”. 
Relationships with other people are essential in getting things done in organizational 
contexts. Working in small teams of four to six individuals in a number of ongoing projects 
was the norm in both organizations and departments typically comprised of six to ten 
individuals including managers and vice presidents. Any breakdown in the tacit 
integrations that are ineffably used to performing certain tasks can lead to unexpected 
consequences that may have major impact in the execution of routines. For example, 
interview participants spoke of an apparent lack of trust, disrespecting of rules and 
regulations, cultural misunderstandings, misinterpretations of company policies and 
procedures, all of which have given rise to changing performances, teams, routines, and 
practices. In the Hiring and Promotions routine, for example, it was noted that a number 
of people got positions that they did not deserve; the company hired people without the 
necessary credentials to be employed; others denied promotion on the basis of personal 
rather than professional matters; and others yet experienced a freezing in their rewards, 
salaries and commissions when these were due at the end of the year. All these, coupled 
with a general sense of dissatisfaction, suspicion, and gossip, have been catalytic in the 
changing (or unchanging) of routines and the ways that participants understood their roles 
and responsibilities in the organization. 
It follows, therefore, that for routines to be effectively performed, relationships with other 
people in the organization, the department, or the team, need to sustain a level of 
coherence and stability. In most instances, colleagues of the same rank had not been 
talking about their colleagues in other departments or units. Interestingly, the blame was 
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typically put on managers and senior managers as they felt are responsible for the 
unpleasant situations that they were finding themselves into. On the other hand, a number 
of interviewees were also managers (some of them in senior positions) and they too were 
pointing towards senior colleagues in the organization. Although this may be due to a felt 
jealousy, it could not be verified during the fieldwork. What is important to note, however, 
is that tacit integrations in relation to other people had to be continuously revised and re-
aligned as what once had worked well for them, it now no longer suffices.   
5.3.3 Integration with artifacts (tools and objects)  
The third area of breakdown in the tacit dimension of knowing within the context of 
routines relates to the ways that individuals integrate and use artifacts, tools, objects and 
equipment. This is an important area in the study of routines and of tacit knowing as it 
relates to the ways that people make sense of the physical objects that are used in order 
to effectively carry out a task or a performance. Within the literature on routines, artifacts 
are distinguished from routines and particularly their ostensive aspects. For example, 
Feldman and Pendland (2003; 2008) noted that artifacts such as standard operating 
procedures, written rules and policies, company regulations, technologies, and so on, 
should only be understood in terms of meaning their use have or is intended to have for 
participants in organizational contexts. Feldman and Orlikowski (2011: 1246) also point 
out that various technologies can be viewed as artifacts whose operations and outcomes 
are not fixed but always emergent through interaction with humans. As these interactions 
are carried out in organizational contexts, their meaning can sometimes break and 
different interpretations are required to complete the action in question.  
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In the case of the hiring and promotions routine, for example, as indicated in the previous 
section, both companies had publicized (internally) a set of policies related to hiring and 
promotion. However, a number of participants suggested that the standard operating 
procedures and company rules and policies have not been followed by senior 
management or they were interpreted at will to suit different situations. Artifacts – such 
as, in this case, the internal company documentation – act as pointers of routine 
performances, not as the set principles of the routine itself. Interpretations of various 
actors who are not so much involved in the hiring or promotion routine (but may have 
been involved in the past) bring forward the variety in routine performance and 
understanding at any given time. Feldman and Orlikowski (2011: 1247) discuss a similar 
experience where a multinational consulting firm had adopted a groupware technology to 
facilitate knowledge sharing amongst its consultants and the authors narrated that the 
managers who were responsible for the implementation and facilitation of the technology 
were very happy with the end product whereas the consultants who were supposed to 
use this technology were not using it that much at all. 
Breakdowns affecting tools, artifacts and objects have also been discussed by the 
interviewed participants. For example, JR (Manager in Finance and Accounts in company 
‘R’) narrated an incident of how his experience in auditing (he had spent 14 years as an 
auditor and accountant before joining ‘R’) enabled him to identify a fraud practice after 
scrutinizing data that ‘looked suspicious’. As he has put it: 
“A company was giving commission based on sales so we found that a huge amount of 
commissions have been paid whereas there is no reflection of this on the sales or on the revenue 
as such. For example, the profits going down and commissions go up; and even revenue is going 
down. This gave us alert signal and we went to test them”.   
210 
 
The ‘signal’ that this manager refers to is a form of breakdown of tacit integrations when 
using tools to complete certain tasks. For this experienced manager who has perhaps 
seen similar instances before, the problem was fairly quickly spotted and further 
investigation revealed a fraudulent practice on commissions that reached 700,000 USD.  
He also wondered how such a big gap in the company accounts had not been spotted 
before by any accountant or senior accountant in the firm. He explained that since the 
company comprised of some 24 branches in different geographical locations, the current 
system in use was not robust enough and therefore the integrity of the data had been 
compromised by someone (or more people) in any of the branches. 
In any case, breakdowns in the use and interpretations of artifacts provide a snapshot of 
the ways that tacit knowing aligns and re-aligns in the view of new organizational 
experiences in the context of routines. In the Rebranding routine, failure of a supplier’s 
equipment to produce brochures on time for a company presentation meant a change in 
the supplier; in the HR Systems routine, the decision to de-centralize the system led to a 
change in the current system; and in the Customer Service routine, the observed long 
queues in the customer service desks led to a new way of handling clients in the branch 
and on the telephone. Tacit knowing, in all these instances has been disrupted and novel 
ways of integrating subsidiary particulars to attend to focal targets are needed in order to 
perform organizational tasks effectively and efficiently. 
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5.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This Chapter provides an overview of the thesis major findings. My aim in this Chapter 
was to understand how breakdowns (accidents or surprises) in practical engagement of 
the participants in their daily routines altered their understanding of the practices involved 
in enacting these routines. Looking closely at four different routines, namely, Rebranding, 
Hiring and Promotions, HR Systems implementation, and Customer Service, and building 
on data deriving from company documentation and informal and formal interviews it was 
revealed that changes in the routines are a result of breakdowns in the structure of tacit 
knowing. This is because of an inability of an individual employee (or a group of 
employees) to effectively integrate their subsidiary particulars in order to attend to focal 
targets in three areas: (a) integrations related to identities, roles, and responsibilities; (b) 
integrations related to various relationships; and (c) integrations related to the use of 
artifacts (objects or tools). Breakdowns occur in relation to these three aspects of 
organizational experience, all of which upset the bringing into range of focal targets in 
major or minor way. 
In the following Chapter (Chapter Six) a detailed and in-depth discussion of these findings 
is provided in an attempt to bring the notion of breakdown in line with the concept of tacit 
knowing and explore further its fundamental role in routine change. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
In the previous Chapter (Chapter Five) I presented evidence of the ways that routines 
and tacit knowing are intertwined within two specific Middle-Eastern organizational 
contexts. Looking at four organizational routines that participants discussed in their 
interviews (i.e. hiring and promotions, rebranding, implementation of new HR systems, 
and customer services), my intention was to understand how breakdowns in routines 
impacted or altered organizational performances and what role tacit knowing plays within 
this context. Research on routines such as the hiring routine (Feldman, 2000; Rerup and 
Feldman 2011), the pricing routine (Zbaracki and Bergen, 2010), or the garbage collection 
routine (Turner and Rindova, 2012) has shown that routines are enacted in order to 
accomplish hiring, pricing, and garbage collecting and even to accomplish these in a 
particular way. However, when these enactments are disrupted, routine participants do 
take notice. More importantly, in amidst of accomplishing these tasks there is much else 
that is accomplished, which is not necessarily noticed and it is often unintended. 
Building on interview data (based on critical incidents) and informal discussions in two 
organizations and in line with recent research on organizational routines and the role of 
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reflective talk on how routines change (Dittrich et al 2016), participants discussed how 
their understandings were altered or changed in light of new organizational experiences 
when engaging in organizational routines. The value of ‘talk’ is important in the research 
on routines and tacit knowing as it was revealed throughout the analysis that when 
routines break down they affect the structure of tacit knowing and vice versa. This means 
that when the performance of a routine breaks down, it impacts on the structure of tacit 
knowing; when the structure of tacit knowing breaks down, it affects the performance of 
routines. It is through these breakdowns that change brings itself forward in enacting 
routines and in knowing in organizations.  
The findings of this research indicate that breakdowns play a crucial and often catalytic 
role in changing routines as they bring forward a disturbance in the ways that 
organizational participants integrate and re-integrate their subsidiary particulars in order 
to attend to focal targets. These integrations constitute the structure of tacit knowing (as 
discussed in Chapter Three) and their disruption leads one to change the ways that 
enacts or performs a particular routine. However, many times, these integrations are not 
recovered immediately and this leads to critical reflection which, in turn, enables 
organizational participants to re-view, re-assess, and re-evaluate various experiences in 
which they find themselves involved. 
The analysis revealed that moments of breakdown led participants to a failure of 
integrating subsidiary particulars in order to attend to focal targets related to three areas: 
(a) identities, roles, and responsibilities; (b) relationships with other people; and (c) 
artifacts, tools and objects. This particular emphasis on the routine participants’ 
integrative powers and interpersonal relationships has recently been the focus of attention 
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in research dealing with the link between organizational routines and dynamic capabilities 
(Salvato and Vassolo, 2018). Failure of these integrations deriving from a breakdown in 
practical engagement of participants in organizational contexts affect the ways that 
routines are enacted in a more or less significant way. Depending on the extent and 
severity of the breakdown, participants are forced to critically reflect on these novel 
experiences before they are able to re-align their tacit understandings in order to perform 
the routine effectively.  
As this Chapter unfolds, I shall attempt to discuss the ways that the findings of this 
research contribute to our understanding of routines and the role of tacit knowing in such 
a context. 
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6.2 BREAKDOWNS: THE STARTING POINT OF CHANGING 
ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINES  
One of the key questions in research on routines is the question of how routines change 
(Dittrich et al 2016; Feldman 2000; Feldman et al 2016; Pentland et al 2012) (or fail to do 
so) in organizational contexts. One question, however, that remains largely unexplored 
and this research attempts to answer is the question of why routines change and what is 
the process that enables routines to change (whether in a major or minor way) and at the 
same time maintain their stability in organizations? The answer to this question lies in the 
concept of ‘breakdowns’ which was explored in this thesis. Breakdowns have been 
discussed by a number of authors including Kaplan and Orlikowski (2013), Sandberg and 
Tsoukas (2011), and Zundel and Kokkalis (2010), amongst others. The word 
‘breakdowns’ signifies a disturbance of practical activity in which actors are engaged in 
their everyday lives and call for moments of reflection depending on the severity of the 
experienced breakdown.  
The overall framework of breakdowns and their relationship to organizational routines is 
also relevant to how we can understand tacit knowing in this context. A breakdown of 
routines almost inevitably influences the ways that individuals learn to alter or amend 
actions when routines are enacted. The analysis of interviews revealed that during a 
breakdown, the upsetting of routines also upsets the tacit integrations by which 
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organizational members draw upon when enacting a particular routine. The findings 
suggest that breakdowns affect three areas where tacit integrations fail to meet 
individuals’ expectations of effective performance: (a) integrations with one’s own identity, 
roles and responsibilities; (b) integrations of how one relates with others; and (c) 
integrations with the use of tools or artifacts. Recently, Salvato and Vassolo (2018) 
emphasized that an explanation of dynamic capabilities (and organizational routines) will 
be more complete if we take seriously the ‘meso-level’ (as opposed to merely looking at 
the micro- or macro-levels) of interpersonal interactions and connections among a firm’s 
employees, in which persons (and not necessarily a few senior managers or directors) 
take center stage. Such a focus allows for an explication on how individual level action 
aggregates into firm level. 
How do then breakdowns affect or impact on organizational routines in this particular 
research context? When the performative aspect of routines is interrupted, individuals are 
not able to carry on effective actions in the context of routines because the subsidiary 
integration that people tacitly draw upon to attend to focal targets fail to withhold disruptive 
pressures related to the three aforementioned areas, namely, identity, relations, and 
artifacts. In order for actors to recover these integrations, critical self-reflection is required 
which draws upon, primarily, dialogical engagement with other organizational actors. 
Feldman (2000: 625) asserts that self-reflection and other reflective behavior of 
organizational actors is critical part of routines’ enactment as “reflecting on what they are 
doing, and doing different things (or doing the same things differently)” is a result of this 
reflection.  
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According to Sandberg and Tsoukas (2011: 344-346), for example, two major forms of 
breakdown occur, namely temporary breakdown and complete breakdown. When a 
temporary breakdown occurs, actors are involved in thematic deliberation where even 
though they are still involved in a practical activity, they now pay deliberate attention to 
what they are doing in order to continue. When a complete breakdown occurs, however, 
practical engagement becomes completely interrupted and this may force actors to 
become completely disconnected from practical activity thus prompting critical reflection.   
The findings of this research reveal that breakdowns take different forms and result in 
different responses by organizational participants. For example, the Rebranding routine 
in company ‘R’ was initiated mainly due to managerial intervention based on the 
understanding that the company’s position in the market, its competitiveness, and its 
identity were not clearly explained to key stakeholders. These reasons for a breakdown 
to occur came from exogenous forces. Early explanations for change in routines were 
based on the existence of ‘exogenous shocks’ (Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011: 1244) 
such as management demand or technological changes. Feldman (2000) and Pentland 
et al (2011) suggested, however, that exogenous forces do not necessarily cause 
changes in routines as those who enact them often exhibit considerable flexibility in the 
actions they take to maintain patterns of action. The findings of this research show that 
this may not be the case as although participants in the Rebranding routine found it 
difficult to cope with the novel rebranding project, they did eventually put together the 
necessary actions to complete the exercise in an effective way. Similarly, the HR system 
implementation routine was introduced by a need to integrate ‘best practices’ in the 
organization, and was initiated by exogenous forces and managerial intervention.  
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The findings also revealed that most of the breakdowns occurred in organizational 
routines were related to their performative aspect rather than the ostensive. Nevertheless, 
the findings indicate that for some of these routines, such as the Rebranding routine and 
the Customer Service routine, the ostensive aspect have also been re-negotiated and re-
evaluated in the light of novel organizational experiences. Industry-wide routines, such as 
the Rebranding routine that had not been performed in the researched organizations 
before, may seem to be difficult to be conceptualized in specific terms as the execution 
of the routine unfolds. The exact process, direction, and performance of the routine itself 
may be more difficult to channel than more established and institutionalized routines [such 
as hiring (Rerup and Feldman 2011) or invoice processing (Pentland et al. 2011)]. Since 
the ostensive aspect of routines manifests itself in formal scripts and codified procedures 
which “participants use…to guide, account for and refer to specific circumstances” 
(Pentland and Feldman 2005: 796), the findings suggest that the ostensive aspect of the 
Rebranding routine is ‘ostensive-in-the-making’ as formal rules and procedures are not 
yet in place for the routine to be enacted. This is not the case with the hiring routine, for 
example, as it is one that is performed in organizations worldwide and its ostensive part 
is less abstract than a branding (or, indeed, re-branding) routine which is performed under 
specific situations or circumstances.  
6.2.1 Emotions 
The severity of breakdowns experienced by organizational actors when participating in 
routines may also play an important role in the magnitude and pace of change in routines. 
Particularly in relation to their performative aspects, routines are much more susceptible 
to breakdowns, accidents or even crises and organizational actors need to respond to 
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certain situations in relation to experiencing novel stimuli. The findings indicate that a 
number of breakdowns are closely connected to emotional responses that then pose a 
challenge in enacting routines in effective ways. For example, in the Hiring and 
Promotions routine, organizational participants felt frustration and, at times, anger that 
the company’s annual evaluations were not so much transparent and objective as they 
should have been for particular employees. This created tensions between employers 
and managers and questions were asked in relation to the effectiveness or usefulness of 
these evaluations. Moreover, concerns were raised in relation to the hiring policies and 
procedures that participants felt were only ‘letters on a paper’ rather than properly 
implemented set of rules and policies that the organization was actually using.  
Surprisingly, research on the concept of emotions at the individual level in the 
performance of organizational routines is rather scarce (Feldman, 2016). Despite some 
calls to include emotions or ‘impulse’ in research on routines (Cohen, 2007; Salvato and 
Rerup, 2011; Winter, 2013), the focus of research to-date has remained too much 
concentrated on cognition (or deliberation) in performing routines (Howard-Grenville and 
Rerup 2016). Cohen (2007), for instance, called for more attention to the emotional (and 
‘habitual’) aspects of enacting routines as they shape and subsequently influence the 
ways that these are reproduced over time. Farjoun et al (2015: 5) suggest that the 
interruption of routines by breakdowns or crises triggers an emotion of doubt which is 
closely followed by a process of ‘abduction’, that is, “new hypotheses are generated to 
combine the non-routine with existing knowledge, which can lead to new beliefs and 
habits as well as imaginative leaps, often accompanied by feelings of satisfaction and 
pleasure” (Farjoun et al 2015: 5).  
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Emotions then are released when habitual (or routinized) action gets interrupted in some 
way or conflicts with one another and, therefore, no longer provides guidance in an 
individual’s interaction with his/her environment (Farjoun et al 2015). Emotions can be 
thought of as the motivational bases for creativity and innovation (Adler and Obstfeld, 
2007) as they direct and stimulate action because they are the source of originality in 
thought and action (James, 1956; in Farjoun et al 2015: 5). Interruptions or surprises do 
affect those experiencing them and how they react to them depends on how permeable 
they are to surprises (how much they register it and let it influence them). Different kinds 
of surprise enact different kinds of permeability (Yanow and Tsoukas 2009: 1345). Cohen 
(2007) argues that emotions engaged by a task and established habits no longer suffice 
to accomplish it gives rise to challenges and breakdowns. The cognitive powers that we 
engage to diagnose the reasons for the breakdown and find new capabilities and new 
combinations of doing things is an endless cycle of emotionally engaging perceptions and 
activities. These are then interrupted by more breakdowns and the continuous effort to 
repair them generates an array of reasonably effective and mutually coherent habits or 
routines (Cohen, 2007: 777).  
6.2.2 Dialogue 
‘Dialogue’ or ‘conversational interaction’ has been acknowledged in the literature as a key 
component of knowledge creation in organizational settings (Nonaka and von Krogh, 
2009; Nonaka et al, 2006; Nonaka and Toyama, 2007) and, more recently, as the most 
important aspect in a theory of knowledge creation (Baralou and Tsoukas 2015; 
Majchrzak et al 2012; Tsoukas 2009). As we saw earlier in Chapter Three, Tsoukas 
(2009) has outlined a dialogical theory of knowledge creation in which he defined the 
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latter as the making of new distinctions deriving from participants dialogical interactive 
engagements in the context of performing a particular organizational task. He argued that 
dialogue enables participants to take a distance from their customary assumptions and 
understandings – ‘self-distanciation’ (Tsoukas 2009: 943) – and reconceptualize a 
situation in question. In this way, new distinctions are brought forward insofar as 
participants take a distance from their previous held assumptions and views. What 
enables such change to occur, Tsoukas argues, is ‘reflexivity’. It follows then that dialogue 
and reflexivity go hand in hand: one cannot occur in any meaningful sense if the other is 
not exercised appropriately. Put it differently, reflexivity enables dialogue and dialogue 
enables reflexivity. 
Therefore, breakdowns in performative aspects of routines disrupt subsidiary particulars 
which have the potential to be recovered through reflection which enables (and it is 
enabled by) dialogical exchanges amongst participants in organizational contexts. The 
result of this process is the re-alignment of assumptions and understandings which 
produce novel distinctions and therefore participants engaging in routines can enact 
actions more effectively. Maintaining consistency and stability in the enactment of 
routines, nevertheless, requires the ability of individuals to mindfully engage with tasks 
and appropriately respond to unanticipated outcomes.  
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6.3. INTEGRATION WITH IDENTITIES, ROLES, RELATIONSHIPS, AND 
ARTIFACTS  
One of the most important findings of this research relates to the areas where participants’ 
tacit integrations broke down because their identities, roles, relationships and the use of 
artifacts that were once used unreflectively to get things done, have now become 
disrupted and needed to be re-viewed and re-aligned in order to continue their 
participation in routine performances. The integrations of subsidiary particulars in our 
background understanding are – as we have seen in Chapter Three – the key function of 
all knowing. Briefly put here, concepts are created through the from-to tacit integration of 
indeterminate clues (the from) into a joint comprehension (the to). Such comprehensions 
can themselves become clues to further tacit integrations in a constant attempt to arrive 
at focal targets. Focal targets, in turn, are the outcomes of an individual’s attention to 
achieving something (arriving at a destination or accomplishing a particular task). Such 
acts of integration (and the acts of indwelling and interiorization they imply) are evident in 
all acts of knowing. Knowing itself is an action, it is the doing of things, and as such it is 
shaped by a participant who is embedded in, constituted in relation to, and is in ongoing 
communication with a particular context. Once tacit integrations have formed effectively 
they signify progress in something that has been learned (e.g. riding bicycles, driving cars, 
speaking a foreign language, conducting interviews, and so on) and such progress cannot 
be reversed; it can only be modified in light of new experiences. 
When we carry out a task, we increase our familiarity with the context in which such action 
takes place. Particularly within organizations where tasks are performed to achieve 
particular outcomes, the context comprises of intertwined connections of other people’s 
roles, responsibilities, identities, relationships, and their use of tools, and artifacts. Such 
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an understanding of the context in which human activity takes place is consistent with the 
principles of practice theoretical approaches in organization studies (Feldman and 
Orlikowski 2011; Feldman and Pentland 2003; Whitford and Zirpoli 2014). These 
approaches, although they display wide variations, they converge on three core principles 
shared by practice theory (Feldman and Orlikowski 2011: 1241-1243): (a) everyday 
actions are consequential in producing the contours of social life; (b) emphasis on 
relationality of mutual constitution whereby all actions (and thus all practices) are related 
with one another in the production of meaningful systems; and (c) the rejection of long-
held dualisms such as mind vs. body, cognition vs. action, objective vs. subjective, and 
so on. 
Being sensitive to these conditions, the findings of this research revealed that participants 
engaging in routines in the two researched settings produce consequential actions and 
then discussed how these actions have been evaluated in the course of an enacted 
routine. The consequentiality of actions in routines implies that routines must be enacted 
as without action they remain ‘empty formalizations’ (Feldman 2016) or espoused 
routines (Rerup and Feldman 2011). However, the enactment of routines and their 
consequential nature on the organization depends on who performs a routine and how 
the routine is enacted (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville 2011). Crucially, the findings 
indicate that participants engaging in different routines, such as the Rebranding routine 
or the Hiring and Promotions routine, found it difficult to produce meaningful sequences 
of actions not so much because of their inability to perform particular actions but due to 
an observed (or, at least, perceived) lack of clear frameworks under which routines should 
belong to. For instance, absence of standard operating procedures, policies and 
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regulations, lack of communication, and misinterpretations of existing policies appeared 
to impact on participants’ understandings in relation to their role and responsibilities within 
the routines and the broader organizational structure. Such a breakdown on one’s identity 
and role in the organization breaks the chain of routine performance and the 
consequences are not only confined to the individual concerned but to the broader 
enactment of the same routine in the future or of other routines that such a routine 
depends upon.  
6.3.1 Identity 
Recently, Salvato and Vassolo (2018) point out that the quality of interpersonal 
relationships amongst participants of routine performance can determine the extent to 
which a change proposal may or may not develop and advance within an organization. 
Drawing on the dialogical perspective proposed by Tsoukas (2009), they identify two 
distinct types of relationships with other people: “I-You” (or ‘relational engagement’) and 
“I-It” (or ‘calculative engagement’). The authors argue that productive interpersonal 
relationships are more likely to emerge from relational engagement, which involves 
cooperation between organizational participants, whereas calculative engagement 
involves minimal cooperative behavior as it is more concerned with controlling others and 
not to engage them in ‘productive interpersonal relationships’ (Salvato and Vassolo, 2018: 
11). The “I” in “I-You” can be read as an expression of ‘Identity’, and the “You” is the 
identities of others in relationships characterized by ‘relational engagement’, whereas the 
“It” in “I-It” could refer to the identities of others in relationships characterized by 
‘calculative engagement’.  
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The literature on identity uses these two terms (identity and self) interchangeably. 
Identities are mental models, cognitive schemas, self-schemata, narratives, world-views 
that influence how people think about themselves and how they relate to others. Identity 
research clarifies that individuals are not separate from their social contexts and that 
‘social contexts do not exist apart from people’ (DiMaggio and Markus, 2010: 348). Selves 
and identities reflect the ‘individual’s engagement with the world’ (DiMaggio and Markus, 
2010: 349); they matter because how individuals view themselves and their beliefs on 
how others view them influence how they interact with those around them (see DiMaggio, 
1997). Interpersonal relationships affect a person’s sense of self (identity); beliefs about 
self and beliefs about how they are perceived by others (Markus and Kitayama, 2010). 
Because an individual’s networks of relationships vary, individuals acquire a repertoire of 
schemas and will have multiple identities, and these identities may be in conflict.  
Importantly, individuals are not entirely free to decide their own identities. Instead, a 
person’s identity can be decided for them by others (from the relationships they participate 
within social contexts). It is others who decide to accept or reject the identity we have 
created. For example, an academic’s ‘researcher identity’ may conflict with the image or 
identity that his/her peers have of that academic. It is not easy to change others’ 
perceptions of a person’s identity. Thus, ‘relational engagement’ is more likely when the 
identities of participants are verified by others and as a consequence, participants are 
more likely to cooperate and engage in joint problem solving activities. Contrary behaviour 
would be expected under ‘calculative engagement’. Hence, the degree to which 
breakdowns are detected and managed is influenced by the types of interpersonal 
relationships that pervade the group and the identities generated through these 
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relationships, as these will determine whether individuals engage in productive dialogue, 
or just ignore one another (Tsoukas 2009: 945).  
6.3.2 Interactions among routines 
The findings suggest that actions taken towards the enactment of one routine have 
consequences on other routines and their enactment is influenced by other structures 
(such as culture). For example, the findings revealed that the enactment of the HR 
Systems implementation routine impacted the Customer Services routine which may also 
influence back the initial routine. How phone calls are managed in the customer services 
may impact the evaluation of employees and the relationships with management which 
may in turn influence Hiring and Promotion routines and so on. Although the 
interconnecting nature of routines is acknowledged in the literature (Howard-Grenville et 
al 2016; Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville 2011), the evidence in this research suggests 
that the impact of one routine over another may be more significant than one may expect 
(Feldman et al 2016) and for this reason calls for more research in this direction have 
recently been put forward (Howard-Grenville et al 2016). This is because actions enacted 
in routines are intertwined with other actions, artifacts, or people in other routines and 
thus the boundaries of one routine in relation to another begin to dissolve (Butcher and 
Langley, 2016). This is what has been termed as the ‘ecology’ of routines (Birnholtz et al 
2007: 318; Turner and Rindova 2012) whereby the interaction of routines with one 
another and their interaction with organizational and other contexts becomes particularly 
important. 
The findings of this research shed light on this latter point of ecological interaction of 
routines in relation to wider contexts such as culture. The Hiring and Promotions routine, 
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for instance, is one that most of the participants’ dissatisfaction and frustration was 
evidenced as they believed that policies, rules and regulations were only applicable to 
selective few organizational members.  The untold ‘Wasta’ principle was often exercised 
not only in the hiring practices of the companies but also – and, perhaps more worryingly 
– in the promotion of particular individuals. The taking up of new ideas and proposals by 
younger managers was often perceived with scepticism and many times were ignored by 
more senior managers. This was often attributed to a misunderstanding of the cultural 
parameters within the Emirates by expatriate managers whose interests and intentions 
did not appear to match those of local Emirati workforce. Such ‘clash of cultures’ as it was 
referred to by some participants, coupled with the government’s initiatives for 
‘Emiratization’, caused strong tension between expatriates and local managers and 
changes in the enactment of the routine appeared to be very slow.  Howard-Grenville 
(2005: 632) suggested that since ‘embedded routines’ are mutually constituted with other 
structures (e.g. culture), their overlap with other structures, artifacts, and expectations 
makes change of these routines very difficult. Feldman (2003) showed how a change in 
a routine that was requested by supervisors failed to change when its performance 
contradicted employees’ understandings about the organization. On the other hand, an 
embedded routine may be weak if the overlaps with other structures, if any, are arbitrary 
and therefore its change may be inconsequential for other routines and structures.   
In this research, the distinction between ostensive and performative routines first 
proposed by Pentland and Feldman (2003) was taken up to explain the differences 
observed in the enactment of organizational routines. The literature on routines identifies 
mainly two approaches that attempt to explain their dynamic nature (Bucher and Langley, 
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2016: 3-4). The first is the ‘Within’ approach which puts emphasis on the building up of 
the routines from the performative aspect to the ostensive (e.g. Bresman 2013; D’Adderio 
2008, 2014; Feldman 2003; Rerup and Feldman 2011; Salvato 2009). The second, is the 
‘Without’ approach which emphasizes how the ostensive aspect pushes down to the 
performative (Pentland and Feldman 2008; Jarzabkowski et al 2012; Obstfeld 2012). For 
example, regarding the ‘Within’ approach, Salvato’s (2009) study of strategic renewal at 
Alessi through incremental change to its product development processes showed how 
variations to standard operating procedures occurred through localized adjustments to 
external requirements and then selected and recombined by managers, ensuring the 
reproduction of more successful ostensive routines. Similarly, Rerup and Feldman (2011) 
identified that surprises – or breakdowns – encountered in performing particular routines 
led to trials and adjustments that were incorporated into the routine’s ostensive aspects, 
but was then clashed with organizational schema leading to further trials and adjustments 
at that level too impacting other routines.  
The findings of this research are in line with these studies whereby routines such as HR 
Systems, and Customer Services were characterized by increased managerial 
intervention and trial and error processes when the respective routine was enacted in 
particular ways and then were communicated and reviewed by management to adjust or 
change particular aspects of the performance. Through series of feedback and dialogue 
between those different participants who were carrying the responsibility to create, 
maintain and use the system, the routine was effectively implemented. In the Hiring and 
Promotions routine, however, things were not that straight forward in relation to its 
performance. The perceived purpose and implementation of policies and procedures by 
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various organizational participants led to a series of serious breakdowns and tensions 
between managers and employees. The critical incident accounts indicated that even 
though the ostensive part of the routine was explicated in a series of internal documents, 
participants felt that these policies and rules were not actually used when these routines 
were carried out. This means that in this case a gap exists between the ostensive and the 
performative aspects of the routines and changing the ostensive became very difficult in 
practice. 
On the other hand, the way that the Rebranding routine had been enacted and 
understood in the organization demonstrates the ‘Without’ approach to routines 
reorientation (Bucher and Langley 2016). Besides endogenous change in routines, 
variations can be generated from outside routines themselves and the literature identifies 
abrupt environmental shifts and opportunities as being responsible for intentionally 
reconfiguring routines. Feldman (2003: 749) pointed out that “when managers or others 
intend to change a routine…they produce a new way to conceptualize it”. This means that 
actors who intend change can develop a new concept of a routine and communicate their 
intentions to others eventually leading to altered performances and finally a changed 
routine. When concepts of routines and their ongoing performances are interdependent 
and mutually reinforcing, deliberately re-orientating routines can be a significant challenge 
(Feldman 2003). Thus, the Rebranding routine and, to some extent, the Customer Service 
routine, maybe viewed through what Obstfeld (2012: 1571) referred to as ‘creative project’ 
that constitute a form of non-routine organizing composed of “emergent trajectories of 
interdependent action” through which actors – or organizational units – become 
connected in new ways and engage in new actions geared toward an envisioned change 
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in routines. Obstfeld (2012: 1572) offers an example of a ‘creative project’ that was 
suggested by Winter’s (2006: 130) imaginary popsicle factory vignette: 
“[T]he president says to the director of research that “I’ve just been reading about the great 
strides that have been made recently in cryogenic technology. Why don’t you look into that and 
see if there is anything that will give us a cheaper way of making popsicles”. This directive…set[s] 
in motion a chain of organizational events which may ultimately lead to a new set of production 
processes. It differs [from more incremental adjustments to routines] in that the timing, 
magnitude, and character of its impact on the way the firm operates is very difficult to predict” 
(Winter 2006: 130: cited in Obstfeld 2012: 1572). 
The findings revealed that the Rebranding routine was initiated by a decision at the board 
of directors’ level to change the name, logo, and communication material of company ‘R’ 
and then communicate this decision to senior management for its implementation. Senior 
management in turn assigned the project to the marketing manager – and his department 
– and through a series of actions, combinations, tensions, breakdowns, and discussions 
it was successfully implemented after four to five months. Thus, in the two research 
settings both routines and creative projects were evident which provides a reconciliation 
between routine and less routine action in organizational settings as being responsible 
for stability and change in organizations. 
6.3.3 Routines and artifacts 
Another area that the findings of this research shed light on is the role of artifacts in the 
enactment of routines. Artifacts play a crucial, mediating role in the relation between 
ostensive and performative aspects of routines (D’Adderio 2011, 2014; Howard-Grenville 
2005; Turner and Rindova 2012) and they include physical tools such as equipment, 
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databases, documents, and work procedures such as standard operating procedures that 
actors use (or draw upon) to get things done. Artifacts in the literature on routines have 
been treated differently as research evolved. D’Adderio (2011: 224) shows how artifacts 
have gradually become a central theme in routines research as they are now understood 
to play a central role in the interaction between performative and ostensive aspects of 
routines.  The findings of this research show that the way people understand ostensive 
and performative routines differs depending on their role and responsibilities in the 
organization. For example, in the Hiring and Promotions routine, company policies, 
written documentation and rules were interpreted in different ways by those who were 
executing the routine (managers) and those who were observing it (employees). Feldman 
and Pentland (2003: 101) suggest that a “dean’s perspective on the academic hiring 
routine is likely to be very different from a graduate student’s perspective”. Similarly, in 
this research, the IT and HR manager’s perspective on the implementation of a new HR 
system differs markedly from that of an employee. Interests and intentions seem to 
diverge as the interpretation of what the routine should entail (ostensive) and how it 
should be executed (performative) was perceived differently. This implies that the 
meaning of what something is (or ought to be) is not given but negotiated in the enactment 
of routines in organized contexts. Through a series of breakdowns in the ways that these 
artifacts ‘represent’ what something should be, meanings are reviewed and experiences 
are re-evaluated when participants draw upon explicit rules that are expected to guide 
practice. Research, however, has shown that formal rules and company documentation 
(artifacts) should not be confused with ostensive or performative aspects of routines 
(Feldman 2000, 2003; 2016; Howard-Grenville 2005). Rather, as Feldman and Orlikowski 
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(2011: 1246) argue, artifacts’ “operation and outcomes are neither fixed nor given a priori, 
but [are] always temporally emergent through interactions with humans in practice”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6.4. (CRITICAL) REFLECTION AND MINDFULNESS IN ACTION 
The focus on breakdowns as the starting point of routines change brings forward another 
area of attention in the structure of enacting and understanding performative and 
ostensive aspects of routines in organizational contexts. The notion that routines change 
as a consequence of members’ reflective responses to previous outcomes (Feldman and 
Pentland 2003) emphasizes the constitutive and transformative role of human action in 
locally embedded, institutional and social organizational contexts. If routines are viewed 
as interlinked habits characterized by sequential patterns of action based on the habits of 
routine participants (Turner and Cacciatori 2016), it follows that routines emerge through 
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a process of gradual learning by participants in routines. Equating routines to habits, has 
given credence to the idea that routine action is more automatic in nature, characterized 
by stability or even mindlessness in performing routine actions. This is because, habits, 
have been conceptualized as static and difficult to change. More recently, however, 
scholars have called attention to the micro-foundations of routines (Cohen et al 2014; 
Felin et al 2012; Winter 2013) which view habits as more flexible, dynamic, and generative 
and can exhibit mindful qualities. 
The difference between mindful and less-mindful behavior (Levinthal and Rerup 2006; 
Rerup 2005, 2009) in the enactment of routines is strongly linked to managerial practice 
(Salvato and Rerup 2011). Parallel to this distinction lays the relationship between 
reflection and action (or practice) that has been explored most influentially by Donald 
Schön’s (1983, 1987) ‘reflective practitioner’ who exhibits reflection-in-action and 
reflection-on-action. The latter is the kind of reflection one might engage in after action 
has transpired (Yanow and Tsoukas 2009) – a term that has been closely associated with 
the concept of (critical) reflection. In the former, however, the practitioner “does not 
separate thinking from doing, rationalizing his way to a decision he must later convert to 
an action”, as “the practitioner approaches the practice problem as a unique case. It is 
thus a kind of experimenting” (Schön 1983: 129; 132). Schön argues that when someone 
reflects-in-action, he becomes a researcher in the practice context, “the description of 
intuitive knowing feeds reflection, enabling the inquirer to criticize, test, and restructure 
his understanding” (Schön 1983: 277). Thus, the reflective practitioner is characterized 
by the ability and willingness to question routinized ways of thinking and acting in the 
midst of acting where it is possible to alter one’s current course of action by framing the 
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problem in a new way or by improvising on new ways of solving the problem at hand 
(Jordan 2010: 392). 
The concept of reflection-in-action is therefore closely linked to the concept of 
mindfulness in organizational routines. Levinthal and Rerup (2006: 506) defined 
mindfulness as attentiveness to context and the capacity to respond to unanticipated cues 
or signals. Mindfulness is a mode of practice that allows the questioning of expectations, 
knowledge, and adequacy of routines in complex and unpredictable settings. Mindfulness 
is the quality of attention that enables practitioners to minimize errors, remain vigilant, 
and respond effectively to unexpected events (Rerup 2005: 452). Such quality of 
attention, however, needs to be sustained so that the quality of mindfulness is heightened. 
Mindfulness creates enriched awareness to notice more issues, process these issues 
with care, and detect and respond to early signs of trouble. For example, an experienced 
doctor with heightened mindfulness uses discriminative content to pick up cues about a 
patient’s condition that a less experienced doctor overlooks or fails to see. This, in some 
cases, might have severe consequences for the patient if early signs of cancer are not 
picked up or respond to appropriately to the situation at hand.  
The findings of this research demonstrate that mindfulness has been exercised with 
positive effects when, for instance, the experience of a practitioner to pick up early signs 
of trouble (fraud) enabled him to identify and respond quickly and decisively to a 
particularly troublesome situation for the organization he was part of. In other instances, 
participants discussed how their experience in working in different organizations and 
performing similar routines to the ones they were enacting in their current roles find it 
easier to transform their experience and knowledge into the new context. However, more 
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often than not, mindfulness takes time to be built into an organization. To paraphrase 
Rerup’s (2005: 452-453) assertion, “if all [practitioners] could switch instantly to 
mindfulness, and if mindfulness improved organizational performance, then all 
[practitioners] would be mindful…It is demanding and difficult to be mindful”.  
Engaging in routines mindfully is thus an important aspect in maintaining stability and 
instigating change in organizational routines. Breakdowns, surprises and accidents in 
organizational life can bring about changes in the enactment of performative routines and 
it is through reflection-in-action or mindfulness that understandings and experiences can 
be re-aligned for performances to move on. These moments of re-aligning actions to 
effectively perform a particular task is built upon dialogical exchanges amongst 
organizational actors who are enacting (or have enacted in the past) the same routine. 
Weick (1993) showed that lack of talk in the face of a breakdown can result in a fatal 
collapse of a routine. Dialogical interaction, as it has already been pointed out earlier, is 
a crucial aspect of knowledge creation which involves both reflection-on-action and 
reflection-in-action. Faced with a moment of perplexity or difficulty, engaging in dialogue 
can potentially dispose of doubts, uncertainties, fears, and hesitations so that routine 
participants can effectively arrive at desired outcomes. Drawing our attention to how we 
draw each other’s attention to things plays a crucial role in the continuation of performing 
organizational routines. Tsoukas (2003: 15-16) argued that instructive forms of talk such 
as ‘think of…’, ‘imagine…’ , ‘suppose…’, and so on, can help practitioners to re-orientate 
themselves on how they relate to others and thus enabling them to act (and talk) 
differently. 
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6.5 THE ROLE OF TACIT KNOWING IN THE CONTEXT OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINES  
Change in the ways that routines are performed is one of the most prevalent themes 
amongst researchers on routines. Since the research of Feldman (2000) and Feldman 
and Pentland (2003), two reasons have been identified in the literature that relate to the 
ways in which routines change: first, participants engaging in routines might not perform 
the same routine identically every time; and, second, as routines are enacted by multiple 
participants, it is possible that not all agree on how to perform the routine because of 
differences in orientations, positions, and power within the organization. Such variability 
in routine performance is therefore responsible for both stability and change in 
organizational routines.  
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This thesis complements and extends current conceptualizations on the reasons behind 
routines change as it is argued that one of the reasons that participants might not perform 
the same routine identically every time they enact it may relate to the ways that 
breakdowns affect the subsidiary integrations of participants’ roles and responsibilities, 
the use of artifacts and objects, and the relationships amongst colleagues and external 
organizational actors. Additionally, since the enactment of routines involve multiple 
actors, disagreements do arise that do not only come from endogenous forces of 
positions, power and orientation of participants but also exogenous forces in the form of 
managerial intervention and market demands that may instigate novel projects which 
could gradually become routinized in organizational contexts (as it was the case with the 
Rebranding routine). In this research, the breakdown of routines is closely related to the 
breakdown of the structure of tacit knowing and vice versa. Briefly described here, 
knowing comprises of the ability of an individual to skilfully integrate and re-integrate 
subsidiary particulars in order to attend to focal targets so that meaning is created. These 
integrations are silent and operate in the background as guiding forces in getting 
individuals effectively completing different tasks. Such connections are made possible 
through action and their realization is only made possible in retrospect as we do not know 
what to do before we actually do it – and then reflect on it. Moments of breakdown disrupt 
this process as our tacit integrations become insufficient in getting things done and need 
to be re-aligned in order to move the activity forward.  
As the literature on routines highlights, a similar process is observed when individual 
actors engage in performing organizational routines. Performative aspects of routines are 
responsible for creating, modifying, and sustaining ostensive routines in a similar way that 
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integrating and re-integrating subsidiary particulars shape the quality of attending to focal 
targets. Any breakdown (whether major or minor) in the performance of the routine has 
an impact on the structure of tacit knowing. Recovering the tacit requires reflecting, 
reviewing and refocusing attention to the performed action geared towards a particular 
purpose; so does the recovering of the enactment of routines. Such a recovery, in 
organizational settings, is possible through dialogical interaction with participants who are 
engaged in the same routine or have been engaged in the past and can potentially direct 
participants’ attention to novel insight on how to perform a particular task. 
Think, for instance, of the following example. Writing this thesis is part of the routine of 
obtaining a PhD in the social sciences. It comprises of ostensive and performative 
aspects whereby the former includes the abstract, collective perception of what a PhD 
should look like, what it should contain, and how it should be approached; this is the 
ostensive aspect of the routine. The performative aspect, on the other hand, includes the 
series of actions that, broadly speaking, include reading, writing, thinking, discussing, and 
so on that taken together give shape to the ostensive aspect. Looking at the routine of 
writing a PhD thesis from the point of view of the structure of tacit knowing, it may be said 
that it comprises a focal target, namely, the final outcome (the thesis itself), and subsidiary 
particulars that include all of the actions and performances that will contribute to the 
outcome. As the process of writing the thesis unfolds, the researcher faces many 
breakdowns that may come from internal or external sources and their impact can vary in 
terms of severity and timing that they take place.  
In my case, for instance, writing was interrupted not only because of moments of 
breakdown that were triggered by my understanding of reading a particular research 
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paper or a book and the impact these had on my intellectual and thinking processes 
(internal factors), but also by moments whereby my health, family, and supervisory team 
influenced my performance at different stages of the process (external factors). It was 
only through heightened determination, increased mindfulness, and fixed attention to the 
focal target that I was able to complete the thesis within the given time frame (even though 
this had to be negotiated a few times). Yet, despite assurances by the supervisory team 
that this is a PhD in social sciences that eventually grants its author the title of a Doctor 
of Philosophy along with the unspoken acceptance of him/her as being a qualified 
researcher in the field of organization and management studies, its final outcome will be 
determined by fellow researchers who have not been involved in this thesis themselves 
but have been involved in their own routine of writing  and successfully defending their 
thesis some time ago (external and internal examiners). For these examiners, the 
performative aspect of the routine (e.g. writing, reading, discussing, etc.) becomes 
secondary in terms of importance as what really matters to them is whether the ostensive 
aspect is compatible, comparable, and in alignment with other PhD theses in the field. 
Conforming to ‘industry-wide standards’ of what the ostensive part of the routine is (or 
should be) determines whether this thesis is a PhD or not.  
On the other hand, the performative aspect of the routine is very much context-specific, 
or company-specific. How researchers write PhD theses, what breakdowns they 
encounter in the process, how they respond to these and move on (or not), depends very 
much on the individual, the context, the experience, and the ability of the researcher to 
remain mindfully aware of the ostensive aspect (i.e. becoming a Doctor of Philosophy). 
How people in a University understand the PhD writing routine is, too, based on their 
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assumptions, experiences, culture, and values within the particular setting (it is very 
different writing, completing, and defending a PhD thesis in the UK than it is in the UAE 
or in Pakistan). Therefore, seeing the performative aspect of the routine in isolation and 
away from its mutually constitutive ostensive aspect is like looking at knowing only in its 
subsidiary form without attention to its focal counterpart. As Feldman and Pentland (2003: 
102-103) suggested, both aspects are crucial in understanding a routine, just as in music 
“the ostensive part is…the musical score, while the performative part is the actual 
performance of the music”. Both need to be made aware to a participant who is involved 
in their execution for effectively carrying out a music-related routine. 
Feldman and Pentland (2003: 104) also argue that the ostensive and the performative 
part of routines can be seen in terms of Ryle’s (1949) distinction between ‘knowing that’ 
(ostensive) and ‘knowing how’ (performative). However, as it has been demonstrated in 
Chapter Three, Ryle sees knowledge as a spectrum where tacit (know-how) and explicit 
(know-that) knowledge are placed at opposite ends. For Polanyi, however, such a 
distinction cannot be sustained. These two forms of knowing are not separated but they 
must be viewed together as one shapes the other in a recursive manner.  For Polanyi, 
“all knowing is either tacit or it is rooted in tacit knowledge” (Polanyi, 1966: 7). It follows 
then that performative and ostensive aspects of routines cannot be separated; they are 
just the two sides of the same coin. They comprise of a ‘from-to’ structure – like the 
structure of tacit knowing: the performative aspect bears on a focus to which we attend 
from it, that is, the ostensive. A routine’s functional character is manifested on the 
enactment of performative aspects by relying on our awareness of them for attending to 
something else. We perform rebranding activities in order to accomplish rebranding; we 
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perform hiring and promotion activities in order to accomplish hiring and promotion (and 
accomplish these in particular ways).  
Changing one element of a routine or one whole aspect (e.g. performative) does not 
necessarily lead to changing the other. Overestimating the importance of the ostensive 
aspect leads to underestimating the importance of the adjustments and improvisations 
that people take to make the routine work (Feldman and Pentland 2003). Thus, ostensive 
and performative aspects of routines are recursively related whereby “performances 
create and recreate the ostensive aspect and the ostensive aspect constraining and 
enabling performances” (Feldman and Pentland 2003: 105). Such an understanding of 
the recursive relationship between ostensive and performative routines and the role of 
tacit knowing in the enactment and understanding of these aspects in organizational 
settings is a key component of practice-theoretical approaches in organization and 
management studies. 
Finally, it is important to underline how the methodological approach adopted in this thesis 
with its focus on breakdowns and critical incidents brought forward important insights in 
relation to ostensive and performative aspects of routines and the role of tacit knowing. 
The preceding discussion centers on how and why breakdowns play a crucial role in the 
enactment of routines and the structure of knowing in such a context. Breakdowns 
occurred not only because of changes in the environment but also because ongoing 
efforts to carry out effective decisions and actions were hindered and inconsistences were 
observed (Kaplan and Orlikowski 2013). We cannot understand routines if we do not 
recognize social customs and rules and the role that breakdowns play in individual 
learning and creativity (Farjoun et al 2015). However, breakdowns are not only 
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responsible for the interruption of progress in the engagement of organizational life. They 
can also be seen as generative in provoking a search for new interpretations and possible 
actions (Kaplan and Orlikowski 2013). Bearing this in mind, the focus on breakdowns as 
a theoretical and methodological tool should be acknowledged. The former is important 
in that it treats breakdowns as the norm in organizations rather than the exception 
(Whitford and Zirpoli 2014). The latter is also important because it offers methodological 
opportunities to study routines as during moments of breakdowns and interruptions 
participants are likely to engage mindfully and intelligently (Dionysiou and Tsoukas 2013; 
Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011) thus “enabling researchers to capture the surfacing of 
meanings and understandings” (Dionysiou and Tsoukas 2013: 200) of participants in 
routines. This has been possible with the use of the critical incident technique as a tool 
that enables ‘talk’ between the participants and the researcher where instances of 
breakdown were brought to the foreground for the analysis to take place. Therefore, 
rather than merely observing and informally discussing with participants in the context of 
routine performance, the value of reflective ‘talk’ has been particularly important. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUDING REMARKS AND 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
7.1 CONCLUSIONS 
When I embarked on this research I was primarily interested in tacit knowing, the process 
by which organizational actors learn to conduct their daily activities in organizational 
contexts. As time passed, I also became interested in organizational routines in which 
tacit knowing is said to constitute its foundational premise (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; 
Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville 2011; Pentland et al 2012). As Parmigiani and Howard-
Grenville (2011: 441) suggested, since routines, by their very nature, comprise of patterns 
of interdependent activities performed by multiple actors, they necessarily embody tacit 
knowledge. Interestingly, however, what role tacit knowing plays in the context of 
organizational routines has only been limitedly explored in the literature of organizational 
routines. One of the central themes in this literature is the so-called paradox between 
stability and change, or what Cohen (2007: 782) referred to as the “paradox of the (n)ever 
changing world”. Early scholarship viewed routines as stable, self-contained, and thing-
244 
 
like entities responsible for maintaining stability in organizational life. More recently, 
however, routines have been conceptualized as processes encompassing human action 
in the effort to accomplish particular tasks and are, therefore, sources of change. This 
difference in perspective is attributed to the level of analysis one takes to explain the 
paradox. Focusing on action and interaction in routines and the ways that they are 
enacted enforces the view that change is part of stability and stability is part of change 
(Feldman 2016). 
The question of how routines change (or fail to change) has attracted considerable 
attention by organizational scholars and various explanations have been provided. 
However, what has not been adequately addressed is the question of why routines 
change and what is the process that enables routines to change and, at the same time, 
maintain their stability in organizational contexts? In this research, I attempted to answer 
these two questions in the following way. As indicated earlier, when I started this inquiry 
I was concerned with tacit knowing and the ways that it manifests itself in people’s actions 
and practices. The tacit dimension of knowledge has been widely explored in organization 
and management studies literatures. Building implicitly or explicitly on the work of M. 
Polanyi (1962; 1966) these literatures underlie the importance of tacit knowledge in 
organizational settings and its significant role in the execution of effective business 
strategies.  
The concept of tacit knowledge gave credence to one of the most influential frameworks 
in the area of organization and management studies, namely, the resource-based theory 
of the firm. At the heart of the theory lays the concept of tacit knowledge which is viewed 
as the most significant resource possessed by an organization in its attempt to gain and 
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sustain competitive advantage (Barney et al 2011). In a similar way, the dynamic 
capabilities perspective also argues that the capability of the manager to make strategic 
decisions in terms of appropriate resource allocation is informed by (tacit) knowledge 
(Teece et al. 1997). At the heart of the capabilities perspective lays the concept of 
organizational routines but a clear distinction between the two (capabilities and routines) 
is not entirely apparent. Organizational routines are often regarded to be the ‘building 
block of capabilities’ (Dosi et al, 2008: 1167). Capabilities, in turn, from a more 
macro/organizational level, are often viewed as higher-level organizational routines 
(Teece 2007; Zollo and Winter 2002) or decision-making rules (Eisenherdt and Martin 
2000). From a micro/individual level, capabilities are interpreted as decision-making 
activities based on the skills of one or more entrepreneurial top managers (Helfat and 
Peteraf 2015). Therefore, if capabilities are conceptualized as routines, individual 
knowledge (and in particularly its tacit aspects) play a central role in the process of 
learning in organizational contexts. 
This is because every organizational routine has an inherent capability to generate 
change merely by its ongoing performance (Feldman and Pentland 2003). Routines are 
sources of endogenous change because of tacit knowing which evolves and continuously 
changes in its application (Becker 2004). The literature on routines highlights the fact that 
routine behavior is mainly rooted in the practical consciousness of individuals who 
participate in these and reflects routinized action. Actors in routines know tacitly about 
how to go on in the context of social life “without being able to give them discursive 
expression” (Giddens, 1984: xxiii). From this perspective, which builds on the premises 
of practice-theoretical approaches in social sciences, all social life is considered as being 
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mainly rooted in the routinized and largely unconscious processes which are connected 
to practical, tacit, or pre-reflective knowledge. This perspective helps us to see 
“organizations as systems of practices, existing in the world of tacit knowledge” (Gherardi, 
2000: 215).  
These insights provided the basis for a deeper exploration of the tacit. Building on the 
works of Polanyi (1962; 1966) and Collins (2010), it has been argued that tacit knowing 
comprises of the ability of an individual to effectively integrate (connect and re-connect) 
subsidiary particulars to focal targets. These integrations remain largely tacit if the 
activities that individuals engage in are performed without interruptions and disturbances. 
However, when practical activity becomes disrupted because of a breakdown (major or 
minor), participants begin to reflect on what they do and may perform the same action in 
a different way or perform different actions. It is in these moments, it is argued, that the 
process and structure of tacit knowing breaks down because the integration of subsidiary 
particulars that are tacitly used to attend to focal targets no longer suffices and need to 
be re-integrated. 
Hence, if we accept that tacit knowing is at the heart of routine action, it implies that any 
breakdown of the tacit will inevitably affect the routine actions that participants engage in. 
This is a particularly important insight that this research adds to the literature on routines 
as it places tacit knowing at the core of routine action. This conceptualization of the tacit 
has further implications on the structure of routines. It is widely accepted in the literature 
on routines that they are comprising of two recursive and mutually constitutive 
dimensions: (a) the ostensive dimension which represents the abstract description of 
organizational routines that contain both explicit (written instructions, standard operating 
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procedures, rules and policies, and so on) and tacit, collective understandings of how an 
activity should be performed; and (b) the performative dimension which represents the 
actual performances of organizational routines carried out by human actors as they 
create, maintain and modify the ostensive part. The specific interaction of these two 
dimensions of routines determines the degree to which routines can change, the extent 
to which they can be flexible, and the extent to which they can be transferred to other 
contexts (Feldman and Pentland 2003; Pentland and Feldman 2005).  
By definition, routines imply a stability of recurring action and therefore they have been 
linked to organizational stability for two main reasons: (a) when routine results are 
satisfactory and no alternative ways of problem solving can be identified, routines remain 
largely unchanged; and (b) since stability of routines allow for valuable feedback which 
may be used to assess changes, comparisons, and learning, sometimes such feedback 
may not be taken into consideration by performing agents. This, the literature suggests, 
can lead to the development of ‘defensive routines’ (Argyris 1990) which, in turn, can 
generate ‘competency traps’ (Levitt and March 1988) or ‘structural inertia’ (Hannan and 
Freeman 1984). From this perspective, as Feldman and Pentland (2003: 98) argued, 
“routines are seen as the antithesis of flexibility and change, locking organizations into 
inflexible, unchanging patterns of action” thereby emphasizing the effects of stability 
rather than change.  
How and why then routines change? Importantly, routines are linked to the fundamental 
role that learning plays in changing them. Learning, in turn, is closely associated to the 
structure of knowing, and in particular its tacit aspect which gets modified, amended, or 
changed in light of new experiences. But such change or modification in human 
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understanding does not happen automatically; the triggering mechanism responsible for 
instigating such change, I have argued in this thesis, are moments of breakdown in 
practical engagement of individuals involved in organizational routines. The literature on 
routines has highlighted a number of reasons for the performing actors to adapt and 
change organizational routines. For example, when existing routines do not produce the 
intended outcomes, or, as a result of existing routines, new problems occur and then have 
to be solved. What is missing from these accounts, however, is that the link between 
learning and changing or adapting organizational routines is a result of breakdowns in the 
structure of tacit knowing. Recently, Dittrich et al (2016) have acknowledged the role of 
reflection as the source of changing routines. However, in this research I emphasize that 
before reflection occurs, a breakdown has occurred, which allows for reflection to take 
place.  
Breakdowns operate in various ways and have different effects in the structure of tacit 
knowing. When they occur they disturb the ‘from-to’ structure of knowing in a more or less 
significant way. The subsidiary particulars which a person tacitly draws upon in order to 
attend to a particular task (or a focal target) become upset and thus need to be re-aligned 
before the actual performance can be carried out. In such instances improvisations and 
creativity may surface as the individual is attempting to effectively complete the routine 
he/she is engaged in. From riding bicycles and reading maps to performing customer 
services and hiring and promotion routines, the fundamental role breakdowns have in 
carrying on effectively the respective task has been explored and acknowledged. In 
instances of breakdown, action cannot move forward; it becomes the focus of attention 
itself where the individual performing it tries to understand what other courses of action 
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may be available for the performance to move forward. In organizational contexts, this 
takes the form of dialogue and talk with other individuals who are engaging in the same 
routine. Dialogue enables reflection and reflection is the source which enables routine 
action to change (Dittrich et al 2016).  
The quality of such reflection and the ability and willingness of the individual to question 
routinized action is what enables mindfulness in the enactment of routines. Mindfulness 
is what allows organizational practitioners to remain vigilant in sight of unexpected events, 
minimize errors and respond effectively to cues or potential breakdowns. High levels of 
mindfulness allow for the sustainability and consistency of effective routine performance 
because it fixes the attention to focal targets. Although mindfulness is grounded in 
individual behavior, it also builds on organizational mechanisms and therefore become a 
collective phenomenon. Collective mindfulness largely depends on communication which 
builds upon dialogue between or among organizational practitioners in sight of unusual 
experiences. Therefore, breakdowns can generate mindful behavior in organizational 
contexts. 
In order to research the role of tacit knowing in organizational routines this thesis is built 
on a methodology that draws upon ethnographic, dialogical, and inductive approaches to 
investigating social phenomena. From an interpretivist perspective, knowing is a social 
accomplishment which is manifested in sayings and doings of people in organized 
contexts. Similarly, from an interpretivist perspective, routines are conceptualized as 
practices in which patterns of action are their essential part and are enacted by people 
who are reflective of the actions that constitute them. Therefore, investigating the tacit in 
the context of doings and sayings of organizational actors requires methods that are 
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inductive and dialogic in nature such as participative inquiry (i.e. observations) and 
unstructured interviews (both formal and informal). Hence, building on interview data with 
a focus on critical incident technique and discussions in two public-owned UAE-based 
organizational settings, I attempted to identify how participants’ understandings altered or 
changed in light of novel organizational experiences when engaging in organizational 
routines.  This approach is consistent with recent work on organizational routines (Dittrich 
et al 2016) and the role of ‘talk’ or ‘dialogue’ in understanding the ways that routines 
change. 
What is presented in this thesis, of course, is not supposed to be considered as definitive 
or exhaustive. Instead, it is supposed to stimulate the reader’s interest in tacit knowing 
and its role in organizational routines and raise awareness on the importance of 
breakdowns as an integral and essential part of organizational life along with some 
suggestions regarding their relevance, application, and importance in our investigations 
of the tacit in the context of routines. Thus, nearing the end of this journey, it is hoped that 
four main contributions have been achieved in this thesis: 
1. Although investigating tacit knowing in organizational contexts is not essentially 
new, the connection between tacit knowing and organizational routines is a novel 
contribution of this thesis. It has been argued that it is the breakdown in the 
structure of tacit knowing (the integration of subsidiary particulars and focal targets 
by a person) that affects the performance of routines in a minor or major way. 
Additionally, the explicit focus on breakdowns as the triggering source of changing 
organizational routines represents another contribution of this thesis.  
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2. Another important area that this research has contributed to is the methodological 
attention on ‘talk’ (Dittrich et al 2016). Embracing the view that routines are 
practices enacted by individuals in social contexts and manifested in sayings and 
doings of routine participants, it follows that tacit knowing is (or, should be) at the 
core of any inquiry into the ways that routines change or fail to do so in 
organizations. Therefore, quite apart from observing routines and actors’ behavior 
in organizations (the ‘doings’ of routines) as an important aspect of understanding 
routine performance attention can be paid on the ‘sayings’ of routine participants 
as in this way we can delve deeper into participants’ understandings and reflective 
accounts of how and why things take place in one way rather than another. 
Therefore, in this thesis, such an attention to the ‘sayings’ of routine participants 
brought forward instances of breakdowns (deriving from narrated critical 
incidents); moments in organizational life in which participants became reflective 
inquires in their attempt to explain how and why things were done in one way rather 
than another; and this, it is argued in the thesis, is a novel methodological 
contribution. 
3. Another important contribution of this thesis is its empirical value in the sense that 
the focus on breakdowns in ongoing practical activity revealed the ways in which 
participants dealt with accidents, surprises and unusual organizational 
experiences. The ever-changing character of tacit knowing is manifested in 
disruptions of on-going activities and the task of the researcher is to identify these 
instances and bring them to the fore. This is what Salvato and Vassolo (2018) refer 
to as the meso-level of focus and analysis; not merely the micro/individual or 
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macro/organizational. There is something interesting and valuable in the notion of 
breakdowns as a way of forcing the familiar to become strange and that, in turn, to 
become again familiar. In these ‘turning points’, breakdowns can be seen as a 
useful research tool. In addition, the focus of the empirical work on two public UAE-
based organizations represents a novel insight on organizational settings that are 
not considered as ‘first choice’ for researchers of routines or tacit knowing. This 
thesis is, therefore, the first one to use empirical data deriving from Middle-Eastern 
organizational settings.  
4. The thesis also offers contributions to practitioners because the notion of 
breakdowns may be construed as vantage points whereby organizational 
participants’ activities can be reflected upon, reviewed, analyzed, re-assessed, 
and perhaps stimulate change. If practitioners take seriously the fact that 
breakdown do happen in organizational contexts and they are prepared to reflect 
upon these moments, then novel opportunities could be created, and new ways of 
doings and sayings may be established. This is beneficial for organizations overall 
as breakdowns that have been reflected upon and intentionally put forward may 
create the space for the emergence of dynamic capabilities. 
 
In the next section (7.2) I sketch out these contributions in more detail along with the 
limitations and implications of the research. Also, some directions for possible future 
research are considered in section 7.3. 
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7.2 THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE  
There are four main areas that this thesis is believed to have contributed to. These are 
classified as theoretical, methodological, empirical, and practical, and are presented in 
turn below. 
7.2.1 Theoretical Contributions 
 An important contribution of this thesis is the explicit link made between two 
literatures, namely, tacit knowing and organizational routines. In this research, it is 
argued that tacit knowing is a result of an unreflective, non-deliberate, invisible 
integration between a set of subsidiary particulars towards something they signify, 
that is, the meaning. Organizational routines are a result of interlinked habits 
characterized by sequential patterns of action based on the tacit understandings 
of routine participants. Routines, moreover, comprise of two aspects, namely the 
ostensive which consists of the abstract, collective, and generalized 
understandings of what the routine is or should be (for example what is or should 
be rebranding or customer services, or auditing) and the performative which 
consists of the actual performances of individuals when enacting routines 
(performing rebranding, customer servicing, and auditing in particular ways). 
Although the literature has acknowledged a close connection between tacit 
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knowing and routines, this has not been explored in any kind of detail. For example, 
Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville (2011) argued that routines necessarily embody 
tacit knowing because, by their very nature, they comprise of interdependent 
patterns of actors’ performances. Since action is at the heart of tacit knowing, it 
follows that the role of tacit knowing in organizational routines should be further 
explored. Thus, the current thesis extends the literature on routines and tacit 
knowing by making more explicit the way each one affects the other. In summary, 
if all knowing is manifested in actions, a person engaging in organizational routines 
integrates and re-integrates subsidiary particulars to focal targets with an intention, 
that is, for the purpose of achieving an outcome. Hence, performing customer 
services (the performative aspect of the routine) whereby an individual integrates 
subsidiary particulars (servicing customers in a timely and effective manner, 
reducing waiting times) is taking place for the purpose of servicing the customer in 
an effective (and efficient) way. This particular routine may be viewed and 
perceived differently depending on the context in which the routine takes place. 
 This leads to another contribution that this thesis is believed to have achieved. One 
of the central questions in the literature on routines is how routines change 
(Feldman 2003; Pentland et al 2012). Although the literature has provided a 
number of reasons that change in routines can be explained, the current study 
extends this literature by offering an explanation not only on how routines change 
but also why they do. I have argued that the triggering mechanism that allows for 
the change to take place is the experiencing of breakdowns in the structure and 
process of tacit knowing. Recently, Farjoun et al (2015: 10) acknowledged that in 
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order to understand (institutional) change, “one needs to appreciate the role of 
breakdowns in individual learning and creativity”. Since routines are the prime 
vehicle of organizational learning, any disturbance in the ways that organizational 
practitioners integrate subsidiary particulars can have an effect (major or minor) in 
the way that a routine is enacted or even understood in a specific context. When 
a breakdown occurs, the integration of subsidiary particulars and focal targets is 
no longer possible. In these moments, practitioners step back from their ongoing 
activity and become reflective in an attempt to find novel ways to move the activity 
forward and thus re-integrate subsidiary particulars and focal targets. This is then 
the mechanism that allows for routines to change. Therefore, although breakdowns 
are particularly useful phenomena when analyzing tacit knowing, they may be seen 
as non-desirable and they remain non-deliberate but still they are unavoidable and 
particularly important in bringing about change in organizational routines. 
Ambiguous happenings, conflicting interests, and tensions are all integral parts of 
organizational life and have the potential to turn our attention to the inherently 
creative nature of human action.  
 A third contribution of that this thesis is believed to have achieved relates to an 
apparent focus on the ‘meso-level’ of organizational routines in which interpersonal 
relationships among routine participants becomes the focus of attention and 
analysis. In a recent paper, Salvato and Vassolo (2018) developed a multi-level 
theory of Dynamic Capabilities that connects the micro/individual and 
macro/organizational level with a meso-level of interpersonal connections among 
organizational employees which allows understanding of how individual-level 
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action aggregates into firm-level Dynamic Capabilities by means of interrelated 
actions supported by productive dialogue. The authors argue that individual 
actions are not so much a product of cognition, habit, and emotions in isolation as 
existing literature suggests, but the integration of the three. In a parallel but similar 
way, in this thesis it is argued that breakdowns in the performative aspect of 
routines affect an individual’s integrations in three areas: (a) identities, roles and 
responsibilities, (b) relationships with others, and (c) the use of artifacts (objects or 
tools). When an individual’s engagement in routines is interrupted by a breakdown 
in any of these three areas, the individual engages in (critical) reflection which, with 
the assistance of dialogue with other organizational participants, can provide 
space for novel and creative action. A crucial element in this model is the role of 
dialogue which needs to be sustained among employees for performances to be 
kept flexible and constantly adjusted in order to adapt to changing conditions. 
 The thesis also confirms what Salvato and Vassolo (2018: 12), building on the 
work of Tsoukas (2009), referred to as ‘relational engagement’ (employees’ 
cooperative behavior aimed at promoting change) versus ‘calculative engagement’ 
(employees confining themselves to minimally cooperative behaviors) in which the 
quality of dialogue between managers and employees is the ‘glue’ that links 
together individuals and teams, teams and the organization. A focus on this meso-
level of organizational work with emphasis on the integrations of identities, roles 
and responsibilities, relationships with others, and the use of artifacts may be the 
mechanism through which the abilities of individuals to address change are 
transformed into a dynamic capability. Current conceptualizations of (dynamic) 
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capabilities portray them as firm-level entities premised on organizational routines 
(Helfat et al 2007; Helfat and Winter 2011). However, this macro-level view does 
not locate the source of creativity and innovation in them. For this reason, micro-
level approaches have emerged (Felin et al 2015; Helfat and Peteraf 2015) which 
although highlight the role of individual employees, do not adequately explain how 
firms develop an ability to change that goes beyond the skills of some top 
managers. By taking into account a more integrative view of organizational life in 
which the micro-, meso- and macro-levels are synthesized can provide 
researchers and practitioners with a comprehensive account of how and why 
change emerges from routinized actions. 
7.2.2 Methodological Contributions 
 An area that this thesis is believed to have contributed to relates to the 
methodological challenge of identifying and analyzing tacit knowing in 
organizational contexts. Taking account of the works of Tsoukas (and his 
colleagues) on tacit knowledge, this thesis has argued that to research such 
knowledge in organizational contexts one needs to pay more attention to 
breakdowns, accidents, and dialogue (Baralou and Tsoukas 2015; Sandberg and 
Tsoukas 2011; Shotter and Tsoukas 2014; Tsoukas 2011, 2009) as these are 
foundational aspects for understanding and researching the tacit. This is because 
knowledge in organizations is ‘complex’ (Tsoukas 2005) and for this reason we 
need to ‘complexify’ (Tsoukas 2005: 6) our theoretical and methodological 
explorations if we want to come closer to the study of how practitioners know, think, 
and act. This involves non-conventional modes of inquiry capable of 
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encompassing not only the creative nature of human action, but also its 
fundamental embeddedness in social practices. Thus, this thesis has been built on 
the premises of a subjectivist ontology (realities are emerging in the routines and 
improvisations of people), an interpretivist epistemology (findings are creative in 
order to understand how social reality emerges), and a dialogic, inductive 
methodology with a focus on narratives, storytelling, ethnography and unstructured 
interviews. It is believed that such a comprehensive methodological approach put 
forward in this thesis has the potential to surface participants’ tacit understandings 
and thus make them available for investigation and analysis.  
 Particularly in relation to the methodological framework employed in this thesis, 
unstructured interviews (with emphasis on critical incidents), and archival company 
data were utilized with a view to understanding and probing the innerness of those 
who participate in organizational routines. Routines are, on occasions, disrupted 
and break down and it is in these moments that the researcher can get a ‘grip’ on 
how to theorize and approach tacit knowing. Such methodological framework is 
consistent with recent works on routine dynamics (Feldman et al 2016) which 
views actors as knowledgeable and often reflective when participating in routines. 
But how can this knowledgeability and reflection be investigated and understood 
in organizational contexts? The answer lies in the concept of ‘dialogue’ or ‘talk’ as 
the prime vehicle by which organizational members can discuss their ‘lived 
experiences’ as these derive from their engagement with organizational processes 
and routines. This presupposes that the researcher is actually present on site as 
an ‘eyewitness’ of organizational experience and attempts to understand how and 
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why people act in the way they do. Without disruptions or breakdowns in activity, 
participants remain absorbed performers and carry it out without the need to 
change or alter an action. If, however, organizational life is disrupted by a 
breakdown – and more often than not, it does – the researcher and the researched 
can become reflective inquirers and begin to discuss the reasons and causes of 
the disruption and the subsequent actions that led to alternative outcomes. This is 
particularly useful because organizations have rarely been seen as disruptive, 
controversial, and discontinuous but always flawless and largely unproblematic. 
The empirical work in this thesis has demonstrated that knowledge is always found 
resting upon a thin line of balance and imbalance, continuity and discontinuity, 
availability and unavailability and it can only be studied as a process that is 
constantly in motion whereby surprises, controversies, accidents, and errors are 
part of its very existence.   
 A salient contribution of this thesis has been the focus on breakdowns as a 
methodological tool affording a different angle in our inquiries into tacit knowing. 
Besides their theoretical value which has been explored in Chapter Three, 
moments of breakdown can be conceived of as ‘turning points’ for individuals who 
participate in organizational events. This is because participants who experience 
breakdowns can become reflective and therefore provide the opportunity to 
deconstruct and reconstruct the meanings embedded in routines, relationships, 
responsibilities, roles, and so on. The use of breakdowns as a methodological tool 
has recently been acknowledged and employed by a number of organizational and 
management studies scholars (see, for example, Austin et al 2012; Cornelissen 
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2012; Garud et al 2011; Jordan 2010) as it affords obtaining different vantage 
points from where researchers can identify, research, and describe organizational 
experience. Additionally, the methodological framework developed in this thesis is 
grounded on a specific context and the experiences of breakdown remain unique 
for each individual participant in this study. However, the three areas of breakdown 
proposed here may be generalized and applied to different organizational contexts. 
7.2.3 Empirical Contributions 
 An important contribution of this thesis is the utilization of the critical incident 
technique as a method of interviewing participants who experience salient 
moments in their engagement in organizational life. In line with recent contributions 
in organizational literature (Cornelissen 2012; Jordan 2010; Leitch et al 2010; 
Mantere et al 2012; Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011) that acknowledge the utility and 
usefulness of the technique, a focus on critical incidents has the capacity to bring 
forward salient moments, thought processes, frames of reference and feelings 
about an incident (or a set of incidents) which participants ascribe particular 
meaning to (Chell 2004). The technique, building upon interview accounts provided 
by participants in the form of stories, conveys failures, achievements, and 
memorable episodes in one’s organizational engagement. To this extent, interview 
accounts may facilitate social interaction as they protect collective understandings, 
raise the level of sense of shared identities, and become the repository of tacit 
knowledge. The task of the researcher is, therefore, to describe in detail how 
organizational members make sense of all those ambiguous or critical experiences 
in an attempt to get as close as possible to their tacit understandings. Additionally, 
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the technique can be used in investigations of organizational routines (it has not, 
yet, been utilized in that literature) whereby researchers can get closer to 
understanding how novel actions emerge and how and why routines may change 
(or not). 
 Another area in which this thesis has contributed to is the particular organizational 
setting that it has been carried out. To-date, research in organization and 
management studies in general and organizational routines in particular derive 
their findings from organizational settings operating in developed countries 
(typically US- or Europe-based). This is one of the first studies to concentrate on 
a Middle-Eastern context and particularly the UAE which is considered one of the 
most advanced, economically developed, and politically stable countries in the 
middle of an unstable and troubled region. The particular research setting is also 
interesting for one further reason. The two sites (company ‘M’ and company ‘R’) 
are large public organizations with complex operations that serve different sectors 
within the wider Emirate community. Access to and research in such a 
‘prototypical’ setting (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007) provides a unique 
opportunity for a rare glimpse into the day-to-day activities of organizational life 
that would normally remain inaccessible to researchers. 
7.2.4 Contributions to Practice 
 This research has made a contribution towards practice with its emphasis upon 
the notion of breakdowns in organizational life. The notion of breakdowns is an 
invitation for reflection upon practitioners’ lived experiences that they possess but 
not as yet attended to. Emphasis on critical incidents in organizational life may 
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stimulate a whole new range of possibilities to be explored, capabilities to be found, 
learning to take place, and a wide range of opportunities to be envisioned. Change 
in routines is possible and indeed desirable because when people face 
breakdowns they become reflective of what they do and may decide to do things 
differently. Through creative and productive dialogue people are given an 
opportunity to think, act, and feel creatively about performed tasks, thus 
envisioning opportunities to improve how the organization operates (Salvato and 
Vassolo 2018). Managers and firms can learn to recognize that breakdowns form 
a valuable and inseparable element of knowledge creation and must therefore 
develop contexts that facilitate dialogue and enhance a firm’s capacity for change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
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No research is, of course, without limitations. The approach developed and implemented 
in this thesis should be viewed as a particular point of view and the findings presented 
should not be seen as complete or exhaustive. This is because the limitations 
acknowledged below can be presented as opportunities and directions for future 
research. 
 The three areas of breakdown in the structure of tacit knowing, that is, the 
breakdown in the process of tacitly integrating subsidiary particulars and focal 
targets in relation to identities, roles, responsibilities, relationships and artifacts, 
have been identified in this thesis as salient features of explaining why routines 
change. However, the interaction and inter-relationship of these features has not 
been examined in any detail. Future research may build on the three areas of 
breakdown identified in this thesis and explore how these relate with one another 
and influence the ways in which routines are performed and understood in practice. 
Future research may explore in more detail how organizational structures and 
culture interact with one another and affect the ways in which routines emerge, 
stabilize, and/or change in light of salient endogenous and exogenous events 
(Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville 2011; Salvato and Rerup 2018). 
 Although the thesis is built on evidence from two organizational settings, one still 
needs to be careful when attempting to generalize these findings. The focus of the 
present study has been on the retrospective accounts of critical organizational 
experiences (translated in terms of breakdowns) of a set of particular participants 
across two research settings. These accounts may be qualitatively different from 
those that other participants in other areas of the organization may provide 
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because of differences in their respective roles, responsibilities, experiences, and 
power. However, it is felt that the present findings can be used for ‘naturalistic 
generalizations’ (Cornelissen 2012: 134) whereby one recognizes similarities 
between the findings of this research and other ‘cases’, particularly if these are 
compared with evidence deriving from other government-based organizations 
based in UAE. An interesting avenue for future research may also examine how 
the present findings compare or contrast with evidence from private entities in the 
specific country or with other entities in Europe and the USA.  
 The inquiry conducted in this thesis calls for a shift in the research focus from the 
micro/individual level and/or the macro/organizational level towards the everyday 
nature of managerial action or what Salvato and Vassolo (2018) refer to as the 
meso (or interpersonal) level of everyday interaction. This provides researchers 
with an opportunity to investigate social accomplishments that are fluid and 
changing and how their effectiveness varies across time and across firms. 
Additionally, more research in needed to understand the interactions of these three 
levels in an attempt to capture the process by which individual actions influence 
interpersonal relations which in turn generate change in routines and capabilities.  
 
As a final thought in this thesis, I close with a quote from M. Polanyi (1969: 134) which I 
believe captures the process developed and presented in this thesis and will be likely to 
occupy much of my future intellectual explorations: “If an act of knowing affects our choice 
between alternative frameworks, or modifies the framework in which we dwell, it involves 
a change in our way of being” (Polanyi, 1969: 134). 
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